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MANUAL OF
OUT-POST DUTIES
BY LORD FREDERICK
FITZCLARENCE.







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A
MANUAL
OF
OUT-POST DUTIES

BY **LIEUT.-GENERAL**
LORD FREDERICK FITZCLARENCE, G.C.H.,
COLONEL OF THE 36TH REGIMENT;

TO WHICH ARE ADDED

I. LETTERS ON OUT-POST DUTIES,

ADDRESSED TO HIS LORDSHIP
BY SEVERAL DISTINGUISHED OFFICERS.

II. EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL ORDERS,

SHOWING THE DISPOSITION OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S OUT-POSTS
FROM 1810 TO 1814.

III. A PRIVATE JOURNAL

OF GENERAL CRAFTURD'S OUT-POST OPERATIONS
ON THE COA AND AGUEDA IN 1810, BY
MAJOR-GENERAL SHAW KENNEDY, C.B.

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INTRODUCTION.

To LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR ALEX. WOODFORD,
G.M.G., K.C.B., *late Commanding Cold-
stream Guards, and* COLONEL J. P. HUNT,
C.B., *late Commanding 52nd and 11th
Regiments.*

My dear old Friends and late Commanding Officers,
Permit me to dedicate this little Work to
you, as a small tribute of gratitude for the instruc-
tions in my military duties, which I first received
from you, and in token of the high respect which,
in common with all who have ever had the honor
and happiness of serving under your orders, I
entertain towards you.

Your example and kindness gave me that love for
my profession, which, I am happy to say, increases
rather than diminishes, after thirty-seven years'
service. To you I am deeply indebted for having
taught me the grammar of my profession; and to
that elementary tuition, which you so properly
insisted on, do I consider that I owe whatever
knowledge I may possess of the military duties,
which enabled me to command two regiments with,

I hope, some little credit to myself, and, I trust, with advantage and happiness to those under my orders.

You have seen the *practical working* of the system I now place before the military public, and will perceive that my little book is compiled entirely from the various *English* authors who have written on Out-post Duties. I lay great stress on the word, "*English*," as I am convinced that the officers of our service are as capable of becoming good Out-post Officers as any in the world, provided they will only give their minds and time to that study. As a proof of this, the perfection of the Light Division, and of the XIIth, XIVth, and XVIth Light Dragoons, is most manifest, and the list of English authors* I have given in the body of the book (*vide* p. 45,) shows

* This list could easily have been extended by the introduction of a number of English books on Out-post Duties, which are out of print: as, for example, *Hints for the Consideration of Officers in Command of Detachments and Picquets on Service*, by Captain Glasse, and General Sontag's *Hints for Non-commissioned Officers on Actual Service*. After the following pages were in press, and arranged for publication, Sir Charles Napier most kindly gave me a copy of the latter little work—a book Sir John Moore insisted on all his Officers possessing, and which should never have been suffered to become scarce. My publishers, however, have undertaken to reproduce it as one of a series of practical works, to be issued from time to time at a very moderate cost, in order to bring them within the means of the Non-commissioned Officers of the army.

the theory is perfectly understood, but, I grieve to say, it is now *seldom, if ever*, practised in the army. It is, therefore, with the view of inducing officers commanding regiments to instruct those under their orders, that I have drawn up this Manual, in such an easy form, that all may comprehend the theory and practice of Out-post Duty; and to do away with the false impression entertained by military men on the Continent, that we are obliged to have foreigners to act as our Out-post troops. I quote what Decker, one of the most modern German authors, says when writing of the English: "Les Anglais conservent encore leur système suranné et ridicule d'avant-postes, et ils n'ont qu'une idée fort imparfaite de ce genre de service. C'est aussi pour ce motif que dans la guerre d'Espagne ils n'y ont employé exclusivement que les troupes allemandes à leur solde." — *La Petite Guerre*, par C. DECKER, Major de l'Etat-Major, Général Prussien.

This was true in 1793 and 1798, and also, I believe, in the first years of the Peninsular War, but was altered and rectified after the first or second campaign. In my humble opinion, no officer or man should go on active service who is not, to a certain degree, an instructed soldier, as is the case in the French, Prussian, and, indeed, in all the continental services; and no officer can be considered as efficient who is not acquainted with the various

duties requisite to be known on outlying picquet. No one can doubt that the place to learn is not *before* an enlightened and well-instructed enemy, but *previously*, at least as far as theory can teach. I believe I am thoroughly borne out in this remark, by the letters I have received from the distinguished officers who have been so kind as to permit me to publish them in this little Work. Am I wrong in saying that officers and men should be acquainted with every thing that might be required of them on service—tenting, throwing up field works, hutting, marching, cooking, &c., and not have to learn them under fire, a burning sun, or soaking rain? You have taught me that such should not be the case. Is it not, therefore, a pity that some few weeks of the exercising time should not be devoted to acquiring this knowledge, (as in all foreign services,) instead of everlastingly marching round a barrack square, learning little, and boring everybody? You will see that in my endeavours to obtain as much valuable information as possible, I wrote to Sir William Napier, who was so kind as to favor me with an introduction to General Shaw Kennedy whose name is so well known to most military men. He, in the most liberal and kind manner, besides writing me a most instructive letter, sent me his Journal of the transactions between the Coa and the Agueda in 1810, when attached

to Major-General Craufurd, then in command of the Light Division; a period as interesting as any during that eventful and glorious War of the Peninsula, particularly as relating to Out-post Duties. It was my wish to have placed the Journal at the beginning of the book as I deduce from it so many instances of facts in the Catechism, but the Major-General's great diffidence would not permit this; it is, therefore, at his desire, placed at the end of the Manual, and, (I must remark,) as a Sovereign at his coronation, being the *greatest*, walks the last.

This Journal will, I am sure, be read with the greatest gratification by military men, as it shows how the Out-post Duties were really carried on for a period of six months against an active enemy, by English troops, commanded by a most zealous and intelligent officer, under great difficulties. I say English troops, for the infantry was nearly all composed of those gallant corps, the old Rifles, LIInd, and XLIIIRD, never, however, forgetting the Hussars of the German Legion—under Col. Arentschildt and my old friend Kraukenberg—with whom I had the good fortune to become acquainted in 1817, when I went to Hanover. I was there attached to the Hanoverian Guards, and then learnt the Out-post Duties as practised by that army, before it had in the least forgotten, by a lengthened peace, that knowledge which it had brought to perfection

in actual war. Nothing could be more simple than the rules taught to the young Hanoverian officers ; nothing more strictly attended to. All the officers of other armies declared the system perfect ; and from them the Prussians took theirs, which I saw put in force in 1825 and 32, when I was with that army during the large manœuvres under the late King of Prussia. Particular as the Prussians were in placing their Picquets of cavalry and infantry, I consider the Hanoverians were much more generally instructed in that branch of their profession. There was a union of action between the Picquets of the cavalry and infantry that made them one. It appeared as if the ideas of the officers of these different arms were cast in the same *military* mould. Nothing could exceed the quiet workmanlike way in which the officers of the Jager Guard under Colonel Bush, and the Grenadier Guard under Colonel Baring, took up their ground, and the instruction given to the young soldiers, who appeared to be most apt and willing scholars, was most excellent.

I have also seen the Austrians acting as Out-post. Their system is much the same as the Prussian, only they employ as a rule more men and horses, which, according to our principles, is an error. I have been several times with the French army, and have paid much attention both to the theory and practice of their system of in-

struction, which is now brought to a great state of perfection; but nothing can surpass the Hanoverian method and routine.

You will see that I have inserted the Duke of Wellington's Orders, as published by Sir G. Murray, which are very instructive and most interesting, given out as they were for placing his Out-posts in actual contact with the enemy.

It was my intention to have entered more fully, in this dedicatory letter, into the different systems as taught and practised by the continental armies; and other subjects as connected with our own, but being obliged to hurry on my publication, before I leave for Madeira, where I go to accompany my daughter, and my mind being much engrossed by anxiety on her account, I am forced to come to a more abrupt conclusion than I should otherwise have done.

Should I, however, hereafter be able to find time to enlarge this letter, (which then might touch on many subjects connected with the possible amelioration of our service,) I hope you will permit me to address myself again to you.

I therefore now, under your patronage, and the support of General S. Kennedy's Letter and Journal, and of those distinguished officers who have so much assisted me in my humble endeavours, place this little Work before the military world, praying it may be of use to the Young, and not

totally uninteresting to the Old Officers, who, by their gallantry in the field, have brought a system to perfection, which, to a certain degree, can be learnt in time of peace*.

God bless you, my dear old friends.

Pray believe me,

Your most sincere, true, and grateful friend,

FREDERICK FITZCLARENCE.

*Government House, Portsmouth,
1st October, 1851.*

* *Vide* SIR C. NAPIER, COLONEL LEACH, and SIR H. SMITH's *Letters to Lord F. Fitzclarence*.

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LETTERS ON OUT-POST DUTIES

ADDRESSED TO

LORD FREDERICK FITZCLARENCE.

From Lieut.-Gen. Sir H. G. W. Smith, Bt., G.C.B.

London, 11th September, 1847.

My dear Lord Frederick,

I have carefully perused the Memorandum you have complimented me by submitting for remarks. I do not see how I can improve it.

Leach's book on Out-Posts is very good; and Captain Jebb's work is the most practical and useful work on the Art Military I know.

Ever faithfully,

H. G. SMITH.

Letters from Colonel Leach, C. B.

Worthing, 17th February, 1848.

Dear Lord Frederick,

I have read with great pleasure and much attention your lordship's instructions relative to Picquet Duties; and I consider them so very clear and explicit, that Officers who cannot understand and carry them into effect, must be exceedingly stupid.

One of the greatest disadvantages under which British troops labour, (that part of them, at least, on home

service,) is the extreme difficulty of procuring ground sufficiently extensive on which the duties of the Outposts can be practised and fully explained to those uninitiated in them.

I have always been a strong advocate for the system of Attack and Defence; or, in other words, for *Sham-fights*; and I first caught the infection, some forty years ago, from a most intelligent and excellent Outpost Officer, the late Sir Sidney Beckwith, who commanded the first battalion of my old corps for many years.

He frequently sent out two or three companies to occupy a chain of posts, and attacked them with the remainder of the battalion. We were generally much cramped for ground, but we did the best we could; and I have never seen any kind of field exercise that excited and interested officers and soldiers half so much as those sham-fights, or from which such real information could be obtained. I would strongly recommend the expenditure of a few rounds of blank cartridge on such occasions, as it tends to give all hands a far better idea of a warm skirmish than can be obtained without it.

Whenever it is *practicable*, (which is not always the case,) the *supports* to the Picquets—as you have directed in your letter of instruction—should be placed under cover, for it is always highly desirable to save the men from unnecessary exposure to the weather; but, *coûte qui coûte*, I think the supports should *invariably* be near enough to the Picquets to render them *immediate assistance if attacked*; and if houses, barns, &c., are sufficiently near, I would by all means put the

supports into them, ready, however, to turn out at one moment's notice.

With your directions to the Officers, "that the *supports*, when sufficient men cannot be procured, must be imaginary," I entirely agree; for, by *extending* ten or twelve men only, (formed in a single rank,) with an interval of a dozen or more paces between each man, ground enough may thus be covered to show a respectable front.

Many years ago I published a letter in the *Naval and Military Gazette* on "Sham-fights;" and I endeavoured to point out in what manner two or three hundred men might be made to represent ten times that number. I really think that in these days, when a mere handful of men only can be scraped together, a plan of the kind might be advantageously adopted.

I would offer a short remark on that part of your letter which supposes the Right or Left of a Picquet to be *en l'air*, and I will state an instance of the kind which once happened to my own Picquets in the Peninsula.

At the end of the tenth day of constant fighting, marching, and scuffling with Soult's army in the Pyrenees in the summer of 1813, the Light and 7th Divisions arrived on their ground after nightfall, and I had charge of the Picquets of Sir James Kempt's brigade.

The Sentries of the two armies at this point were within musket-shot of each other. The Left of my Picquets communicated with the other brigade of the Light Division; but my *Right* was in every sense of the word, *en l'air*, for the *nearest* Picquet of the 7th

Division (which bivouacked on the side of a mountain on our right) was a full half-mile distant; and a valley, which separated the two Divisions ran at right angles to the extreme right of my Picquet, and from thence down to the foot of the French advanced posts.

I sent an Officer to the Left Picquet of the 7th Division to explain that I would extend my chain of Sentries half-way towards *him*, provided *he* would make a similar extension towards *my Right*, and thus keep up the communication between us. The Officer commanding it refused to move without orders, and I therefore pushed a chain of double Sentries some way down the valley, which chain ran at *right angles with my extreme Right*, and thus guarded it from the approach of the French up the valley, who, had they done so without being thus watched, might have attacked the right of Kempt's brigade in its bivouac.

Whether the 7th Division took similar precautions I know not; but if they omitted to do so, it is clear enough that their Left must have been totally unguarded all that night.

I know not, if, in this long explanation, I have made myself understood, but I hope I have done so.

The instruction you have laid down in the "Skeleton Drill," wherein the Officer is to observe on coming to his ground what Posts would be easiest to hold in case of being compelled to retreat, is most essential; and it is of paramount importance, therefore, that he should be well acquainted with the bridges, rivers, the *fords* across them, the defiles, narrow roads, &c., &c., lying in his line of retreat.

If those in power could be persuaded how very essential it is for every Officer of Infantry and Cavalry to be well conversant with those most interesting duties, it cannot be doubted that the general efficiency of our army would be materially increased; and I sincerely hope the day is not far distant when such will be the case.

I am anxious and curious to know what the nature of the plan is which will be laid before Parliament very soon as to our National Defences. I hope the militia will be put on a proper footing, or an army of reserve formed.

Believe me, dear Lord Frederick,
Very truly and faithfully yours,
J. LEACH.

Worthing, 4th June, 1848.

My dear Lord Frederick,

The hard pulling horse and the rain which was falling when we reached the *First* or *Left* Picquet, occupied too much of my attention; and I fear that we passed that Post (and perhaps some others) without having examined the ground as minutely as might have been desirable.

As well as I can carry the thing in my mind's eye, it strikes me that the *main body of the Left Picquet*, instead of being placed at the *base* of the hill (on the *summit* of which were its double Sentries), would have been more advantageously posted, had it been advanced somewhat *nearer the brow*; but the two Sentinels could not, I think, *during the day*, have been better placed than where you directed; for I conclude that the eye

ranges from thence over a great extent of country. At *night*, however, a party might be sent under a non-commissioned officer very nearly to the summit; from whence I would push the double Sentries some way down the hill in front. This little detachment would thus keep up the communication between the main body of the Picquet and the advanced Sentries, and be at hand to give immediate support to the latter if attacked.

On that ridge, I conceive as obstinate a stand as possible should be made, and for this reason:—

If I recollect rightly, the *Second* Picquet to which we came, was considerably farther from Winchester (which we suppose to be either an extensive cantonment or a defensive position taken up by the army) than the one alluded to; and, therefore, if an enemy advanced rapidly and in force by the road on which the *Left* Picquet was posted, and did not receive a considerable *check* from it, so as to enable *No. 2* Picquet and the chain of Posts extending from *its Right* up to the summit of the hill, to *fall back*, *No. 2* would, in all probability, be cut off from Winchester, as would also some of the Posts on its right.

The left Picquet ought to be a strong one, for various reasons:—First, to enable it to make a good stand, if attacked: Secondly, to allow of its furnishing at *night* a sufficient number of men to communicate with the chain of sentries of *No. 2*: and, Thirdly, to admit of a small party under a non-commissioned officer, being posted on the road running from the rear of *No. 1* to the main body of *No. 2*; thus keeping up a ready communication with each other.

Two or three dragoons attached to each Infantry Picquet in almost every description of country, and especially in one so open as that in question, would be of inestimable value; for intelligence could be transmitted by them with great rapidity from Post to Post, and accompanied by a sharp, clever, mounted Officer with a telescope, the ground could be reconnoitred at much greater distances, both in front and on the flanks, than it would be advisable to attempt doing with infantry. So strongly am I convinced of the vast utility of having a few Cavalry attached to Infantry Picquets generally, that I believe it would be good policy to have a certain number of light, active, intelligent men of *every Regiment of Infantry* taught how to ride sufficiently well for the purposes of patrolling, and to understand also something of the management of horses.

I have known instances where even a couple of mounted soldiers would have been exceedingly useful in communicating rapidly from the advanced Infantry Picquet to the rear, and in obtaining information by patrolling to the front and flanks.

My notion is, that as *No. 2* and the chain of Posts extending from its right up the hill, occupied the *convex*, and consequently, the *most distant* part of the cordon of Posts from Winchester, they ought, on hearing the *Left Picquet* (or indeed, *any Picquets nearer than themselves* to Winchester) attacked warmly, to fall back towards the point menaced:—First, because they would be a valuable reinforcement, and might enable a check to be put, *FOR A TIME*, to the enemy's advance:—Secondly, because if they *failed* to retire in

time from the convex part of the cordon, they must be cut off from Winchester. I am, however, supposing that the enemy is advancing by one road only; but were he to move on by *all the roads simultaneously* which lead to Winchester, each Picquet would, of course, have enough to do in its own immediate front; and when obliged to retreat, they ought to keep up a good communication with those on their Right and Left, and conform to the movements of each other as far as possible.

My imperfect knowledge of the ground, and our somewhat rapid passage over it, may have given me an erroneous view of those Posts; and to explain more fully what I mean, you will greatly oblige me by looking into my little book, at page 32, paragraphs in that page Nos. 2 and 3.

Although *no river* flows in front of the line of Posts which you took up beyond Winchester, the case which, in my book, I have *supposed* to exist, is pretty nearly a parallel one, as it shows that bridges, fords, roads, and defiles which are *nearest* to the Position, covered by the Advanced Posts, ought to be obstinately defended, with a view of allowing time to those occupying the convex, and consequently, more distant points, to effect their retreat in proper time.

As an example of the dangerous error of a Picquet *shutting itself up* in a building, or in any other stronghold, unless it is intended that the said house or stronghold shall be supported by a strong body, and be considered as part of a position intended to be permanently defended, I will merely mention, that on the *plain* in front of Craufurd's Position at the Coa, was a

little conical mound or hillock, covered with rocks ; and to this hillock he sent a Subaltern and fifteen or twenty men of my old corps. As Ney's Cavalry approached our Position, they were not so unwise as to ride up to a rocky hill, where our Riflemen could not be got at by Cavalry, and from whence the fire of our men would have been deadly, each man resting his rifle on a rock : the French very naturally cantered *round the flanks* of the conical hill, and cut them off ; the consequence of which was, that my gallant brother Officer and all his men were made prisoners. We all *foretold* that such must inevitably be the result.

Believe me, my dear Lord Frederick,
Most faithfully yours,
J. LEACH.

Letters from Gen. Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B., &c., &c.

17th February, 1849.

My dear Lord Frederick,


Your little Work will prove very useful. It teaches what all ought to know, and very few do know. Many Commanding Officers do not teach. They forget that it is an important part of their duty. Young men, on joining their Regiments, have all the temptations in the world to pleasure ; none to study ; and they some day find themselves compromised on service from want of knowledge, not of talent. Now I may safely say that your little Book, in a few pages, gives as much

information on the ordinary duties of an Officer commanding a Picquet, as he would collect from reading several *books*. He will not read the books. They would interfere with wine, women, race-horses, shooting; so he goes "FAST," and remains ignorant! Now, a short, simple pamphlet (aye, even the *Plans alone*) like yours, gives him knowledge, *selected*, and interferes with none of his amusements; and if he be sent out on Picquet, he will not get surprised, though he may not have read much as an Officer. It is quite true, that Service alone makes a finished Out-post Officer; but to say that preparation in theory is not also necessary, is to strike at education altogether. What are Military Colleges for? But I go farther than the Ensign; I think many *Lieut.-Colonels* will learn from your little book what they do not know. It is very wrong, but it is true, that one-half of them do not *teach* because they do not *know*, and are too lazy to learn! These sort of men will read a little work of this kind, which, without trouble, arranges their own confused ideas for them. They no longer fear to venture in the field to teach; and, as they must have more or less of experience, it all comes into play. I therefore do think this little book will be very useful to all readers.

I have made one or two pencil notes, as you desired me, or I should not have taken the liberty to do so.

The Circular Kitchens are the best kind. Your lordship has no doubt seen them. A circular trench is dug, about two feet deep; the earth thrown to the centre to form a mound, leaving a berm, and into this berm you

cut niches for the pots and fires. The pots being hung thus, on the sticks *aa*, the mound of earth protects



them from the wind, especially if covered with furze or brushwood. I fear that my explanation is not clear. There is an order about these Circular Kitchens in the Quarter-Master General's office, and a plan of them, or was, some thirty years ago.

Believe me to be,

My dear Lord Frederick,

Your obliged,

C. NAPIER.

50, Upper Berkeley Street,
24th February, 1849.

My dear Lord Frederick,

Your letter of 20th followed me here. I came up to an investiture. This will account for my not immediately answering.

Pray make any use of the remarks which I presumed to make that you please. I am delighted that you approve of the remarks I made, because I always feel nervous at making notes on another man's works, on which he has fixed his attention. One is more apt to do harm than good, and especially when one is not well. The man whose mind is given to the subject at the

time, is more likely to be right than the casual reader. However, as your lordship concurs in the little alterations I made, I hope they are right.

Believe me to be,

My dear Lord Frederick,

Yours faithfully,

C. NAPIER.

From M.-General Sir William Napier, K.C.B., &c.

Scinde House, Clapham,
September 25th, 1850.

My dear Lord Frederick,

Yesterday I was quite beaten; to-day I am stronger; and while you wait for General Shaw Kennedy's information, I will give you one Picquet affair which happened to myself.

When Craufurd occupied Gallegos and Espeja, which place you will find on my little plan in 3rd Volume, Plate IX*, he had Picquets of Cavalry at Carpio, and a chain of cavalry forts from Carpio along the woody heights lining the Azava, connecting it with an Infantry Picquet at Marialva. The woods were there a prize; and from Carpio to Marialva we could see over an open plain to Ciudad Rodrigo, then besieged by Massena. The French often menaced us, and the affair was very critical; but Craufurd had beacons and videttes at openings in the woods, so that no movement could be made, except at night, without a signal

* See Plan facing page 405, vol. ii. of the new edition of Sir William Napier's *History of the War in the Peninsula*.

being given to the brigades in Gallegos and Espeja. There were various signals. The horsemen mounted, and riding once round a beacon indicated a movement: for example,—twice round, large bodies of cavalry; three times round, advancing; vidette on foot moving round, indicated infantry; and so on. I am not sure that these are correct, but that was the system. The ford you see on the left over the Agueda below the junction of the Azava, we watched, but only with sentries hidden at some distance, because at first we did not know if the French were aware of it, and we did not wish to point it out. There was a house at Marialva, and a very little hillock on the left of it, and the Bridge of Marialva was behind. One day I had just taken the Picquet of two Companies, a Rifle Company and the 43rd Company, when a very large body of cavalry were descried coming towards us, followed by some infantry. The orders were at that time to fight with the Picquet until the Brigade got under arms, as the General designed to defend the Bridge of Marialva. I did not like the appearance of a great body of cavalry who could ride round me and get at the bridge, so I sent off the Rifles to the ford below on the left, placed some men in the windows of the Picquet's house, and with the rest in a very short time threw up with our bayonets, and hands, and bill-hooks, a tambour round the hillock, of about two feet high, and I made the men lie down and only show their heads and muskets above, as if we were behind a high rampart. The thing took, the French cavalry stopped, looked at us, and went back. My brother Charles went in soon after with a flag of truce about his

exchange, and the French officers were very inquisitive under the guise of quizzing about the *great work* we had thrown up at Marialva. You will see from all this that we depended chiefly on our rapidly getting under arms, more than on the Picquets. The Alarm Post was then on a hill behind Gallegos for the baggage, and a quarter of an hour sufficient to place it there loaded, day or night; as *seven minutes* will have put the Brigade in motion towards Marialva.

Believe me, yours most respectfully,

W. NAPIER.

Further Letters from Colonel Leach.

Worthing, 22nd December, 1850.

My dear Lord Frederick,

Believe me, I am very much gratified at the assurance your lordship gives me that you agree with me in my views relative to muskets and target practice.

Having much idle time on my hands, I have frequently offered opinions and suggestions on various points connected with a profession, for which, although I have left it, I retain the liveliest interest; and in doing so, I have been actuated by *one motive only*, which is, an ardent hope that some of my suggestions may prove worthy of being considered by those at the helm of affairs.

When a regiment is *perfect* in all its movements, and can perform with the utmost precision and celerity the few manœuvres that ever can be attempted under an enemy's fire, (and I feel well satisfied that *they are but few*,) there are several other points of paramount

importance; and to those, amongst many others, I am very glad to perceive you have turned your serious attention.

The first is, that of lessening by every practicable means the *awfully* heavy load carried in the field by our infantry: the second is, that of giving them much lighter muskets, (such as Greener's, which is FAR superior as to *point blank* and *extreme range* to the present musket,) and rendering every man as perfect a marksman as *practice* and *proper instruction* can possibly make him: and thirdly, instructing all our infantry in the duties of the Out-posts.

Many *thousands* of excellent soldiers, (I speak within bounds,) first and last, in the Peninsular campaigns, were knocked up, and positively UNABLE to keep pace with their more robust comrades, in consequence of being *weighted* far beyond their powers, and I know that such temporary *thinnings* of the ranks frequently took place at times when the proximity of the enemy rendered it a matter of the first importance that every soldier should be in his place.

I have a thousand times asked those officers about me the following question: *Is* this sad system of so terribly overloading the soldier sufficiently considered? Does not common *humanity*, as well as good policy, call loudly for a change?

I am very glad to find that you are about to introduce a *system* for teaching the men to take aim; for hitherto, in most regiments, I really believe there has been *no* particular system applied; but matters of that kind—vastly important as they are—have been left pretty much to *chance*.

I have seen, in the olden time, in some regiments, most ludicrous scenes when at *ball practice*; and I think it probable, in next Saturday's *Naval and Military Gazette*, a *description* of one of them will appear in a letter of mine to the Editor.

I shall be exceedingly glad and much flattered, if you will have the kindness to let me see it when it comes out; and I shall take the liberty (with your lordship's permission) of sending it also to Major Bentham, who served a quarter of a century in the 52nd. That he is exceedingly zealous, and intelligent, and well-informed, I am perfectly convinced. He has written some excellent letters on the "Powers of Infantry Firing," in the *United Service (Monthly) Magazine* of 1849, in the months, I believe, of March, April, and July. I scarcely need say, that I shall be highly gratified at looking over the sheets of your forthcoming Work on Out-posts, and I will give you my very best and unreserved opinions thereon; and should any passage in the book strike me as being the better for a trifling alteration or addition, I will, if your lordship will not consider me too presumptuous, suggest them to you.

I recollect writing to your lordship a letter or letters respecting the line of Out-posts taken up by the 62nd Regiment on the Winchester Downs, which you kindly propose to insert in your book.

It is probable, however, that they were not penned with that care and attention so necessary to be observed ere submitting them to the criticisms of a censorious world, of whom there are not a *few* in *military* life. If, nevertheless, you are of opinion that my letters are likely to carry any weight with them,

and to bring conviction home to many of those who have hitherto held Out-post Duties as things not worth learning, (and of such I know there are too many,) your lordship has my full permission to make what use of them you please.

Believe me, my dear Lord Frederick,

Sincerely yours,

J. LEACH.

Worthing, 27th December, 1850.

My dear Lord Frederick,

I was much interested with your description of the very short time occupied by the 7th Fusiliers, when under your command at Malta, in cooking their dinners; and even if the fire-wood was *dry*, (which I conclude it was,) the thing was rapidly done.

Nineteen times in twenty in the Peninsula, the men were obliged to cut down on the spot, and immediately to make fires with, *green* wood, which, of course, took considerably more time to ignite than if it had been dry; and in rainy weather it was often an exceedingly tedious process.

I have *invariably* been in favour of *each man* cooking in his own small tin, instead of a dozen or more having a *joint-stock concern*, and cramming into a large camp kettle, their meat, rice, onions, &c., such as we used in the early campaigns, but which were soon thrown aside for *cooking* purposes, and used only to draw the rations of wine or spirits.

A common mode of proceeding was the following: A and B, who, we will suppose, were comrades, cut up their meat into pieces, or sometimes boiled it whole,

with rice or biscuit broken up in it, and a few onions, if procurable; whilst the other, if he was fortunate enough to get a few potatoes, boiled them in *his* tin. Thus, in a very short space of time, the dinner was ready.

I will beg your lordship to look for a moment at page 76 in my little book, in which are a few lines relative to our mode of cooking &c., &c.; and, likewise at page 79, where I have stated that the men were *warned* or told off (after their day's march was over, and before they were dismissed) for various duties of fatigue; amongst which were included those of going for wood and water. But during those years, we were placed in such a variety of situations, that your lordship must excuse me if I enter somewhat into detail on this subject.

Always, when practicable, the ground for the camp or bivouac was taken up near a wood and a river or rivulet; and when this was the case, there were no parties sent out for wood and water, as both were at hand. I ought, however, to observe, that it was one of the Standing Orders of the Light Division, that after the rolls had been called, a certain number of men per company should be told off for wood and water; but, I have already said, it was not necessary in such cases as I have just stated, to fall them in and march them regularly for the purpose. Very frequently, and especially in the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, in which we traversed hundreds of miles of the arid, sun-burnt, parched plains of Leon and Castille, where often a tree could not be seen for many miles, and where water was equally scarce; we sometimes encamped

on the plains near the villages, and were obliged therefore to send in to them for both wood and water ; the *first*-mentioned article being issued to the Quarter-Masters of regiments with as sparing a hand as if it had been gold dust ; and the second was, sometimes, dreadfully brackish.

On all such occasions, each Regiment sent large parties for both wood and water ; each under a Subaltern.

When, on the other hand, the Division had the good fortune to be quartered for the night in a town or village, the inhabitants of the house on which each Officer or soldier was billeted, were obliged to find fuel and a light ; and as to water, it was, of course, to be had from the wells or springs in or near the village. In such cases, there was no necessity for employing parties for wood and water.

When near the enemy, and when the Picquets of the two armies were often exceedingly close to each other, the men who were to go on picquet the next day, usually boiled their meat the night before ; their proximity to the Picquets of their opponents, rendering cooking a somewhat precarious undertaking. This must at once strike every reflective person as a very necessary precaution.

There is a point which I have not touched upon in my little book, because it has not reference more to light troops than to others ; but, trifling as it may appear, it is so conducive on many occasions to the comfort of thousands, that I shall say a word or two about it.

When a body of troops are encamped near a river, or small stream, there are many thoughtless, careless

men in all regiments, who will, if steps are not taken to prevent it, bathe and wash their linen, &c., &c., at that part of the stream nearest their own tents, or huts; and, in the summer months, when the rivulets were shallow, and very slow and sluggish, I have soon seen them the colour of soap-suds, from men and women washing clothes in them. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, to place a few sentries along the bank to prevent any one from bathing or washing, *except at a certain point*, and that must be (supposing the river to run *from right to left*), below the *extreme left* of the whole encampment. By those precautions, the water *above* will continue clear, and proper for drinking and cooking. The value attached by my old friend and comrade, Hunt, to *cooking with the utmost expedition*, is undeniable; and His Grace the Duke of Wellington, in the Circular which he sent to the Commanding Officer of **EVERY REGIMENT** of the army at the termination of the disastrous and dreary retreat from Burgos and Madrid, did lay great stress on the vast importance of *cooking quickly*.

Believe me,

My dear Lord Frederick,

Sincerely yours,

J. LEACH.

Worthing, 2nd January, 1851.

My dear Lord Frederick, .

The day after I received your last letter, I had the pleasure of a visit from Major Harvey, who showed me your papers on Field Cooking and Tenting. Your plan for Cooking by means of ramrods is an admirable

one, when it is desirable to get the thing over expeditiously ; and I perfectly well recollect your showing it to me at Winchester.

If any injury is sustained by the ramrods, (which I very much doubt,) it can be but trifling ; and the only one of them likely to suffer, must be that from which the tins are suspended. To obviate it, therefore, nothing would be more easy than to make the ramrods do the duty of the *horizontal* one by *roster* ; and thus it would but seldom come to the turn of each to be a little overheated. I read, with attention, your system of the circular cooking-place for each company ; and I looked carefully also at the *plan* of it, by which I clearly understand your lordship's intention. If troops are to be encamped for some days *to a certainty*, it would be an excellent plan to establish those cooking places ; but *for one or two days only*, or during the glorious uncertainty of not knowing the moment an order may arrive for resuming the march, I think it would be better to cook in the manner described in my last letter, viz.—two comrades making a joint-stock concern of it, or by *your plan* of the *ramrods*. It gave me much pleasure to see the plan drawn on your paper of a small tin placed on *four stones*, with a fire in the centre, for it forcibly reminded me of the *real thing*, and the mode of proceeding which I have a thousand times seen our men adopt in the Peninsula. I believe it, indeed, taking all things into consideration, to be the best, quickest, most independent, and most satisfactory way to the soldier of getting through that very necessary operation.

I quite understand your system of telling off the men by *threes* for meat, wood, dry rations, water, &c. ; and

it must, necessarily, have a strong tendency, as a drill, to make them quick, handy, and *conversant* with the business; and this, I conceive, is your object. There is a point, however, well worth consideration, which at first sight may, perhaps, appear trifling; and that is, *not separating men, who are comrades, by putting them into different messes, if it can be avoided*. We know that comrades, (in consequence of *sizing* the companies,) cannot *always* stand very near each other in the ranks, and, consequently, they can scarcely expect to belong to the *same section of threes*. Soldiers attach very great importance indeed to being near their comrade, both in cooking and going on duty; and the feeling is very natural.

I well recollect, in the olden time, that comrades usually belonged to the *same section of a company*, either to the right, the left, the right centre, or the left centre; and in the event of a section being detached as an advanced picquet from the main body of the company, they were rarely separated. It occurs to me, that unless **VERY GREAT STRESS** is laid on the *sizing* of a company, it might *generally* be so arranged, that two comrades should belong to the *same section of threes*. Your plan of pitching and striking tents is also exceedingly useful; and you will not be backward in believing this to be the case, when I assure your lordship, that when I was encamped under Sir John Moore, at Shorncliff, **Kent**, so long ago as the summer of 1803, Sir John accustomed us to strike the tents by a signal from the drum, to pack them on the *bât-horses*, and instantly prepare to march. By a signal also, we re-pitched them in a very short space of time; a certain number

of men having parts allotted to them, some to stand by the pole, and others to fasten the pegs in the ground and attach the tent-cords to them. The *centre tin*, which you had in the Fusiliers, must often be exceedingly handy and useful; and the additional weight is a mere bagatelle.

You are decidedly correct in believing, that in order to cook with the *greatest expedition*, cutting the meat into small pieces and stewing it, admits of its being much more quickly dressed than in one solid piece.

The error which you *fancy* you made in calling the Retreat in the winter of 1812, (alluded to by Hunt,) from *Burgos*, instead of from *Madrid*, is *no error at all*; the fact being that, at the time the Duke of Wellington was retreating towards Salamanca from *Burgos* with the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions of Infantry, Sir Roland Hill was retreating from *Madrid* to Salamanca, with the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and Light Divisions; and at Salamanca, the whole army formed a junction. The Duke offered battle to the French (who were believed to be about 90,000 strong) near the same ground on which the battle of Salamanca was fought a few months before; but Soult, declining to fight, and contenting himself with threatening by a wide flank movement our communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, the whole of our army continued its retreat, (the Light Division forming the Rear Guard, with some Cavalry,) and after five days of unceasing rain and sleet, through gloomy forests, knee-deep in mud, and with very scanty supplies from the Commissariat, we reached Ciudad Rodrigo in nearly a state of starvation.

I had a good deal of conversation with Major

Harvey on what has long, long been a darling project of mine—that of rendering the soldier's kit much lighter than it is, or ever has been ; and I am much gratified to find that the *present* pack, if *suspended* according to Mr. Berrington's plan, will be the means of relieving the soldier immensely.

And if you can manage to carry out your very laudable and important proposition of reducing the *terrible* back-breaking weight which the soldier carries when in the field, giving him, moreover, a musket like *Greener's*, and by making every man as good a marksman as frequent practice can effect it, and instructing all hands in the duties of the Out-posts, and of Light Infantry, &c., &c., I fearlessly assert, that your lordship will have done *far, far* more for our Infantry than has been effected for many, many a long year. The light great coat, mentioned by you and Major Harvey, must be a vast improvement ; and I am most decidedly of opinion, and long have been so, that the articles which you propose the soldier should carry in the pack, would be quite sufficient.

In the event of our ever again being engaged in a European war, and employing an army on any part of the Continent, it is but reasonable to conclude that Commissariat stations will be established from the *base* of our operations (near the sea-coast, most probably) towards the interior of the country ; at each of which will be a *dépôt* of shoes, shirts, and stockings, so that the men could easily be supplied with those things. And if such expeditions should ever again be employed as those under General Ross against Washington, and that under Pakenham at New Orleans, surely one

shirt in the pack, and one on the man's back, with a spare pair of shoes and stockings, a bit of soap, razor, and hand-towel, will be sufficient. As to *brushes* for shoes, pouches, clothes, &c., a *few* would suffice for a whole section of men, who could carry them by turns.

Wishing your lordship well through this long and illegibly written letter, and a happy new year, with many of them,

Believe me sincerely yours,

J. LEACH.

Letters from Colonel Hunt, C.B.

Walmer, 24th December, 1850.

My dear Lord Frederick,

I regret that I have not been able to reply to your letter sooner. Since I had the pleasure of seeing you, I have been nearly deprived of sight (one eye entirely gone) which almost renders me incapable of writing. Let me, in the first place, make my acknowledgment to you for the kind interest you have taken in my son, who I trust will prove himself grateful, and worthy of it.

I am surprised to hear that any Officer should be insensible to the great importance of "Cooking." In private life, the great saving and advantage of skilful preparation of food, is evident to all; how much more valuable then must this knowledge be to the soldier, whose scanty allowance of food requires to be eked out in every possible way.

The zeal you evinced for the Service from the first, after joining the 11th Regiment, made me feel great

pleasure in conversing with you upon subjects connected with the profession; and although twenty-seven years have since passed, I recollect relating to you the anecdote you allude to, when speaking of the necessity of making each individual soldier know *how to cook*.

Having referred to a sort of journal I kept at the time, I find that on the 4th of November, 1812, four days after evacuating Madrid, the Rear-Guard, composed of the 4th and Light Divisions, under *General Cole*, was ordered to halt behind a small river, to cover the retreat of the stores and stragglers, which then were numerous. Being intimate with the General, I took the liberty of asking if he purposed halting any time. He said about an hour or so. I observed I was glad of it, as it would enable me to do two things very desirable, viz., cook and dry the blankets, which the men had that morning put in their packs wet from the heavy dew. He replied: "That's impossible!" I said: "Permit me to show it is possible." He consented. I immediately returned to my regiment, which I had left under arms, and ordered them to "Pile Arms; Off Knapsacks; Out Blankets; Cook."

The practice was for the men to mess by *twos*, (*comrades*,) *fours*, or more, according to circumstances. One would run for water, others prepared the cooking place by making a hole, or with large stones. The fuel collected, meat cut and prepared, which, with biscuit, flour, and sometimes an onion, was put in their *tins*, and a refreshing meal soon procured.

I must, however, observe, it was my fortune to serve in the *52nd Light Infantry*, mostly veterans, who had

been long used to OUT-POST DUTY, and almost always employed as *Advanced or Rear Guards*, we had neither the *time* nor opportunity that the body of the army had ; so that necessity, perhaps, made our men such good cooks.

I feel myself incapable of entering upon the "details" necessary to instruct the young soldier to cook. The carrying it into effect depends mainly upon the Captains (or Officers Commanding Companies); it is therefore, indispensable that they should understand and personally superintend its operation. The time employed, must vary *with circumstances*, viz., the *having at hand*, water, provisions, and fuel, &c.

I remain,

My dear Lord Frederick,

Yours faithfully,

J. P. HUNT.

Walmer, 28th February, 1851.

My dear Lord Frederick,

When your papers reached me I was confined with a severe fit of rheumatism, which seemed to make my old wounds to break out afresh, so that I fully sympathise with your lordship's sufferings. I sincerely hope that ere this you have quite recovered. Being almost blind as well as lame, I fear I can render you but little assistance in your praiseworthy labours, as my want of sight prevents me looking into plans and detail. This infirmity will also compel me to be brief.

First, with respect to Sir John Moore's system, as it is called; that accomplished Soldier, seeing that the Ger-

man system every where quailed before the new tactics of the revolutionary armies, with their swarms of Light Troops, at length prevailed upon His Royal Highness the Duke of York, to make the 43rd and 52nd Regiments *light*. The former was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Stewart, who had been his Adjutant in the 51st Regiment, the latter by Lieutenant Colonel Mackenzie, an Officer of much service, and of great military genius. At this period the war recommenced. The country being threatened with invasion; a camp was formed at Shorncliff, under Sir J. Moore, and the troops composing it, drilled after the "*new idea*."

Opposition and cavil, which assail every one who travels out of the beaten track, was soon at work, and it was represented to the Commander-in-Chief that Sir John Moore was introducing a system of manœuvres in direct variance with "*Dundas*," the then prescribed authority. After some correspondence, His Royal Highness, accompanied by two of his Royal Brothers, and several distinguished Generals, including Sir David Dundas, came to Shorncliff. A Battalion was formed by two Companies from each of the Regiments composing the camp, and put through several of the (18) *Manœuvres*. Sir David Dundas declared he had never seen them better executed; the Commander-in-Chief being satisfied, the system progressed.

This was the origin of Sir John Moore's system, the superiority of which was proved by the Light Division in many a gallant field.

In 1806, 7, and 8, I had the honour of serving as Aid-de-Camp to Sir John Moore, in Sicily, Sweden,

and Portugal, when I was frequently employed by him in instructing the troops in the Duties of Light Infantry. From October, 1808, when I was promoted to a majority, to 1813, I had much experience on this subject, having had charge of Out-posts of importance on many occasions. This egotism, I trust your lordship will pardon for its motive, which is simply to defend myself from the charge of presumption in so freely giving my opinion upon your system of instruction on this important branch of *British* military service.

I therefore do without hesitation declare, that I cannot devise a better mode than that which I saw adopted at Winchester, to give the Officer and soldier a correct idea of the duties of Out-posts and Outlying Picquets.

The position of the enemy being defined, the chain of Picquets to guard their approach to Winchester appeared to me to be placed so as to take every advantage of ground.

The Picquet Reserves also, placed not too near, but sufficiently so to feed and support the Sentinels in front; the flanks guarded and secured; the communication between the several Picquets duly kept up; with Cavalry occupying the Downs, too open for Infantry, the thing would have been perfect; but these your lordship had not at command.

The usefulness of your plan for giving instruction to, and awakening the intelligence of, the troops under your command, which I witnessed at Portsmouth, must be appreciated by every one who reflects upon the varied service of the British Soldier.

The soldiers of the great armies of Austria and Prus-

sia, whose services are confined to the Continent, may be regarded as the component parts of a great machine, whereas the British soldier is not only liable to be called on to serve in every climate under heaven, from the snows of Canada to the burning sands of Hindoostan, but also to fight against every description of foe, both civilized and savage. To render him equal to such work, surely something more is necessary than "Barrack Yard" drill.

I remain,
My dear Lord Frederick,
Yours faithfully,
J. P. HUNT.

Tottenham High-cross,
My dear Lord Frederick, May 3rd, 1851.

In consequence of my absence from Walmer, I have been prevented answering sooner your letter of the 26th ult.

After I left the service, I passed considerable time on the Continent, and since I settled at Walmer, ill health has compelled me to live almost in seclusion, forgotten and forgetting. But the visit I had the honor of making to your lordship at Portsmouth, two years ago, seems to have revived my former feelings for a service, to which, from early youth, I was devotedly attached. My visit to you having been shortened by the death of a near relative, I was prevented making myself acquainted with much of your system; and being aware that you are almost unceasingly occupied in your important command, I

scarcely know how to prefer the request, which the deep interest I take in your proceedings, (arising out of our old intimacy when serving together in the 11th Regiment) prompts me make.

My request is this, that whenever you have leisure for the purpose, you would be so good to write to me an account of the changes that have taken place, and that you consider it might be advisable to make in the service from what you have observed since you have been on the staff.

Pray excuse my freedom, and believe me to be,

My dear Lord Frederick,

Faithfully yours,

J. P. HUNT.

From Lieut.-Gen. Sir Alexander Woodford,

K.C.B., &c., &c.

January 1851.

My dear Lord Frederick,

I derived very great satisfaction in witnessing the manner in which you carried out the instruction of Officers and non-commissioned officers, which seemed perfect, and gave me great gratification.

I was particularly interested in my visit with you to Winchester, and with all I saw in the 23rd Welsh Fusiliers, as to their drill and movements, and, especially, as to their field works, which you had caused them to throw up, and the instruction for advanced posts and outlying picquets. I must say I never saw Officers more anxious to fulfil the objects you had in view. It was great pleasure to see young

men so active and so willing to receive instruction, and I think it very useful and very beneficial to the service. As your old friend and Commanding Officer, I venture to say to you what I really think.

And believe me,

Yours affectionately,

A. WOODFORD.

From Gen. Lord Viscount Combermere, &c., &c., &c.

Belgrave Square, June 27th, 1851.

My dear Lord Frederick,

I have read with much interest and pleasure, your treatise upon Out-post Duties, &c., &c., &c.

It is much to be regretted that the practice of what on actual service is so essential, (particularly for light troops,) should be neglected; and I consider that it would add greatly to the efficiency of our army, (so perfect in other respects,) if Inspectors of Regiments were instructed to give particular attention to, and report upon, the knowledge and practice of Officers, &c., as to placing picquets, sentries, patrolling, sketching, &c.

When serving in a regiment of cavalry in Flanders during parts of the campaigns of 1793 and 1794, I had frequent occasions to feel, and to witness in others, the disadvantages attending the want of theoretical, as well as practical, knowledge of Out-post Duties; and when in command of a regiment or a brigade of cavalry at home, I adopted a similar mode to yours of instructing Officers, non-commissioned officers, &c., in

their duties when employed at the Out-posts, the advantages of which I was gratified in witnessing in two regiments (14th and 16th Light Dragoons) under my command in the Peninsula, and which regiments I had instructed in their duties prior to these being employed on foreign service.

The system adopted and practised by you is excellent; and the Catechism, as well as the Instructions for Cooking in the Field, Encamping, &c., are in my opinion points upon which, at all inspections, the attention of General Officers, &c., should be particularly directed.

I am,
My dear Lord Frederick,
Very truly yours,
COMBERMERE.

M.-General

The Lord Frederick Fitzclarencce,
&c. &c. &c

GENERAL ORDERS.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S ORDERS FOR HIS OUT-POSTS,

FROM 1810 TO 1814*.

“Busaco, 22nd September, 1810.

“A strong Picquet from the latter body of troops is to be posted on the eastern side of the Sierra, near St. Antonio de Cantaro ; and a Picquet of communication is to be placed upon the top of the Sierra, where the road crosses it.”

“Sierra of Busaco, 26th September, 1810.

“[CIRCULAR.] The camp kettles and the meat are to be immediately sent for, and the troops are to cook as soon as they arrive. Such Regiments as can find means of doing so at hand, may make huts. Picquets are to be thrown out along the front, and a connection to be established between those of contiguous divisions. A line of communication, by means of small posts, is also to be established along the position itself, for the purpose of insuring the prompt circulation of orders during the night. The General Officers commanding divisions will be so good as report to the Quarter-Master-General the place where each will be stationed

* Extracted from SIR GEORGE MURRAY'S *Memoirs of the War in Spain and France*.

during the night. The whole of the troops are to be under arms at their respective stations on the position, at half an hour before day-break to-morrow morning.

“G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“Celorico, 28th March, 1811.

“The troops under Colonel Wilson will occupy Pinhel, and throw forward their Out-posts in the direction of Almeida. Colonel Wilson will connect his troops with those of Colonel Trant, by the bridge over the Coa, between Pinhel and Villa Torpin, if the enemy is not in a situation to hinder that communication; but if he is, it is to be established by the ford of Porto de Vide.

“Colonel Barbaçena will occupy Carvalhal, Atalaya, and neighbouring villages upon the left bank of the Pinhel river; and will push forward his Out-posts and Patrols towards the Coa, as far as the situation and force of the enemy permit, particularly in the direction of Almeida, Castello Bom, and Castello Mendo.

“Colonel Barbaçena will communicate with Colonel Wilson upon the left, and will send a party of dragoons to the village of Parada, near Serdeira, to keep up his communication with the right of the army.

“The 1st division will march from Alverca, &c., by Pinzio, to Parada, Serdeira, Miuselha, and adjacents. It will occupy Seixo upon the right, and Porto de Velha upon the left; placing Picquets along the left bank of the Coa, between those two points, and taking possession of the bridge of Sequeiros. If, however, the enemy should be in too great force upon the Coa to admit of the above arrangements being complied with,

Sir Brent Spencer will place the 1st division upon the Naouemé rivulet, in the neighbourhood of Serdeira, establishing Out-posts in the direction of Ponte de Sequeiros, and also on the left from Parada towards Castello Mendo.

“ The 6th division will move through Guarda, and thence by Marmaleira, towards Rapoulha de Coa. M.-General Campbell will occupy Rapoulha de Coa, and will place Picquets along the left bank of the Coa, communicating on the left flank with the Picquets of the 1st Division, and on the right flank with those of the right column of the army. But should the enemy be too much in force upon the Coa to admit of the above arrangement, Major-General Campbell will halt his division at Martin de Pega, on the Rio dos Bois.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“ Hill of San Christoval, 2nd May, 1811.

“ It does not appear probable that the enemy's army will advance farther to-day than to the bridge between the Azava and the rivulet of Espeja. Sir Stapleton Cotton will be so good, therefore, as to place the cavalry in the country between the Espeja rivulet and Fuentes d'Onoro. Colonel Beckwith's brigade of the Light Division is to be in the woods on the right of the cavalry, and the remainder of the Division in the woods on the left of the cavalry. Colonel Beckwith will endeavour to keep a Picquet on the hill of San Christoval, and he will have a post at Quinta d'Aguilar, to enable him to communicate with Navé d'Avér, and with Poza Velho. The left of the Light Division will, in like manner, put itself in communication with

the infantry of the 5th Division, which occupies the village of Alameda, and also with the troops at Fuentes d'Onoro.

" Sir Stapleton Cotton will continue to keep small posts of observation at Puebla d'Azava and towards Fuenté Guinaldo ; and will cause reports to be made from the posts in the latter direction to the Officer commanding at Navé d'Ayér, as well as to himself. He will also make arrangements for being in direct communication with the Officer commanding at Fuentes d'Onoro, to which place any further orders there may be for the cavalry, or for the Light Division, will be transmitted.

" G. MURRAY, Q. M. G."

" Heights, above Fuentes d'Onoro, 3rd May, 1811.

" The several divisions will throw out Picquets along the ravine of the Dos Casas rivulet.

" These Picquets are to communicate with each other, and are to form a connected chain along the whole line of the front of the army.

" Sir William Erskine will push his look-out posts to a considerable distance beyond the left flank of the army ; and he will put himself in communication likewise with Brigadier-General Pack, through Val de la Mula.

" Major-General Houstoun will push forward strong Picquets into the wood between Fuentes d'Onoro and Pozo Velho, which latter place he will occupy in considerable strength.

" Sir Stapleton Cotton will support the infantry Picquets by posts of cavalry where the ground is open,

and he will also put himself in communication with Don Julian Sanchez, who is at Navé d'Avér.

“ A complete line of connected posts is to be established, likewise, along the whole of the ridge which forms the position now occupied by the troops, that orders may be passed, with certainty and with rapidity, from one division to another, even during the night.

“ The whole of the troops are to be under arms half an hour before day-break to-morrow morning.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“ Lizaso, 27th July, 1813.

“ The 7th Division will march also to the vicinity of Lizaso. But Lord Dalhousie will leave a post of observation in the passes, and Colonel Arentschidt will leave a few hussars with that post to bring reports from it.

“ The 1st Hussars will send a small party under an Officer to the village of Lecumberri, on the great road between Tolosa and Pamplona.

“ This party is stationed there to keep up the communication between the right and left of the army. The Officer commanding it will put himself in communication as soon as possible with Major-Général C. Alton, at Zubieta, and report his having done so.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“ Heights, above Villaba, 29th July, 1813.

“ Posts of observation should be kept on the most commanding hills all day, and should be again on the look out as soon as there is light in the morning.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“ Lezaca, 6th August, 1813.

“ The Condé de la Bisbal has been informed that it is Lord Wellington’s intention that he should arrange with your lordship what share of the Out-post Duties the troops of each are to take upon that part of the line which lies between the posts of the division occupying the Puerto de Maya and the Light Division.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“ Lezaca, 10th August, 1813.

“ The 7th Division is on your left between the Puerto de Maya and the Puerto de Echalar. Copy of a memorandum respecting the connection of the Out-posts of that division with those of the troops in the Puerto de Maya, and also respecting the direct line of communication with Echalar, is enclosed for your information.

“ Lord Wellington considers it essential that the division which occupies the Puerto de Maya should have a Picquet in the village of Urdax.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“ Vera, 27th October, 1813.

“ The Out-posts of the Light Division at the foot of the pass of Vera, and those of Brigadier Longa’s troops, are to remain at their station, until otherwise instructed.

“ Sir John Hope will place an Officer’s detachment of cavalry in the neighbourhood of Jolimont, near the bottom of the hill by which the road goes through Brigadier Longa’s present encampment to the village of Vera. This detachment is intended to keep up the

communication with the centre of the army, in the first instance, through Vera, and afterwards, by Ascain, should that communication become open.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“ St. Jean de Luz, 18th December, 1813.

“ Two brigades of that cavalry (Major-General Alten's and Major-General Lord Edward Somerset's) are to observe the country beyond Hasparren, towards St. Jean Pied de Port and towards St. Palais. These two brigades will be supported by the 3rd Division of infantry, which will move to-morrow to Urcaray, Hasparren, and adjacents, for that purpose, and which will act in concert with the cavalry, as may be requisite.

“ Sir Stapleton Cotton will be so good as to arrange his posts upon the right in such manner as to be in communication with the division of Spanish infantry, which is cantoned at Itsassu, for the purpose of watching the debouches from the upper part of the valley of the Nive. Sir Stapleton Cotton will be pleased to apprise Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill, and also Marshal Beresford, of any movement of importance made by the enemy in the country beyond Hasparren; and he will send separate reports to head quarters also by the most direct route.

“ The whole of the cavalry duties in the country between the river Nive and the sea will be done by Major-General Vandeleur's brigade. General Vandeleur will therefore send a detachment to Arrauntz, with instructions to report to Lieutenant-General Sir Lowry Cole, and another to Arcangues, which is to report to Major-General Charles Alten.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“ St. Sever, 7th March, 1814.

“ Major-General Vandeleur's brigade will also furnish two squadrons of cavalry, which will be directed to move towards Bordeaux, by the route of Les Grandes Landes.

“ The Commanding Officer of these two squadrons will be instructed to endeavour to push forward his patrols into the neighbourhood of Bordeaux on the 11th and 12th. He will be directed also to endeavour to establish a communication from La Bouhere, and from Belin, or Beliel, in Les Grandes Landes, with Roquefort and with Bazas. The cavalry stationed at the two last mentioned places should, therefore, have orders to endeavour, from their side also, to communicate with La Bouhere and with Belin.

“ Marshal Beresford is authorized to order forward the two squadrons of Major-General Vandeleur's brigade to Bordeaux, should he find it expedient to do so; and he will also give them instructions to return to their brigade when he thinks proper.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“ Galan, March 22nd, 1814.

“ One squadron of Colonel Vivian's brigade will turn off at Castelnau, and proceed to Masseube, from whence a patrol is to be sent forward to Auch, and the report of that patrol is to be transmitted to the Quarter-Master-General at Boulogne.

“ Sir Stapleton Cotton will be so good as to order one squadron of cavalry to move from Boulogne upon Ville Franche and Simorre, and to be in communication with the cavalry in the neighbourhood of La Barthe.

Sir Stapleton Cotton will be so good as have cavalry posts at St. Frajon and at St. Laurens.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“ Boulogne, March 23rd, 1814.

“ Sir Stapleton Cotton will move forward the hussars, and Major-General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, beyond Lombes, in the direction of Bragairac, St. Foy, and St. Lys, so as to have his advance in these latter places.

“ Sir Stapleton Cotton will be so good as send patrols at the same time towards Gimont and L'Isle en Jourdain, and will likewise push patrols into the country on the right of his line of march.

“ The 4th Division, and Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry, will follow the same route, and close up towards the 6th Division.

“ Colonel Vivian will be so good as establish a post of cavalry at or near Montpezat, and send patrols into the country on the right of the line of march.

“ Lieutenant-Colonel Bulow will be so good as canton part of the cavalry brigade (Bock's) in St. Frajon, and have a post at Cassaignebere. This brigade will also send patrols to Aurignac, and in the direction of Fousseret.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“ L'Isle en Dodon, March 24th, 1814.

“ A squadron of Major-General Bock's brigade of cavalry will move to-morrow from St. Frajon towards La Bastide des Feuillans, to keep up the communication of the centre of the army with the column.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

Arrangement for the Movement of the Army.

“ 25th March, 1814.

“ Sir Stapleton Cotton will close up the hussars and Major-General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry to the neighbourhood of St. Lys and St. Foy, and will send patrols towards Toulouse, by Plaisance du Touch, also towards Noé and Muret on the right, and on the Auch road upon the left.

“ The Light Division and Major-General Bock's brigade of cavalry will move to the neighbourhood of Samatan, except one squadron of Major-General Bock's brigade, which will move from St. Frajon towards La Bastide des Feuillans, and establish a communication on its right with the cavalry of Sir Rowland Hill's column, and on its left with the cavalry posts at Montpezat and at Rieumes.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“ Portet, 28th March, 1814.

“ The hussar brigade will do the Out-post duties in front of the Light and 3rd Divisions, and as far to the left as the Auch road.

“ The troops under Sir Rowland Hill will lie at Portet, Muret, Villeneuve, Frousins, and adjacents; and the cavalry under Major-General Fane will do the Out-post duties of the right of the line.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“ Seysses, 1st April, 1814.

“ When you have recrossed the Garronne, the pontoon bridge is to be taken up, and a flying bridge substituted in its place; it will be expedient, that you

should have a few dragoons, and a post of infantry on the right bank ; the infantry detachment should keep hold of the place where the flying bridge lands, and the cavalry have a look-out a considerable way in advance.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

“ To Lt.-Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.”

“ Pontoon Bridge, 5th April, 1814.

“ The officer commanding the cavalry on the right bank, will send out patrols, as well towards Toulouse as on the road to Montauban, and into the country which lies beyond the Ers rivulet, and will send reports to head quarters of whatever information is obtained. It will be advisable to have strong Picquets covering the front of the troops towards Toulouse ; and also to endeavour to hold the heights from which the enemy could reconnoitre, in order that he may be prevented, as much as possible, from ascertaining the amount of the force which has been passed over the river.

“ G. MURRAY, Q. M. G.”

INSTRUCTION, CATECHISM, REPORTS, &c.

THE following theoretical Instruction and Catechism for the purpose of teaching young Officers their duties when in command of an Out-laying Picquet, have been drawn up and deduced from the Duke of Wellington's Orders on the above duties, given out by his Grace in actual contact with the enemy, from the year 1808 to 1814, and published in Sir George Murray's "Memoirs of the War in Spain and France, from 1808 to 1814;"—from the foregoing letters of the many superior and practical Officers who have kindly honored me with their extensive information on the above subject (or on Out-post Duty);—from General Shaw Kennedy's Journal, written during one of the most interesting periods of actual Out-post Duty on record in our military annals;—from the Field Exercise Book;—and from the various publications by Officers in the British Army, whose works I beg strongly to recommend to young Officers, with a view to their becoming thoroughly acquainted with their duty in the field*.

* In drawing up the following list of practical Treatises written by British officers on various military subjects, it has been found convenient to trace the works back from the present time in the order of the publication of the last editions.

†
In order to enable the young Officer to attain the knowledge of his duty, when in command of an Out-post or Picquet in front of the enemy, it is necessary he should be made first perfectly acquainted with the theory of Out-post Duties, as laid down in the general principles, from p. 296 to 320 of the *Field Exercise Book*, which should be clearly explained to him by his Commanding Officer, with the assistance of a black board, and a large map, showing the general features of a country, such as the heights, roads, and course of rivers, and how any part of it could be occupied with a given

1851. On Outposts, Patrols, &c., &c. By MAJOR-GENERAL L. B. LOVELL, K.H.

1851. The Young Officer's Companion. By COL. LORD DE ROS.

1851. LIEUT.-COLONEL TORRENS' Familiar Lectures for the Use of Young Military Officers.

1851. SINNOTT's Military Catechism.

1850. The Military Catechism. By CAPTAIN JOHN SIDNEY DOYLE (Colonel North).

1850. The British Gunner. By CAPTAIN SPEARMAN.

1849. A Practical Treatise on the Duties required to be performed by Officers and Soldiers of the Army at a Siege. By LIEUT.-COLONEL JEBB, R.E.

1849. Introductory Essay to the Study of Fortification for Young Officers of the Army. By MAJOR STRAITH.

1849. A System of Light Drill; or, Questions and Answers on the Rudiments of Skirmishing. By CAPTAIN T. H. MITCHELL.

1849. Manual of Light Infantry and other Duties. By LIEUT. and ADJUTANT SINNOTT, 47th Regiment.

1849. Details of Light Infantry Drill, with some Instruction for Patrols. By MAJOR J. P. SPARKS.

1848. Practical Treatises on the Attack and Defence of Outposts, Villages, Houses, Bridges, &c. By LIEUT.-COL. JEBB, R.E.

1848. Questions and Answers on Artillery. By MAJOR BURN, R.A.

1847. Selections from the General Orders of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. Compiled by COLONEL GURWOOD.

1847. The Artillerist's Manual, and British Soldier's Compendium. By CAPTAIN GRIFFITHS, R.A.

number of men, as an Outlying Picquet, ⁱⁿ order to protect the part of the army to which he belongs, that it may rest in quiet and security, and not be dishonoured by surprise.

The instructions, as laid down in the *Field Exercise Book*, being thoroughly understood by the young Officer, I recommend that, in order to impress them more perfectly on his mind, he should transcribe them in his own handwriting, and give them to his Commanding Officer, who will then question him in the following manner:—

1847. A Treatise on Military Surveying. By LIEUT.-COLONEL B. JACKSON.

1846. Rules, chiefly deduced from Experiment, for conducting the Practical Operations of a Siege. By MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES PASLEY, K.C.B.

1845. Observations on Commissariat Field Service. By COM.-GENERAL SIR RANDOLPH I. ROUTH, K.C.B.

1845. JACKSON'S Formation, Discipline, and Economy of Armies. *Third Edition*.

1844. Standing Orders, as given out and enforced by the late MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT CRAUFURD, for the Use of the Light Division during the years 1809, 1810, and 1811.

1844. Instructions for Officers and Non-commissioned Officers of Cavalry on Outpost Duty. By LIEUT.-COL. VON ARENT-SCHILD.

1843. A Treatise on the Employment of Light Troops on Actual Service. By LIEUT.-COLONEL LESLIE, K.H.

1843. The Cavalry Manual. By LIEUT.-COLONEL AINSLIE.

1843. MAJOR-GENERAL ROLT on Moral Command.

1838. Thoughts on Tactics and Military Organization. By LIEUT.-COL. MITCHELL.

1837. Essentials of Good Skirmishing. By LIEUT.-COLONEL GAWLER, K.H.

1836. Memoir on the Duties of Picquets. By COLONEL FITZ-CLARENCE, late Coldstream Guards.

1833. Essays on Field Fortification. By LIEUT. H. FENWICK.

1827. A Treatise on the Disposition and Duties of Out-posts,

Question. What are the different parties of troops called in the British Service, as laid down in the *Field Exercise Book*, which act in front of an army, for its protection and security, when in camp or cantonments?

Answer. The *Outlaying Picquet*, its *Patrols*, and *Detached Parties*, and the *Reserve for the Picquets*—in all, *four*.

Quest. What is an Outlaying Picquet, and its object?

Ans. An Outlaying Picquet is a certain number of men, under the command of a Captain or Subaltern, detached to the front of the main body of troops. Its principal duties are to secure the safety and repose of the camp or cantonments, by occupying such ground, and commanding such roads, that no part of the enemy's force can approach without being seen*.

Quest. What is the Reserve?

Ans. It is a body of Troops of such force, and so placed, as to support and assist the Picquets on their being attacked, or that the Picquets can retire on if found necessary; and to impede the advance of the enemy, so as to enable the main body to get under arms†.

Quest. What is a Patrol?

Ans. As relating to an Outlaying Picquet, it is composed of a small body of men, under command of a Subaltern or Non-commissioned Officer, to be sent to the front and flanks of the Picquet, for the purpose of

abridged from the German by LIEUT.-COLONEL SHORT, late Coldstream Guards.

1827. Proposed System of Out-post Exercise. By CAPTAIN KEE.

* Vide *Field Exercise Book*, p. 296.

† Ibid, p. 297.

gaining information in regard to the movements and position of the enemy that may be in their vicinity*.

Quest. On being ordered to take charge of an Out-laying Picquet with a view of covering any part of the camp or cantonment, what would be your first duty †?

Ans. To make a nominal list of the Non-commissioned Officers and men of the Picquet, and inspect their arms, ammunition, and rations ‡.

Quest. How would you move the Picquet to the ground you are ordered to occupy?

Ans. I should move as an advance guard to avoid being surprised, with advanced, flank, and connecting files§.

Quest. On moving to the ground you are to occupy, what Observation would you make?

Ans. I should take particular notice of all roads on my flanks, and such positions that, should I be driven in, I could defend||.

Quest. What is your "*First Duty*" on arriving on the ground you are to occupy?

Ans. The ground having been pointed out to me by a Superior Officer, where my right and left flanks are to rest, I immediately guard against surprise by placing sentries in such situations that no enemy can approach my Picquet without being seen. Besides which, the advanced files of my Picquet will feel their way, and ascertain if any immediate attack is probable¶.

* Vide p. 307, *Field Exercise Book*, and COLONEL SHORT, Coldstream Guards.

† Vide COL. LEACH, GEN. LOVELL. ‡ Vide COL. ARENTSCHILDT.

§ Vide GENERAL S. KENNEDY. || Vide *Field Exercise Book*.

¶ Vide *Field Exercise Book*, COLONEL LEACH.

Quest. What is the Second Duty after taking the foregoing precaution?

Ans. To communicate with the Officers of the Picquets on my right and left flanks*.

Quest. How do you communicate?

Ans. I take as many men as I think will be requisite to keep up a chain of sentries from my Picquet to the Picquet I am going to communicate with, posting double sentries as I pass along, and keeping them in view; and having communicated with the Officer on my flank, or Non-commissioned Officer in charge of the flank parties, I return to my Picquet, reducing or increasing the sentries as I find requisite, and placing them in the most advantageous positions to overlook the approaches to my Picquet. My junior Officer or Serjeant having done the same on the other flank, I then, by visiting myself personally, ascertain that they have posted the sentries according to orders, and communicated with the Officer on my other flank.

Quest. When do you conceive that your Sentries are posted as they ought to be?

Ans. When they completely command every approach to the Picquet, and can see the sentries on their right and left, and are as much concealed as possible from the enemy's view†.

Quest. Should the Picquet be a flank Picquet, what precautions would you take for its security?

Ans. I should, after taking care of my *immediate* security, send out Patrols, under an Officer or Non-

* Vide DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S *Orders*.

† Vide COLONEL ARENTSCHILD.

commissioned Officer, to the *unprotected flank*, which I should do every half-hour day and night*.

Quest. Into how many Reliefs do you divide your Picquet? And how often do you relieve your Sentries?

Ans. Into Three Reliefs of Double Sentries, and relieve them every hour, taking care to have sufficient men to patrol†.

Quest. After your communications are established with the Picquets on your flanks, and your own security from surprise ensured, what do you do?

Ans. With a Patrol I make myself thoroughly acquainted with the approaches and environs of my post; and, *if ordered to defend it*, do my best to strengthen it, by throwing up obstacles, making loopholes should my Picquet occupy a house, and in the neighbouring walls; throwing up breastworks, if I have tools, and making my defence so as to have as many cross fires as possible‡.

Quest. Are the Sentries on an Outlying Picquet posted double?

Ans. Yes, and a Communicating (single) Sentry from them to the body of the Picquet, to convey any signal or order that might come from the front.

Quest. How do you place your Sentries at night?

Ans. I generally move them from the place they occupied during the day, particularly should they have been seen by the enemy; and if they have been on a

* Vide COLONEL LEACH's *Letters to Lord F. Fitzclarence*.

† Vide *Exercise Book*.

‡ Vide JEBB, *On Defence of Out-Posts*, and MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W. NAPIER's *Letters to Lord F. Fitzclarence*.

height, I move them to lower ground, in order that they may discern any object on the sky-line with greater ease than looking down they would be able to do, and place them in the most advantageous positions*.

Quest. Would you increase the number of Sentries at night?

Ans. As a rule, yes, with the view of preventing the possibility of the enemy stealing in between them.

Quest. Would you increase your Sentries at any other time?

Ans. Yes, during foggy weather.

Quest. Ought you to post your Sentries thickly or not?

Ans. If possible not, but it must depend on the nature of the ground and the state of the atmosphere. The great object should be to save my men as much as possible, always bearing in mind that every unnecessary Sentry entails additional "*duty on all his comrades†.*"

Quest. When the Advanced Sentry is very near the enemy, what precautions would you take to secure his preservation?

Ans. I should place obstacles in the approaches to his post, about 30 yards in his front, as well as flanks, when it is practicable to do so, such as abattis, &c., which the Sentry could see over, *and so that they may not afford shelter to the enemy*, in order to stop any sudden rush that might be made upon him. I should particularly take this precaution at night, or should the Sentry

* Vide MAJOR-GENERAL SHAW KENNEDY's *Letter to Lord F. Fitzclarence.*

† Vide LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR C. NAPIER's *Letter to Lord F. Fitzclarence.*

be placed at the end of a bridge where he must actually stand on the end of the defile*.

Quest. Were you not to take this precaution, what might happen?

Ans. The Sentry might be suddenly overcome, and not able to fire, or give the alarm, and, consequently, the Picquet might be surprised, from being unable to get under arms in time to meet the enemy†.

Quest. Is it generally recommended that the *Advanced* Sentries should be so protected?

Ans. Yes, where practicable, for the above reasons.

Quest. When a wood is in your Front, how would you place your Sentry?

Ans. As far from the wood as would be advisable, with a view of keeping as good a look out as possible, but being most particular not to endanger the Sentry from a sudden rush from the wood.

Quest. How do you ensure the body of the Picquet being instantly made acquainted with any immediate threatened approach of the enemy?

Ans. By the Communicating Sentry firing or making the preconcerted signal.

Quest. What regulates the actual position where you place the body of your Picquet?

Ans. After having ascertained the most advantageous point for posting my Advanced Sentries, I place my Picquet so as to be within hearing of the Connecting Sentries' fire, and out of sight of the enemy,

* Vide GENERAL SHAW KENNEDY's *Letter to Lord F. Fitzclarence*.

† Vide NAPIER's *History of the Peninsular War*, v. 3, p. 277.

and as near the centre of my line of sentries as possible*.

Quest. Do you examine the Sentries as they are relieved?

Ans. Yes, in order to ascertain whether they have observed any thing in their front, and, if of importance, immediately to report the circumstance to the Field Officer of the Picquets, always taking care to state in my report whether the movements, or whatever demonstration was observed, was on *our* right, or the *enemy's* left, or *vice versa*.

Quest. On receiving Verbal Orders from your Superior, do you write them down immediately?

Ans. Yes, in order to give them over correctly to the Officer of the new Picquet that relieves me†.

Quest. Do you place the same men on the same posts during the time they are on Picquet?

Ans. Yes; and I take care to place the most intelligent men on the most important stations‡.

Quest. Should a Sentry or a man from the Picquet desert, what would you do?

Ans. Immediately inform the Field Officer of the day of the circumstance, and the Officers on my right and left, and be most careful of my immediate security.

Quest. When you are permitted to have a fire for your Picquet, where would you place it?

Ans. As much out of observation as possible; and in case the Picquet should be attacked at night, I should previously point out the place for the Alarm

* Vide ARENTSCHILDT.

† Vide MAJOR-GENERAL SHAW KENNEDY's *Letter to Lord F. Fitzclarence*, and GENERAL CRAUFURD's *Orders for the Light Division*.

‡ Ibid.

Post on the strongest and most defensible ground, and, if possible, *in rear of the fire*, in order that the enemy should be exposed themselves on coming up to it *.

Quest. When do you *always* get your Picquet under arms ?

Ans. One hour before day-break.

Quest. How do you ensure your Sentries looking in the right direction during the dark ?

Ans. By placing a piece of stick horizontally on two forked pegs in the direction of the enemy's posts. This precaution is to be taken also by the body of the Picquet †.

Quest. Under what circumstances should you retire your Picquet ?

Ans. When my flanks are thoroughly threatened, unless I have orders to defend my post to the last ‡.

Quest. If you were forced to retire, in what direction would you fall back ?

Ans. The Field Officer of the day having shown me where the Reserve is posted, I should retire upon it, firing, and disputing the ground ; and on approaching the Reserve, I should order my Picquet, which would be in extended order, to place itself on its flank, and not cloud its front by our retrograde movement, so as to impede its fire on the advancing enemy.

Quest. When you hear firing on your flank or flanks, which indicates a retrograde movement of the Picquets posted there, what should you do ?

Ans. I should retire, throwing myself on the flank

* Vide ARENTSCHILD.

† Vide *Field Exercise Book*. ‡ Ibid.

of the advancing enemy, of course keeping my retreat open to the rear*.

Quest. If after you have been relieved from your post, you hear firing in the front, what should you do?

Ans. I should immediately return, and give my support to the advanced Picquets, and send word of what I had done to the Field Officer of the day†.

Quest. You have stated that a Patrol is a body of troops varying in strength according to circumstances, sent out under command of an Officer or N.-C. Officer, to gain information regarding the enemy; how many different sorts of Patrols are laid down in the Regulations of our service?

Ans. Two. One for patrolling when the enemy is near, the other when the enemy is distant‡.

Quest. What should you do previously to going out with your Patrol when the enemy is near? And how do you move?

Ans. I should inform the Officer or N.-C. Officer on my flank from whence I start, that I am going to patrol.

Quest. Do you always commence patrolling from a flank of your Picquet?

Ans. As a general rule, yes, and return by the other, passing along the front of the line of sentries, never out of their sight, if possible, during the day,

* Vide COLONEL LEACH's *Letter to Lord F. Fitzclarence*.

† Outlying Picquets are frequently commanded by a Field Officer, in which case they usually consist of 200 or 300 men, and are sometimes composed of both infantry and cavalry, according to the nature of the ground. I have known also a light-field piece accompany the Picquets.—COL. LEACH's *Letter to Lord F. Fitzclarence*.

‡ Vide pages 307, 8, 9, of the *Field Exercise Book*.

nor out of hearing the report of a firelock at night, and move as silently as possible, often halting to listen, and returning within the line of sentries to the place from whence I started.

Quest. If you meet an enemy within the line of sentries, what do you do ?

Ans. Immediately fire, and continue doing so to give the alarm ^

Quest. Should a Patrol avoid firing as much as possible ?

Ans. Yes; and give as little alarm as can be avoided to the Picquet †.

Quest. How should you act when ordered to patrol, the enemy being *distant* ?

Ans. I should move in the direction ordered as a small Advance Guard, with feelers in front, flankers, and connecting files, the first being men chosen for their quickness of sight and hearing ‡.

Quest. What should the advanced files and the feelers do if they hear any footsteps approaching ?

Ans. They should instantly fall back to the Patrol; and if a larger body than the party to which they belong was advancing, two men should be sent back to the Picquet to give information to the Officer, who would take immediate measures accordingly.

Quest. What does the Patrol do ?

Ans. It retires steadily, and if possible unobserved, on the Picquet; but, if observed and overtaken, it will keep up an incessant fire to give the alarm.

* Vide *Field Exercise Book*.

† Ibid.

‡ Vide GENERAL S. KENNEDY.

Quest. Should a Patrol fire on meeting an enemy's patrol?

Ans. If possible not, as it tends to alarm unnecessarily.

Quest. Who should inform the Conductors of the different Patrols the route they should take?

Ans. The Field Officer of the day, who would also inform them the distance they should patrol to the front or flanks.

Quest. Do you send out a strong Patrol just before day-break?

Ans. Yes, towards the enemy; and this Patrol must be very cautious, as this is generally the time the enemy makes his attack*.

Quest. What precaution should be taken on the return of the Patrol?

Ans. They must often look to the rear on returning, to ascertain that they are not followed, which is very frequently the case, and frequently halt to listen.

Quest. In what manner would you move a large Patrol to the front?

Ans. In the same way as an advanced guard, with advanced, connecting, and flank files†.

The young Officers having been thoroughly instructed by the Majors of Wings in the Theory of Out-post Duties as pointed out in Part V., Section 8, of the *Field Exercise Book* of the Service, and by the

* "I would also—as long as the fog continued—keep patrols frequently in motion, and with great caution, to the right, left, and front."—COLONEL LEACH'S *Letter to Lord F. Fitzclarence*.

† Vide COLONEL SHORT'S *Treatise on Out-posts, Field Exercise Book*, COLONEL ARENTSCHILD, LLOYD, MITCHELL.

foregoing examination, I recommend the next instruction should be upon Plan No. I., (which should be drawn on a black board, and *enlarged* to a scale of 3 or 4 feet to the mile) which shows a piece of ground to be occupied by one company *only*, its flanks being supposed to rest on, and communicate with, two companies on its right and left, at A and B.

They will then be examined, supposing, separately, themselves to have command of a company, and ordered by their Commanding Officer to take their parties to the front, to act as an outlying picquet; describing with chalk on the board, their line and order of march, the placing their sentinels on arriving on the ground, their own line of movement when going to the right or left to communicate with the Officers on their flanks; and indicating the places where they would post their sentries, and the route of their patrols, and giving reasons for so doing, according to Part V., Sec. 8, *Field Exercise Book*.

They will then consider themselves attacked, and ordered to retire, fighting and disputing the ground, on the reserve at C, and will show on the board how they would occupy the ground at D, (which ground they are supposed to have observed on passing to the front,) and then continue their retreat on the reserve C, marking the way in which they would clear the front of that body, forming on its flanks, or in its rear as its support.

The Commanding Officer will then assemble the entire of his Officers, and will further instruct them on Plan No. II., which should be drawn on a black board, on an enlarged scale of 1 foot to a mile.

The Plan represents a line of about four miles in extent, occupied by the outlying picquets of a battalion which has been ordered out to the front of the division or body of troops cantoned in and about the town of H.

The line occupied by the picquets is an open chain of Down hills, with a river on their left flank (to the Westward) running nearly North and South; the country to the front and centre of the line slightly enclosed, and wooded towards the front, and right or North-East of the line.

The ground being open, it is conjectured that five companies of sixty rank and file are more than sufficient to furnish the line or chains of sentries. The remaining five companies are posted in reserve by the Majors in command of Wings*.

The Picquets are furnished as follows:

Three companies from the Left Wing and two companies from the Right Wing—Total five companies, leaving five in reserve.

The company on the extreme left of the line has detached a party to the West, consisting of 1 serjeant and 6 rank and file to watch a ford on the river—this detached party furnishes one double sentry for this purpose. There is another detached party from the same picquet or company to its front and flank or North-West, consisting of 1 Subaltern, 1 serjeant, and 12 rank and file to the bridge—furnishing a double sentry to the bridge-head to watch that approach, and to furnish a

* The Reserves and Picquets should be as much as possible under cover, in houses, barns, &c., but with reference to the position of the advanced sentries.

patrol on the West of the river. The object in sending out these detached parties is to secure the left flank of this picquet, which being the extreme left of the line is consequently exposed to the Westward. A patrol is likewise furnished from the left company, consisting of 1 serjeant and 3 rank and file to its front (the North) with orders to patrol to the Eastward along the front of the line until it communicates with the patrol belonging to the picquet or company on its right. It also sends patrols "*across*" the river.

The sentries furnished by this left picquet are two double sentries, posted on the crest or top of the ridge, as much out of sight as possible—these sentries at night would be advanced* sufficiently far down the face of the hill to prevent their being exposed, or seen in relief against the sky.—At night it would be necessary to increase the number of sentries, thus making the number furnished by the left company four double ones instead of two, or more in foggy weather.

The Left Picquet will, therefore, be found to stand thus :

	Subt.	Serjeant	Rk. & File.	
Detached parties..	1	.. 1	.. 12	— (bridge)
Ditto, do. ..	0	.. 1	.. 6	— (ford)
Ditto, do. ..	0	.. 1	.. 3	— (patrol)
<hr/>				
Total det ^a . parties	1	.. 3	.. 21	rank & file.

* It is supposed to be better to advance the night sentries beyond the hills, than to draw them over the hill and nearer the picquet, because the hill might be seized during the night should the sentries be withdrawn, and a contest ensue for the height.—Vide COLONEL LEACH'S *Book*.

Leaving the main body of the picquet to consist of 1 Captain, 1 Subaltern, and 39 rank and file, leaving sufficient for patrols.

The next Picquet in the line furnishes three double sentries from its main body, and a patrol; the same rules being applicable in this instance with regard to the moving forward of the sentries at night, and the chain would here, in like manner, be *doubled*.

The next Picquet on the Right furnishes two sentries from its main body—a patrol and detached or advanced party of 1 serjeant and 6 rank and file for the purpose of securing the small wood to its front, (the North). This detached party at night furnishing one double sentry to the front of the wood, which sentry, by day, they could dispense with, as they would visit the wood frequently, and because the wood is commanded by the hill to its right (or Eastward)—*vide Plan*. These complete the three Picquets furnished by the Left Wing.

The next Picquet on the right, commences those furnished by the Right Wing. It has posted three double sentries to its Front, and sends out two patrols (*vide Plan*), consisting of 1 serjeant and 6 rank and file to each patrol. The right patrol of the two has orders to proceed to the wood in its front, and ascertain, from time to time, that no force of the enemy is concealing or concentrating itself there.

The next Picquet, the Grenadiers, is the extreme right of the line, furnishing a detached party to its front and flank (North-East)—*vide Plan*—consisting of 1 subaltern, 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 18 rank

and file, which detached party furnishes one double sentry to its extreme right (the East), that flank being unprotected, and a patrol to its front to the wood, which patrol communicates round its right flank and rear with a patrol from the right reserve.

The reserve of the Right Wing is the strongest, because, in this line of Picquets, the right flank is more exposed than the left, which has the river to protect it. It patrols in the rear, and communicates with the right picquet by its right flank, by patrols, every half-hour.

In this plan (No. II.) it will be seen that a regiment is ordered to cover the cantonments of a division or brigade in its rear at H. It must, however, be observed that on actual service, companies from different regiments might be appointed to this duty; but, in order to make the example as clear as possible, a regiment is named to cover the line of country in the following manner :

The Adjutant, or Quarter-Master General of the division, or Brigade-Major having informed the Officer in command of the regiment ordered out, that his right flank out-post is to rest on X, and his left on W, he immediately takes a view of the country, (or refers to his map,) and orders his two Majors to divide the line of country ordered to be covered, between their two Wings, leaving to them the placing the reserves, or doing so himself.

The Majors, on finding where their respective flanks of wings are to rest, will indicate to the Officers in command of companies, the points on which their respective flanks are to be placed; the companies on

moving out, *diverging* from their cantonments to the places they are to occupy. The picquets and their sentries, being posted, the Majors of wings will visit the line and see that all is correct previous to their being visited by the General or Commanding Officer.

It must now be observed that such a line of country as is represented in the plan No. II., should, on account of its openness,* in a great measure be occupied by cavalry videttes, or both arms conjointly. Indeed, it is strongly recommended, and should so be ordered on all out-post duty†, that the outlaying picquet, even in an enclosed country, should be composed of the two arms for the purpose of carrying information to the rear. But, in the present instance, it must be supposed that no cavalry is opposed to the out-post of infantry on the plan, in order to place the picquet in their proper posts and positions, according to the foregoing rules‡.

After carefully studying the Plan No. II., the Officers will be examined by the Commanding Officer in the following Questions, "*and any others*" which he may consider applicable to the subject.

Question. Why does the left Picquet send out two detached parties ?

Answer. Because it is a Flank Picquet, and its left is assailable by the ford and bridge over the river; consequently, it is necessary to post a party

* Even when light artillery can with safety be brought to the front it should be done.—Vide NAPIER's *Peninsular War*, vol. 3, p. 275.

† Vide COLONEL LEACH.

‡ Vide NAPIER's *Peninsular War*, vol. 3, p. 275.

at each of those points ; and the distance is too great to furnish the sentry from the main picquet.

Quest. Is the Party near the bridge properly placed on the map ?

Ans. No ; it should be under cover in the advanced houses of the village ; taking care to communicate with the body of the Picquet by the communicating Sentry *.

Quest. Where do you move the Sentries to at night ?

Ans. Either to the front or flanks of the hill, as the ground may be best suited, in order to look upwards, as objects are thus more easily seen than looking downwards from a height at night †.

Quest. Would you move your Picquet at night, after altering the position of your Sentries ?

Ans. Yes, if the enemy could have seen the exact locality of my Picquet during the day, or could see my bivouac fire, or if it were necessary to be nearer my advanced Sentry ; otherwise I might remain where I was during the day, but it is preferable to move if the enemy is near ‡.

Quest. Is the detached Party of No. 7 Company wrongly placed ?

Ans. Yes.

Quest. In what way ?

Ans. By being in rear of the small wood in its front.

Quest. Where ought it to be placed ?

* Vide LIEUT.-GENERAL Sir C. NAPIER's *Letter to Lord F. Fitzclarence*.

† Vide MAJOR-GENERAL SHAW KENNEDY's *Letter to Lord F. Fitzclarence*.

‡ Vide COLONEL ARENTSCHILDT.

Ans. In the wood, with a Sentry on the South side, and a communicating Sentry belonging to No. 7 Company on the top of the hill*.

Quest. The Grenadier Company being on the right flank, and having no Picquet on its outer flank, and therefore, unprotected, how does it secure its flank, observing also that the wood, which is about 200 yards in its front, is too large to occupy thoroughly?

Ans. It detaches a party *or two* to its flank, keeping up a communication with them, and patrolling through the day to some distance into the wood, and at night-fall occupying the wood with a detached party, and patrolling well to the front, flank, and rear†.

Quest. What Patrol should the Grenadier flank and rear Patrol communicate with?

Ans. With that of the Right Reserve, which should patrol to its right flank and rear.

Quest. Do you conceive the troops in the cantonments are now as secure as can be expected under the circumstances of being in front of an active enemy?

Ans. Yes, unless it should be foggy weather, or very dark nights, when I should double or treble my Sentries, to avoid the possibility of being dishonoured by a surprise‡.

The foregoing instructions given by the Commanding Officer regarding Out-post Duty, will be put in practice in detail by Majors of Wings, commencing with the

* Vide GENERAL SIR C. NAPIER's *Letter*.

† Vide COLONEL LEACH's *Letter*. GENERAL SIR C. NAPIER's Alteration of Plan No. II., and Field Officer of the Day's Report, as well as of the Officer in command of that Post.

‡ Vide COLONEL LEACH.

Officers only (without men) of "*one company at a time, in Skeleton Drill*," on any chosen piece of ground near the quarters of the regiment, which could be watched or covered by one company of 60 files, a body of that number being supposed to occupy the ground.

The Officer to command the supposed Picquet must have pointed out to him *most distinctly* where his flanks are to rest. He will then make himself acquainted with the different heights, &c. within his command, will decide where he would place his sentries, the body of his picquet, communicating sentries, &c., the same as if he had men with him. On the Major of his Wing or Commanding Officer, visiting him, he will point out the spots where he would have placed his sentries, &c.; the Major, or Commanding Officer, making such alterations as he may think proper, giving the young Officer "*clearly to understand the cause and reason of any alterations he may order.*" After which, the young Officer will send in a sketch and report of the ground he has occupied, showing the places where the sentries would have stood during the day, and any alteration that would have taken place at night.—*Vide* Company Officers' Plans.

This Skeleton Drill will be practised by Wings, under their respective Majors, who will indicate the place where "*their*" supposed reserves would be posted, which should, if possible, be under cover.

It will be evident, that in practising the above Skeleton Drill, any harassing of the troops for the sake of instructing *the Officers only*, is completely avoided, and that can be practised at all times, when the severity of duty, either garrison or regimental, precludes the

having the men out with the Officers ; indeed, the men have not much to do, except to keep a good look out to their front and flanks, while the Officer on this particular duty, has to use his head, eyes, and ears.

The Commanding Officer of the regiment having had all his Officers instructed by the Skeleton Drill, as well as with men, will take out his entire battalion on any line of country, covering a *supposed position*, cantonments, or camp in his rear, pointing out to the Majors of Wings, where their flanks are to rest. Previous to leaving the barracks, or cantonments, it must be most clearly explained to both Officers and men, that the rights of property must be respected, and that no damage be done to any fence, or paling, under any circumstances whatever ; and the following orders must be read before marching off :

“1 No hedge to be broken down or attempted to be “crossed.”

“2 No private garden or pleasure ground to be “entered.”

“3 The road not to be left, except where no harm “can possibly be done to private property*.”

Whenever Officers find it impossible from the above reasons to place sentries where they ought to be to have a good look out, the Officer commanding the picquet will show the places where they *should have been*, to his Commanding Officer, when he

* In this country from its being generally much enclosed, the sentries will have to be placed on and along the roads, that run parallel to the *supposed position* or cantonment which they are ordered out to protect.—*Vide* LIEUT. WALLACE'S Plan of a position of out-posts in “an inclosed country.”

visits his picquet, and will mark the spot on the plan where they should have stood. Majors of Wings should also point out where their reserves should have been placed.

The Commanding Officer having made his visits to the several posts, picquets, and reserves, Officers commanding Wings and Picquets, will give in plans and reports of the ground they have occupied; the greatest care being taken that the plans are drawn according to a scale of 4 inches to a mile; that the cardinal points are correctly laid down, and the comparative height of the hills distinctly shown, either by *shading* or by *numbers*, the lowest being No. 1.

It is not at all requisite that the Plans should always be finished in the superior manner in which most of those are executed, of which *fac similes* have been given; but the above rules as to scale, &c., must be strictly adhered to.

When the Commanding Officer of a regiment has looked over the different plans of his Majors and Company Officers, he will make, or cause one large plan to be made, of the entire position, as shown by the plans of Lieut.-Colonel Torrens, and that of Captain Prince Edward of Saxe Weimar and Colonel Cadogan's.

REPORTS.

Report of the Major of the Right Wing, (or the Field Officer of the Day) relative to the Picquets, as shown in Plate II.

Sir,

In obedience to your orders I marched with the companies of the Right Wing, having previously ascertained that the men going on duty had been inspected by the Officers in command, and that each man had sixty rounds, their rations ready cooked (or uncooked, as the case might be) and biscuit for two days, flour or rice, &c. On leaving the town H., I pointed out to the Officers commanding the picquets, the spots where their flanks ought to rest, which I had previously done on the map; and directed them to diverge to their different positions, taking care to observe those places on their advance, where they could *make a stand* should they be driven in, and pointing out where the Reserve would be placed, the different Companies moved off at 5 a. m.*

I visited the different Picquets by day and night. I ordered Patrols to be sent out to the front of the large wood on the right; to proceed to a considerable distance on the road directly in their front and to their flanks. I may here remark, that it would have been

* Vide COLONEL SIR C. NAPIER'S *Remarks on Plan No. II.*

of the greatest use for the above duty, had a non-commissioned officer and six hussars been with my Right Picquet which being unprotected was greatly harassed by the constant patrolling which was necessary*, knowing that the enemy was but a few miles in my front and in force, and having no troops on my right. Under these circumstances I caused the Reserve to send Patrols constantly to the right and rear, communicating with the Right Picquet and its detached party.

I had to alter the position of the detached party of the Right Picquet, considering it much *too* near the wood; and according to your order when visiting the Picquets, I placed it in the wood†, the sentry on the hill on the extreme right being able to keep up the communication between the body of the Picquet and the party in the wood. I also, according to your orders, desired the Patrol of No. 1 Company to patrol into, and round, the village in its front, which it had not done previously to your visiting the posts‡.

The detached party of No. 7 was advanced to the front of the small wood in its front by your direction, the Officer in command excusing himself in not having done so before, stating that the sentry on the hill, on the picquet side of the wood, entirely commanded the ground in its front§.

According to your orders, I caused the night-sentries to be placed more at the East and West sides of the hill, and on their flanks at their base||.

* Vide COLONEL LEACH, *Duties of Troops*.

† Vide SIR C. NAPIER'S *Alteration of Plan No. II*.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid.

|| Vide M.-GEN. SHAW KENNEDY'S *Letter to Lord F. Fitzclarence*.

Nothing could exceed the zeal and anxiety of the Officers to do their duty ; and, considering that this was nearly the first time they had been on such a duty, they took up their ground with discernment and intelligence. Indeed had not Major * * * and myself instructed the Officers during our passage on board ship in the duties of Officers on Out-posts, I know not what might have happened to us, with such an active enemy in our front ; as I grieve to say our late Commanding Officer, Colonel * * *, never gave us the slightest instruction in Out-post Duty or Patrolling, although such instruction is strictly enjoined in the Regulations of the service,—*Field Exercise Book*, p. 296 to 308 ; but I grieve to say that notwithstanding these strict and most necessary orders, I, who have been sixteen years in the service, have never been instructed by my superiors. I merely mention this, as the cause of any error you may have seen in the disposition of my Picquets, and as an excuse for my professional ignorance ; but which excuse I am fully aware the English public (who pay) would not have conceived sufficient, had the enemy, through my ignorance, passed my Picquets, dishonored us by surprise, and made the Division, for whose safety I was supposed to be responsible, prisoners.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient humble Servant,

* * *

Major of Right Wing of the Picquets.

*Report of the Officer in command of Right Picquet
(the Grenadier Guards) relative to Plate No. II.*

Sir,

I inspected the Grenadier Company yesterday morning previous to marching it off as an out-laying Picquet. Each man had sixty rounds of ammunition. Their arms were all in good order, and the copper caps in their leather pockets; their meat cooked, two days' biscuit, and the rice and flour which were issued to them yesterday. I made a nominal list of every man I had with me. I had a pencil (or pen) and paper, a map of the country, a telescope and compass. On your pointing out to me the right and left of the ground where my Picquet was to be posted, I moved as an Advance Guard to a high hill, about the centre of my position, which would command the entire position I was to occupy; and observing the ground attentively as I went, the roads that came in on my rear, the bridges, &c., I decided on a post which I could easily defend, were I forced to retire; consisting of a bridge over an impassable brook, and two stone houses, which commanded it, and could be easily defended and not turned.

I halted on the hill; provided for my immediate security, by placing sentries on the outer circle of the hill, and took a serjeant and twelve men towards the point where my Right was to rest, viz., a circular hill on my right, leaving double sentries as I passed along, and keeping them in view. On arriving at the extreme right, I found no Picquet there; I therefore ordered the serjeant and four men to patrol into the wood and to the flank, with orders to return to the body of the Picquet; and returning to my Picquet, reducing

two sentries on my way that were unnecessary, I ordered Lieutenant * * * to take a party to the road, about 450 paces in my front. I then communicated with the Officer on my left, Lieutenant * * * having done so previously, and placed the sentries, which, finding too thickly posted, I reduced.

I was visited by the Major-General at sun-set, who ordered me to place my detached party on the road, under Lieutenant * * *, in the wood in his front, and "*thoroughly to watch it*," which was done*. He also ordered, after asking me where I intended to post my night sentries, to place them lower on the hill, and more on their flanks, which was done†. I moved the body of my Picquet after dark as I thought my fires might be seen from the wood, and between the hills; but I returned to the original ground before the sun was up. My Picquet was under arms one hour before day-light. My Patrols went out every half-hour after the Reliefs, which went every hour.

I observed, as I mentioned to you when you visited me, a large column of dust apparently six miles due North, and which continued to rise to the East, our right, the enemy's left; but I could see no troops; and the Patrols that went to the North, and towards the dust, did not meet any Patrols of the enemy. A slight musketry-firing was heard to our right. I was relieved at six o'clock, a. m. I went round the sentries and posts with the Officer who relieved me;

* Vide SIR C. NAPIER'S *Alteration on Plan No. II.*

† Vide MAJOR-GENERAL SHAW KENNEDY'S *Letter to Lord F. Fitzclarence.*

and gave him in writing the orders I received from the Major-General yesterday. I heard every sentry give over his orders to the relieving sentries*.

May I beg you will inform the Major-General, if I am committing no breach of discipline or respect, that I fear my right flank was not placed quite as he wished it, on his visiting my post; but as you know, we have never been instructed in Out-post Duty; and that had it not been for your and Major * * * 's kindness in teaching us something of it when on our passage out to act against an enemy, when we ought already to have been acquainted with it, we should have been totally ignorant of our duty. This is my only excuse; but I feel that justice was not done me by my late superior, in not having taught me my duty according and in obedience to the laws of the country and the regulations of the service.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient humble servant.

* * *

Captain of the Right Picquet.

HAVING now shown the system of instruction in Out-post Duties which I have established in my district, grounded strictly on the regulations of the service as

* GENERAL CRAUFURD'S *Orders to Light Division*. Vide MAJ.-GENERAL SHAW KENNEDY'S *Letter to Lord F. Fitzclarence*.

ordered in pages 126-7 of the *Queen's Orders*, and in the *Field Exercise Book*, supported by the authority of the distinguished Officers who have been kind enough to assist me with their great fund of military knowledge and experience, I shall proceed to lay before my readers the manner in which the system has been put in practice, and "*carried out*" by those under my orders.

I should remark that the Plans and Reports are taken almost at random from the large collection I have in my possession from almost every regiment I have had the honour and good fortune to have had under my orders; indeed, from all being good, it has been difficult to choose which or what regimental Plans and Reports to select for the above purpose: I have therefore taken those of the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards, now under my command, commanded by Colonel Thornton, and whose Adjutant is Prince Edward of Saxe Weimer; and those of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens, and of Captain Wynn of the Royal Fusiliers, and Major Mackirdy of 69th Regiment; and one Plan also of Lieutenant Wallace, of the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards, showing a line of picquets in an enclosed country, covering a supposed cantonment in its rear. The latter I have inserted with a view of showing that, however intersected a country may be where a regiment may be quartered, instruction can equally be carried on, although it is certainly more difficult than in an open hilly country like the Downs about Winchester or Chichester. Underneath is my letter to Lieutenant Colonel Torrens, ordering out his regiment, which is nearly the same to all Commanding Officers, with the

exception of naming the different positions I wish their corps to occupy. A Commanding Officer sending the same style of order to an Officer on detachment, would receive similar Plans and Reports as those given hereafter, by which arrangement Officers on detachment with a very small number of men, can be practised in the essential duties of Picquets and Patrolling.

Sir,—You will take the Battalion under your orders, and place it (to act as out-laying picquets in front of a supposed enemy) with your right on the River Itchen, under St. Catherine's Mount, and your left on the hill above Avington Park, to cover the supposed cantonments of a Division in your rear.

I have the honor to be, &c., &c.,

FREDERICK FITZCLARENCE,

Major-General.

Lt. Col. Torrens, Commanding R. W. F.

Winchester.

Winchester, 10th March, 1849.

My Lord,—Agreeable to your orders, I took up on the 8th instant the position directed,—viz., with my right at the Bridge, near St. Catherine's Hill, and with my left in front of Avington Park. Owing to the length of the front, I considered it essential to

establish four Reserves for the proper support of the Picquets,—viz., that of the right at Bar End, the right centre at Chilcomb, the left centre at the New Inn on the Alresford Road, and the extreme left (which should be a strong Reserve from the nature of the country and its distance from the cantonments) at the village of Avington.

I enclose, herewith, the Reports of the Officers commanding the Picquets, with their sketch of each post; and I beg to transmit, in addition, a general sketch of the whole position, showing the entire chain of Sentries, Picquets, and Reserves.

I have the honor to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient servant,

ARTHUR W. TORRENS,

Lt. Col. R. W. F., Commanding 1st. Bat.


To M.-Gen. Lord F. Fitzclarence, G.C.H.*.

Winchester, 8th of March, 1849.

Sir,—I have the honor to report to you, that according to the order of yesterday's date, I proceeded with my Company at 8 o'clock this morning to take up a position at Avington Park, being on the left of a line of picquets.

On examining the ground, I found that the park and country to the right of it was much wooded, I therefore placed my line of sentries in advance, on some clear heights, communicating on my right with

* Vide *Plan No. III.*



Arthur. W. Torrens.
Lt. Colonel R. W. Fusiliers
Comm. 1st Battⁿ
Winchester 9th March 1849.

Lieut. Phillips. I detached a party to a cottage (brick) situated in some thin wood towards my right, and another to a farm-house (brick, with out-houses) to the left of my position, to watch the main road and communications that lay on that flank. The main party of my picquet I advanced to the hedge-row of the park, to be within reach if required, leaving the park and house to fall back upon, if necessary. I also communicated with the reserve in rear.

At 11 o'clock all my arrangements were complete. By day my sentries were able to see all the country to my front and left; by night it would have been necessary to increase their number, and watch the bridge communicating with the road on my left. I should also have patrolled round that flank and through the plantation in front.

I perceived a church and village in advance of my left, too far for me to visit, also a large house in a park, which circumstances I reported to the Field Officer of the day.

I enclose herewith a sketch of my position.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

D. LYSONS, Capt. R. W. Fus^{rs}

Lt.-Col. Torrens, Commanding R. W. Fusiliers *.

Winchester, 9th March, 1849.

Sir,—I have the honor to report for your information, that yesterday, in compliance with your

* Vide *Plan No. IV.*

order, I took up a position with No. 1 Company on the Hill in front of Chilcomb, having left a small party on the side next the village, for the purpose of communicating with the Reserve posted there. I advanced my Picquet to the opposite foot of the hill, where I found an enclosed farm-yard, admirably suited for my head-quarters; from them I detached a party under the command of the Serjeant-Major to occupy the right extremity of the chain of hill in my front, which, commanding the entrance to the valley, forms a very important point of the position. I threw out a chain of sentries along the front, which, from its elevation, commanded a most extensive tract of country, communicating with Lieutenant Tritton on the right, and Captain Campbell on the left. I found four double sentries amply sufficient for this duty by day. I enclose a small sketch of the position, in which is indicated the change and increase I should think it necessary to make if posting them for night duty. Upon first taking up this position, I sent a party to reconnoitre the small village of Montend, which lay about a quarter of a mile in advance of my right front.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

ROBERT BRUCE, Lieut. R. W. Fusiliers.


To Lt.-Col. A. W. Torrens, Commanding R.W.F.*

* Vide *Plan No V.*

Position of
No 2 Company
Extreme Left



Village of Morehead




day sentry +
night sentry +
picquet □

Position of 1st Company R. Bruce
8th March 1849.
L.L.
v.F.

Scale of 12 Inches to a Mile
2 Miles



F. B. Tritton





Winchester, March 10th, 1849.

Sir,—I have the honor to report that in obedience to your orders, I marched to the bridge at the foot of St. Catherine's Hill, where the main body of my Picquet was stationed, my right resting on the River Itchen. I then sent out two detached parties, one on the road to Twyford, and the other to the entrance of a lane in my front, which communicated with Lieutenant Bruce's Picquet on my left.

I had seven double sentries, and I should not have increased them at night, but should have withdrawn them from the rising ground.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

T. B. TRITTON,

Lieutenant, R. W. Fusiliers.

To Lieut.-Col. Torrens,
Commanding R. W. Fusiliers*.

Winchester, November 15th, 1850.

SIR,—I have the honor to report to you, that, agreeable to your orders, I proceeded with the company under my command, to occupy the position forming the extreme right of the line taken up by the Regiment.

I marched out of Winchester by the Romsey Road, which I quitted at about half a mile from the town, and proceeded along the Roman Road leading to Old Sarum.

After marching about two miles from Winchester, I came to the position shown in the annexed sketch†. I posted my Company behind a hedge, near the top of

* Vide *Plan No. VI.*

† See page 84.

the hill, a short distance to the right of the Roman Road, with one sentry in front communicating with the Company on the left. I posted another sentry to the right at the head of the valley; and placed my right section close to a small lane on the right, with a sentry a short distance on their right as shown in the annexed sketch. I also posted a sentry at the head of the valley near the farm house, a position where the surrounding country could be seen for several miles. I also sent out a strong patrol, under a non-commissioned officer, along the Roman Road to a considerable distance in advance of my position, with orders to search the wood in my front thoroughly.

After having posted my own Company, I proceeded to visit the other Companies of the Right Wing of which you ordered me to take charge.

Lieut. Miller occupied the ground to the left of the Roman Road with his Picquet, posted between the Roman Road and the Romsey Road, with a sentry on the left of the Roman Road, one on the right of the lane leading from Pit Farm, and another on a projecting point of ground about half way between Pit Farm Lane and the high road. A strong Patrol was sent from this Company, with orders to proceed along the left of the hollow road leading from Pit Farm, and then to patrol the ground between that and the high road, and thence to follow up the valley to the position of the Company on his left.

Captain Mills occupied the left of the turnpike road, and formed the left of the Right Wing. He was posted in rear of a small wood, one section being detached to occupy a farm on the extreme left.

He had one sentry posted on the top of the hill, and another about half way down, while a third, posted close to the lane leading to Hursley, completed the chain of communication with the Left Wing. A Patrol from his left section proceeded along the lane towards Hursley turning to the right a little way beyond the last-named sentry, and crossing the top of the hill reached the Romsey Road, a short distance beyond a small fir plantation.

Lieut. Edgell with his Company was posted as a Reserve in rear of Pitfield Farm close to the turnpike road. He sent out a strong patrol round the whole of the right of the position, passing through Crab Wood, which they had orders to examine carefully, and returning by the Roman Road.

The position in rear of Crab Wood is the best in the neighbourhood, although considerably impaired as a post of observation by the extensive wood in front of the right. It herefore kept patrols constantly moving to the front and through the wood which I occupied at night.

Strong posts of cavalry should be posted in advance and on the outskirts of the wood. They should send out frequent patrols on all the neighbouring roads.

The Roman Road passing along by Crab Wood is of no great importance, as it ceases to be practicable about a mile and a half from the position.

The small road from Pit Farm is of no importance whatever, as it soon forks off to the Roman and Turnpike Roads.

The Turnpike Road is of very great importance. About a mile and a quarter from the position occupied by the Picquets, the road divides, one branch leading

to Southampton through the village of Hursley, the other to Romsey. This latter is the most direct road from London to Dorchester and Weymouth. Strong parties should be posted considerably in advance on each of these roads with orders to patrol frequently. There is a small road on the left of the position leading more directly to Hursley; it is practicable for all arms, and should be carefully watched.

All these roads concentrate on Winchester.

There is an admirable line of retreat from the position by a line of heights above Winchester to the North-West, this crosses the London Road about a mile from Winchester.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

HERB^r. W. W^{ms}. WYNN,

Capt. Royal Fusiliers.

Lieut.-Colonel Yea,
Commanding Royal Fusiliers.

Chichester, January 25th, 1851.

My Lord,—In obedience to your lordship's orders, which I received on the 23rd, I this morning march'd the Battalion to the line, pointed out by your lordship.

I gave the command of the Right Wing to Lieut-Col. Thornton; and separating from it at the cross-roads South of East and Mid Lavant, I proceeded with the Left Wing by the road in the direction of Rooke's Hill.

Upon arriving on the open Down South of Rooke's Hill, with the assistance of Lieut.-Col. Cadogan, I directed the different Companies upon points in the line, which are marked in the accompanying plan, thus forming a chain of sentries, and communicating with those of the Right Wing at the ford of the stream immediately below Binderton.

Both Officers and men appeared to me to take up their ground with much promptness and regularity.

With regard to the line we occupied, whether regarded as a chain of out-posts, or as a position occupied by a considerable force, I apprehend that any force occupying Binderton, should be directed to retire by the open country to the rear and to the right of that place, and *not* by the high road, inasmuch as a hostile force advancing from East Lavant, and forcing the line of Picquets at Rooke's Hill, would be at Singleton before the force from Binderton could be withdrawn through West Dean and Singleton.

The ground in front of the line appears to be adapted to the proper use of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

There is a very strong position on the high ground called Levin Down, crossing the road in rear of Singleton, and reaching along the high ground in the rear of West Dean. I conceive this position to be impregnable in front, but to be turned on the right by a movement along the very open country to the right of West Dean. I prefer, therefore, a position about a mile to the rear, with the flanks resting on Singleton Forest and West Dean Woods. These Woods are so

far peculiar, that troops might move through them; and there is a remarkable plateau in the rear of them, along which Reserves might be moved to the right or left flank if required, or a flank movement made.

Your lordship will readily detect many errors in these observations, and will, I know, as cheerfully pardon them.

I have the honor to remain

Your Lordship's obedient servant,

THOMAS WOOD,

Capt. & Lt.-Col. Commanding 3rd Bat.
Grenadier Guards.

M.-Gen. the Lord Frederick Fitzclarence.

Barracks, Chichester, January 25, 1851.

SIR.—I have the honour to state that, in pursuance of orders received from Lieutenant-Colonel W. Thornton, I proceeded in command of No. 1 Company* to occupy a position as a Picquet of Observation, for the purpose of watching the movements of a supposed enemy in the neighbourhood of Chichester.

My Picquet was already told off into three reliefs, and I had ascertained was provided with its rations.

On my march along the Western slope of Kingley Vale, a semicircular hollow, with its sides almost precipitous towards the North, but less steep at its Eastern and Western extremities, I dropped double sentries to

* 1 Lieutenant, 3 Serjeants, 54 Rank and File.

communicate with the right sentries of No. 2 Company. On arriving at the crest of Bow Hill, I desired Serjeant Columbine to post the Company in a position I pointed out to him, immediately behind the crest on the South slope of Bow Hill, and myself proceeded with the remainder of my first relief to the Westward, to take measures for the immediate security of the right flank of my Company, which was to be *en l'air*.

From the openess of the country, I found it was not necessary to leave any support to these sentries nearer than the main body of the Picquet, during the day time. I then returned along the whole of my chain of sentries, relieving a couple that I deemed unnecessary, and communicated with the Officer commanding the Picquet on my left, Captain Wilson.

I have omitted to state that I had made arrangements with Captain Wilson, that our patrols should meet and communicate at a given time, hourly, at the flanks of our Companies.


These patrols were ordered to go by the front and return by the rear of the chain of Sentries.

Having made these arrangements for the security of my Picquet, I found I could cover the extent of my position with five double sentries by day, which I could change to six, and a detached party of a corporal and five men by night. The day sentries are marked ○ in the plan; the night sentries ○; the night detached party ▮*.

In the event of being driven in by the enemy, I should have retired by the road marked *R* on the plan,

* Other marks are used in the plans as printed.

Position occupied by No. 1 Company, 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards, Jan. 25, 1851. CAM. MUNRO, Lieut. and Captain Grenadier Guards.



to the North-Eastward, taking care not to hamper the fire of the reserve, and myself harassing and retarding the advance of the enemy as much as possible.

My Patrol to my right had orders, as that flank was *en l'air*, to circle well round the sentries both to the front and rear, during the night. This was unnecessary during the day, as owing to the nature of the ground, no enemy could stir on that flank without being immediately detected.

The roads marked are mere tracks on the turf, but tolerably levelled.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient humble servant,

CAM. MUNRO.

Lieutenant and Captain, Grenadier Guards.

Chichester Barracks, January 29, 1861.

SIR,—I have the honor to state that in compliance with orders received from Colonel Wood, I proceeded in command of No. 2 Company *, 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards, on Saturday the 25th January, to occupy a position as a Picquet of Observation, for the purpose of watching the movements of a supposed enemy in the neighbourhood of Chichester.

My Picquet had already been told off into three reliefs, and I had ascertained that they were provided with their rations.






* Strength of Company, 1 Lieutenant and Captain, 2 Sergeants, 48 Rank and File.


Having arrived at the appointed ground, I halted the main body of my Picquet under the lee of the hill to the South-East of Bow Hill, and proceeded at once to take steps for my security. For this purpose, dividing my first relief into two parties, I directed Serjeant Hardy to take command of one, and to proceed to the left of my position, then to communicate with the Picquet on my left, dropping sentries as he went along, in such positions as he might deem expedient, and further stationing Serjeant Hancock and six men close to some hay-ricks at the cross-roads; returning, after having fulfilled the above instructions, by the line in which he had posted his sentries, and withdrawing those which might seem superfluous.

I proceeded myself to the North-West or right of my position with the remainder of my relief, posting my sentries for immediate security as I went along, and having communicated with the Officer in command of the Picquet on my right, and thus assured myself that my flank was guarded, I returned along the line of sentries I had originally posted, and found that (owing to the open nature of the ground between the right of my position and the main body of my Picquet,) I could safely withdraw two double sentries.

Having returned to the main body of my Picquet, I ascertained from Serjeant Hardy, that he had fulfilled my instructions and secured the safety of my left flank, by communicating with the Officer in command of the Picquet on my left.

I next proceeded to visit the remainder of the line of sentries, and found them judiciously placed,

-  Main Picquet.
-  Detached Party.
-  Day Sentry.
-  Night do.
-  Connecting Sentry.



Plan of the Position occupied by No. 2 Company, 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards, on the 25th January, 1851, by HERBERT L. WILSON, Lieut. and Captain, Commanding No. 2 Company.

and had no occasion to alter the disposition of Serjeant Hardy's arrangements.

I have omitted to state that I made arrangements with the Officers in command of the Picquets on my right and left, to send out our patrols every hour so as to meet each other, as nearly as possible at a given time on the flanks of my Picquet.

Having completed all the arrangements for the security of my Picquet, I found that I could perfectly cover the extent of my position with six double sentries by day, which I could reinforce by two extra by night. The positions of the day sentries are marked ☉ in the accompanying plan ; the night Sentries ○.

The Reserve of my Wing being posted on the Chilgrove Road, about a mile to the rear of my left flank, in the event of being driven in, I should retire by the road or path leading across the Down from the *right* of my position, but communicating with the high road a little further on, so as not to cloud its fire against the advancing enemy, upon whose flank I should hover as long as I could do so with safety, during my retreat, for the purpose of harassing him as long as possible, and giving the Reserve ample time to prepare for his reception.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

HERBERT LOWTHER WILSON,

Lieutenant and Captain, Grenadier Guards.

To Lieut.-Col. Thornton,
Officer Commanding Right Wing,
3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards.

Chichester Barracks, January 27th, 1851.

Sir,—According to orders received, I proceeded on the 25th instant with four companies, forming the Left Wing of the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards, to take up the position assigned to it as a chain of out-posts, extending from the centre of the *main* position at Binderton on which the left of the Right Wing rested, to the bluff called Rooke's Hill, overlooking Goodwood Race Ground, facing to the Southward, the supposed object being to watch the movements of an enemy in the direction of Chichester.

Having arrived on the ground through East Lavant and the Singleton Road, I disposed of the different Companies under my charge in Out-picquets, in the following manner: W. 5, commencing at Binderton, where its right sentries communicated with the left of W. 4, from thence across the Lavant (a fordable stream) to where the ground begins to ascend to Hayes Down. Picquet on the rise of the hill in a small wood extending along the rear of this and the next post to the left. A serjeant's party occupied a small clump a little in advance. Lieut. Morant, in command W. 6, continued the line along the crest of Hayes Down, whose Picquet was a little to the rear in the wood above-mentioned. A serjeant's party occupied a small stone enclosure a little to the front. Lieut. Burgoyne, W. 7, continued the line over the Down that rises towards Rooke's Hill, where it communicated with the right of W. 8. Picquet at the angle of the wood where the road to West Dean inter-

sects the position. Captain Rowley, W. 8, occupied the remainder of the open Down to Rooke's Hill. This height is crowned by a circular trench and beacon, the remains of a Roman camp. The Picquet being in the trench, a strong serjeant's party occupied a small wood to the Eastward, commanding the approach from Goodwood. At night, sentries would also be required in a small wood at some distance down the slope of the hill to the front of the position. Captain Neville commanded this post.

These different posts being taken up, I assured myself that the proper reliefs and patrols were told according to the requirements of each Picquet; as also that the communication between the different posts was effectually established according to the regulations for Out-post Duty.

I satisfied myself that the nature of the ground and roads in the rear afforded the means of easy retreat on Singleton. I should place the reserve of the Left Wing in any convenient spot contiguous to this road, as being accessible to all, but nearest to my extreme left or unguarded flank. The Colonel in command having inspected my arrangements, I was ordered to withdraw my Picquets and march to barracks.

I beg to enclose a Field Sketch of the position occupied by the Left Wing, as also the Reports of the Officers of the Left Wing.

I have the honor to be Sir,

Your obedient humble servant,

G. CADOGAN,

Capt. & Lt.-Col. 3rd Bat. Gr. Gds.,
Commanding Left Wing.

Barracks, Chichester, January 28th, 1851.

Sir,—I have the honor to state, that in pursuance of orders received from Lt.-Col. Wood, I proceeded in command of No. 8 Company*, to occupy a position as a Picquet of Observation, for the purpose of watching the movements of a supposed enemy in the neighbourhood of Chichester.

My Picquet was already told off into Three Reliefs; and I had ascertained that it was provided with its rations.


On my march along the road from East Lavant to Singleton, I halted on the crest of the hill, and left one double sentry, and proceeded in an Easterly direction to the old entrenchments on Rooke's Hill, where I halted the Company in a sheltered position within the entrenchments. I ordered Serjeant Russell to take part of the first relief and place double sentries to communicate with No. 7 Company on my right, I took the remainder of this relief to my left flank, which was much exposed.

I then returned along the whole of my chain of sentries, relieving one of them, which I deemed unnecessary, and I communicated with the Officer commanding the Company to my right; and I settled with him that our patrols were to meet and communicate each hour, at a given time, as near as possible near the flanks of our Companies.

The patrols were ordered to go by the front and to return by the rear of the chain of sentries.

* 1 Lieutenant, 3 Serjeants, 54 Rank and File.

Outline of Position occupied by No. 8 Company, 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards, the left resting on the hill above the Race Course, and communicating with the left of No. 7 Company, by a line of sentries extended over Rooke's Hill.



- Main Picquet.
- Detached Party.
- Patrol.
- ⊙ Day Sentry.
- ⊗ Night do.

SCALE 1/2 MILE
Scale of 2 inches to the mile.

H. A. NEVILLE,
Lieut. & Capt. Grenadier Guards.
January 25th, 1851.

Having made these arrangements for the security of my Picquet, I found that I could cover the extent of my position with five double sentries, which could change to seven, and a detached party of a corporal and four men by night.

The day sentries are marked ⊙ in the plan, and the night Sentries ○, and the night detached party^s.

In the event of my being driven in by the enemy, I should have retired by the Singleton Road, taking care not to hamper the fire of the Reserve of my Wing, which was placed in the Singleton Road, about a mile in rear of the position; I should harass and retard the advance of the enemy as much as possible. My Patrol to the left flank had orders, as that flank was *en l'air*, to circle well round the sentries both to the front and rear, and to their left flanks during the night and also during the day.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

N. A. NEVILLE,

Lieut. & Capt. Grenadier Guards.

Lt.-Col. the Hon. G. Cadogan,

Commanding Left Wing

3rd Bat. Grenadier Guards.

I had omitted stating, that I posted an advanced party of a serjeant and six men towards the road leading from the enemy's position round my left flank, and along this road a patrol was directed to proceed about two miles.

Chichester Barracks, January 25th, 1851.

Sir,—I have the honour to state, that in compliance with orders received from the Officer Commanding the Battalion, I proceeded in command of No. 7 Company* to occupy a position as Picquet of Observation, in order to watch the movements of a supposed enemy in the vicinity of Chichester.

My Picquet had been told off into three reliefs, and I ascertained that they were provided with their rations.

On arriving at the appointed ground, I halted the main body of the Picquet at the plantation near the Singleton Road, and proceeded to take steps for my general security. From the small extent of ground I had received orders to occupy, I found it necessary only to post two double sentries, one of which was posted by Serjeant Bachelor to communicate with the Company on my right, and the other by myself, to communicate with that on my left, making arrangements with the Officer commanding the Picquet on my left, as did Serjeant Bachelor with the Officer commanding the Picquet on my right, to send out our patrols every hour, so as to meet each other as near as possible at a given time. I found that two extra Sentries would be sufficient at night.

My main Picquet being posted in the aforesaid plantation, directly in rear of my sentries, in the event of my being driven in, I should retire by the Singleton Road on the left of the Reserve, so as not to mask its fire against the advancing enemy, on whose flank I should hover as long as I could do so safely, in order

* 1 Lieutenant and Captain, 2 Serjeants, 25 Rank and File.

to detain him as much as possible, and give the Reserve time to prepare for his reception.

I have the honor to be, Sir,


Your obedient servant,

A. E. ROWLEY,

Lieut. & Capt. Grenadier Guards.

The Officer Commanding the Left Wing.

Sketch of Position occupied by 7th Company.




A. E. ROWLEY, Grenadier Guards,
January 31st, 1851.

Sir,—I have the honor to state that in compliance with orders received from Colonel Wood, I proceeded in command of No. 5 Company*, to occupy a position as a Picquet of Observation, for the purpose of watching the movements of a supposed enemy in the neighbourhood of Chichester. My Picquet had been already told off into three

* 1 Lieutenant, 3 Serjeants, 49 Rank and File.

reliefs, and ascertained they were all provided with their rations. Having arrived at the appointed ground, I halted the main body of my Picquet on the top of Hayes Down, where I found it was under cover, and proceeded at once to take immediate steps for my general security; for this purpose, dividing my first relief into two parties, I ordered Serjeant Hancock to take command of one, and to proceed to the left, until he should communicate with the Picquet of the other Company, dropping sentries as he went along in such positions as he might deem advisable, returning after having communicated as above directed by the line in which he had posted his sentries, and withdrawing those which might seem superfluous. I proceeded myself to the right of my position with the remainder of my relief, posting my sentries for immediate security as I went along, and having communicated with the Officer in command of the Picquet on my right, and thus assured myself that my flank was guarded I returned along the line of sentries I had originally posted. Having returned to the main body of my Picquet, ascertained from Serjeant Hancock that he had secured the safety of my left flank by communicating with the Officer in command of the Picquet on my left. I next proceeded to visit the remainder of the line of sentries, and found them judiciously placed, and had no occasion to alter them. I made arrangements with the Officer in command of the Picquet on my right, as did Serjeant Hancock with the Officer in command of that on my left, to send out our patrols every hour, so as to meet each other as nearly as possible at a given time on the flanks of my

Position of No. 5 Company.



- ▬ Main Body Picquet.
- ▬ Detached Party.
- ⊙ Day Sentry Double.
- ✱ Night Sentry Double.
- ▬ → Patrol proceeding to the Left.
- ← ▬ Patrol proceeding to the Right.

WILLIAM MORANT,
Ens. & Lieut. Grenadier Guards.
January 25th, 1851.

Picquet. These patrols received orders to return by the rear of the chain of sentries. Having made all the arrangements for the security of my Picquet, I found that I could perfectly cover the extent of my position with five double sentries by day, which I could reinforce by four sentries extra by night. The positions of the day sentries are marked ☉ in the Plan, the night sentries ○. The Reserve of my Wing being posted on the road leading to Singleton, in the event of being driven in, I should retire by a pathway on the right flank of my Reserve, so as not to cloud its fire against the advancing enemy, upon whose flank I should hover as long as I could do so with safety during my retreat, for the purpose of harassing him as much as possible, and giving the Reserve ample time to be prepared.

I have the honor to remain, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

WILLIAM MORANT,

Ens. & Lieut. Grenadier Guards.

Jan. 25th, 1851.

Sir,—I have the honor to state, that in compliance with orders received from the Commanding Officer, 3rd Bat. Grenadier Guards, I proceeded in command of No. 6 Company * to occupy a position as a Picquet of Observation, for the purpose of watching the movements of a supposed enemy in the neighbourhood of Chichester.

* 1 Lieutenant, 3 Serjeants, 51 Rank and File.

My Picquet had been already told off into three reliefs. Having arrived at the appointed ground, I halted the main body of my Picquet in rear of the foot path to Binderton, where I found it was under cover, and proceeded at once to take immediate steps for my general security. For this purpose (considering the distance short enough for one party) I ordered Serjeant Russell to take the first relief, and communicate with the Picquets on my right and left, dropping sentries as he went. I proceeded myself to the right of my position, and withdrew one double sentry, thinking for so short a distance three to be sufficient. Having returned to the main body of my Picquet, I ordered Acting-Serjeant Coles to go with four men to occupy an enclosed garden towards my left flank. I next proceeded to visit the whole of the line of sentries, and found them judiciously placed, and had no occasion to alter the disposition of their arrangement.

I made arrangements with the Officer in command of the Picquets on my right and left, to send out our patrols every hour, so as to meet each other as nearly as possible at a given time on the flanks of my Picquet. These patrols received orders to return by the rear of the chain of sentries.

Having made all the arrangements for the security of my Picquet, I found I could perfectly cover the extent of my position with three double sentries by day, which I could reinforce by four night sentries. The day sentries are marked ⊙ (in red), the night ○ in the Plan.

The Reserve of my Wing being posted in rear of West Dean Wood, in the event of being driven in,

I should close with the 7th Company and retire by the Singleton Road.

I have the honor to be, Sir,


Your obedient servant,

J. MONTAGU BURGOYNE,

Ens. & Lieut. Grenadier Guards.

To the Officer Commanding Left Wing
3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards.


Position of the 6th Company.


 Main Body of the Plaque.

 Detached Party.

• Day Sentry.


✕ Night Sentry.


2 inches to 1 Mile.



J. MONTAGU BURGOYNE,
Ens. & Lieut. Gren. Gds.

January 25th, 1851.



Chichester Barracks, 12th July, 1851.

SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Major-General commanding the district, that, in accordance with his lordship's instructions, I occupied, with the depôt 69th Regiment under my command, on the 26th ult., a position of observation, as Out-posts in advance of an army, supposed to be in cantonments at Chilgrove.

My right rested upon Bow Hill, and my left upon Binderton.

I directed three companies to act as Picquets, and enclose copies of my orders to their commanders, and the fourth to be placed in reserve.

I herewith transmit the reports of the several Officers, together with their plans, and my own general plan of the whole position.

I paid particular attention to the night sentries, and at the sound of the evening bugle, by my order, the whole of those were posted according to previous instructions.


I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

D. ELLIOT MACKIRDY,


Major 69th Reg., Commanding Depôt.

To the Major of Brigade,
South West District, Portsmouth.




Scale 2 inches to 1 Mile

1




Scale 2 inches to a Mile



J.W.






FIELD SKETCH

tion occupied by the left wing of
1st Gren^d Guards in a chain of outposts
 from *Bow Hill* on the right to *Rooks*
 extreme left facing towards *Chichester*
 5th 1851.

1st Gudegan Gren^d Guards



COOKING IN THE FIELD.

AFTER the observations and recommendations contained in the letters of Cols. Hunt and Leach to me, it is almost unnecessary to make any more remarks relative to Cooking in the Field, further than to quote the order on this head issued by the Duke of Wellington, dated Freneda, 28th November, 1812.

“ In regard to the good of the soldier, I have often observed and lamented in the late campaign the facility and celerity with which the French soldiers cooked in comparison with those of our army. The cause of this disadvantage is the same with that of every other description—the want of attention of the Officers to the order of the Army, and to the conduct of their men, and their consequent want of authority over their conduct.

“ Certain men of each Company should be appointed to cut and bring wood, others to fetch water, and others to get meat, &c., to be cooked ; and it would be found, if this practice were daily enforced, and a particular hour for seeing their dinner, and for the men dining, named, as it ought to be, equally as for parade, that cooking would no longer require the inconvenient length of time which it has lately been found to take, and that the soldiers would not be exposed to

the privation of their food at the moment at which the Army may be engaged in operations with the enemy.”—DUKE OF WELLINGTON’S DESPATCHES, vol. vi. pages 181 and 182. (*Edition 1844.*)

With a view of carrying out the directions contained in the above order and to establish a system by which the soldiers shall cook with celerity, the Companies having been previously told off by threes, and the non-commissioned officers told off for the following parties, the Regiment will be formed in open or half-distance column, and ordered to pile arms.

Front Rank Men of 1 File of Threes	Fire-men.
Front Rank, No. 2,	ditto Water-men.
Front Rank, No. 3,	ditto Wood-men.
Rear Rank, No. 1,	ditto Beef-men.
Rear Rank, No. 2,	ditto Bread-men.
Rear Rank, No. 3,	ditto Charge of
Arms, Packs, &c.		

Subaltern Officers will be warned who will take charge of the various parties named, and march them off.

The Words of the Commanding Officers of the Battalion will be as follows:—

‘Pile Arms.’—‘Off Packs.’—‘Prepare to Cook.’

‘Out N. C. Officers of parties.’

At this last Word of Command the non-commissioned officers will place themselves in close column in front of the pivot files of each Company, non-commissioned officers of fire-men leading, then water-men, wood-men, beef-men, and bread-men.

“Out Fire-men,” At this word the fire-men will step to the front and form on the leading non-commissioned officer.

- " Out Water-men,"* Ditto, on the second non-commissioned officer.
- " Out Wood-men,"* Ditto, on third non-commissioned officer.
- " Out Beef-men,"* Ditto, on fourth non-commissioned officer.
- " Out Bread-men,"* Ditto, on fifth non-commissioned officer.

The water-men on being called to the front previous to falling in on their non-commissioned officers, will collect the camp kettles of the Company when such are provided ; if not, the whole of the canteens of the front or rear rank, as may be directed by the Officer commanding the Company, and one for every two non-commissioned officers; in case of a blank file, they will take one extra when the rear-rank canteens are used.

The wood-men will in like manner collect the canteen straps and hatchets.

The beef-men will fall in each man with a bayonet, having been previously warned how many they are to draw rations for.

The bread-men ditto with havresacks, having been previously warned how many they are to draw rations for.

The men told off for the arms, and supernumerary men of messes, to remain with the arms, the latter to be available for any fatigue.

The uneven number of men and non-commissioned officers are to be divided amongst the messes, so that the bread- and meat-men may know how many rations

to draw. The Companies will stand thus :—

Non-com^d Officer—No. 1, Fire-men.
 do. do. 2, Water-men.
 do. do. 3, Wood-men.
 do. do. 4, Beef-men.
 do. do. 5, Bread-men.

Pivot Flank ●	⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗	Packs Front Rank.
	× × × ×	Arms Piled.
	⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗	Packs Rear Rank.

All being ready, the Commanding Officer will face each party towards the place where the bread and meat, &c., may be found, and will direct them to close in on the march upon the Companies nearest those points where each party will be taken charge of by the subaltern officer appointed for that purpose, who will be already there, having received directions from the Adjutant.

Word of Command by Commanding Officer.

Fire-men, "*To the Right (or Left) Face.*"

"*Quick March.*"

"*Close on No. — Comp.**"

Water-men,	do.	do.	do.
Wood-men,	do.	do.	do.
Beef-men,	do.	do.	do.
Bread-men,	do.	do.	do.

For practice,—five serjeants may be placed at 50 or 60 paces from the reverse flank, at about 30 or 40 paces apart, to represent the places where the bread,

* *The party of the named Company stopping short, to enable the others to close on them.*

meat, &c., may be procured, and the parties will be marched up to them by the Officers in charge of each.

In Quick Time.

Words of Command.

"Pile Arms."

"Off Packs."

"Prepare to Cook."

At this last Word of Command, all the parties will fall in as above detailed on their non-commissioned officers, and be marched off at once by the Commanding Officer.

The places for the kitchens will be marked off by the Quarter Master of the Regiment, and the fire-men will be at once marched to him. The kitchens will be formed according to one of the four following methods:—

1st. From the spot on which the right-hand man of the fire-men stands, trace a circle 16 feet in diameter on the ground, (see *Fig. 1*,) then another from the same centre, 19 feet in diameter; this can be done by means of a piece of string or wire, or three fire-locks' slings and a couple of sticks or ramrods. Between the circumferences described, dig a trench (T) 1 foot 6 inches deep, and throw the earth from it in a high heap (H) in the centre, taking care to leave a space (or berm) between the bottom of the heap and the edge of the trench, 2 feet 6 inches wide; this done, place four men in the trench at equal distances from each other &c

divide the circle in four equal parts, and cut niches (N N N N) in the inner bank of the trench opposite each of these men, sufficiently wide to admit a camp kettle, made to contain six men's messes, the same depth as the trench, and running into the solid earth towards the centre of the circle about 18 inches or 2 feet, to give room for three small canteens in a row, (A A A) should there not be sufficient number of camp kettles at hand. The back of the niches may be sloped off a little towards the bank, in the centre, to make the fire draw better.

After this, cut as many more niches of the same dimensions between these four, as will give sufficient room for the camp kettles or canteens, containing the messes of the whole company, allowing one camp kettle, or three canteens to every six men.


It is advisable to have two or three spare niches in case of accident or inconvenience from high winds.

The canteens may be supported by sticks stuck in the bank (D) supported by a forked stick (O) in trench (T).


Sixteen niches, that is, three in each space between the first four niches that are cut, would hold 48 small tins, 96 men's messes. This kitchen would answer well for a company 80 strong.

The formation of these kitchens would occupy considerable time, (about two hours in average ground, 8 men being employed,) and they could not be constructed at all without a sufficient supply of tools.

The above kitchen is applicable for a permanent *encampment*, and for the old large 20 or 30 men's *kettles*.

Fig. 1.

Section of Fig. 1.



2nd. (See *Figs. 2 & 3*, overleaf.) These kitchens are for the small mess tins or centre tins* only, with a view of

* These centre tins have been approved of by the Board of General Officers; they are two inches deep, with a wire handle that turns inside the tin when packed up, the cover of the mess tin being made to fit it.

cooking with celerity previous to an unexpected march; or on a halt, or a retreat, when it is requisite the men should have sustenance in order to support them under the effects of severe fatigue and weather, and are formed as follows: with a spade, make a slanting hole in the earth, from the surface about eighteen inches deep at the deepest part, and so narrow that the small tins will

Fig. 2.



stand across it. (*Vide Fig. 2*); or with stones build up a kitchen high enough to contain a good body of fire underneath, which can be assisted by digging out the earth as above. (*Vide Fig. 3.*) These kitchens may be long enough for a mess of one section

of threes, or for comrades (which Col. J. Leach so strongly recommends, and therefore should be followed); but *where great celerity* is required in cooking, it would be better to cook in messes, as the division of labour would greatly accelerate the operation, particularly as the fire-men (No. 1 front rank of threes) would have the kitchen built and fire ready by the time the water, wood, and ration parties were returned. It will

Fig. 3.



be recollected that Colonels Hunt and Leach, in

their letters strongly recommend the above method of cooking; and supported, indeed led, by their experience, I am convinced it is the best,—first, because it is the opinion of these distinguished and practical Officers—secondly, the men like it, and it is no detriment to the service—thirdly, it is the “*quickest*” way in which they can get most nourishment. It should be understood, that advocating as I do the above system of cooking on an emergency, it is far from my intention that the making a good soup either in the six-men’s tin, or in the small mess tins, should not be practised, for nothing can be better or more nourishing food than good soldier’s soup, *when there is* time to make it, composed as it should be of meat and vegetables.

After the observations and remarks that have been made in the Duke of Wellington’s Despatches relative to Cooking in the Field, showing the necessity of doing it with celerity, which is so essential to the soldier, it will be unnecessary to enter much more into the subject, but still it is requisite to make young officers and soldiers aware that the more sustenance and support that can be got out of whatever ration may be provided for the soldier, the better. It therefore becomes a matter of consideration, after knowing what the usual ration on active service generally is, how to make the most of it, in order that it should be most nutritive and wholesome; it seldom consisting of more than a pound of beef or mutton, (generally the former) killed about half an hour previous to being issued, with *perhaps* a little rice or flour, and a pound of biscuit. The meat being generally

tough, hard, and stringy, it requires a little knowledge of gastronomy, which an English soldier seldom possesses, whilst the Frenchman almost naturally does, to make this ration answer the above purpose; and as Messrs Ude and Soyer are not generally in a bivouac, it is right and fair to teach the uninitiated to make as good a mess as possible out of what Providence and the commissariat may provide them with.

The quickest and most efficient way to obtain the most nourishment from the ration is by stewing; or in other words, only "*just*" to cover with water, the meat, which must be cut into small pieces, and not to make it into a jorum of broth, which is objectionable for two reasons—first, it takes three times as long to cook—and secondly, it hardens and soddens the meat if boiled in haste, and makes it therefore less strengthening and nutritious: whilst *stewing* it, with a little biscuit powder (which a man will find at the bottom of his havresack), a little rice or flour and a bit of onion will make him a good mess in twenty minutes, providing he has dry wood and water at command. This can be cooked in the small centre tin by comrades, or in the mess tin. Every soldier should have pepper and salt in his havresack, and with the above ingredients, he is no soldier who can't make a good stew from them. It will be observed that by cooking in the centre tin, *when there is time*, potatoes can be boiled in the men's mess tin.

With a view of cooking when not in the "*immediate neighbourhood of the enemy*," or in any large building where a body of troops might be placed, and where no regular cooking places exist, very convenient

kitchens may be constructed in a few seconds with the ramrods of the men's firelocks, in the following manner: each fireman will collect the six ramrods of his section, each man being provided with a piece of iron wire, about a yard long, and each serjeant with a piece of copper binding wire, about one foot long. The fireman will bind three ramrods firm together with the copper wire about two inches from the small ends, and then spread the bell ends out, and place them on the ground so far asunder as to form a tripod.


These tripods will be arranged in pairs, and across the top of each pair two ramrods will be laid together horizontally to support the canteens, which will be suspended in twos, back to back, by the iron wires to the horizontal ramrods. Six canteens, containing 12 men's messes, in each kitchen.

Fig. 4.



Non-commissioned officers in charge of squads, will keep a supply of the binding wire in their possession,

and hand a sufficient number of lengths of it to the fire-men before they are marched off.



X (Piece of iron wire rolled up to put into man's cap.)

It is of great importance that the soldier's mess tin should be of the best block tin, strongly welded together, with as little solder as possible, in order to resist the influence of the fire.

Each Company Pioneer should have a spade.

ENCAMPING.

THE Regiment being halted in open column, will occupy, when encamped, the extent of its own front.

As soon as a Regiment has taken up its ground, the quarter and regimental guards will be formed and marched off. The quarter guard will be stationed in a tent 108 paces to the front of the extreme right flank of the camp, and will be of sufficient strength to furnish a line of sentries along the front and down the right flank of the encampment. The regimental guard will be stationed 15 paces in rear of the extreme left of the encampment, and furnish a line of sentries along the rear and the left flank :

The battalion having been previously told off by threes, will be told off in the following manner, the band and drums having joined their Companies.

Right Files of Sections—Pole-men.

Second Files of Sections—Unpackers of Tents.

Third Files of Sections—Peg-men.

The Drill will first be practised without tents.

Drill for Encamping in Slow Time.

The first formation will vary according to the number of companies in the battalion.

Words of Command.

Nos. 6 and 8
Companies
"Right About
Face."
Nos. 1, 2, 4, 7,
9, and 10,
Companies,
"Stand Fast."
Nos. 3, 5, 6,
and 8, close to
six paces on
the *Standing*
Companies,
"Quick March,
Halt Dress."
Nos. 3, 5, 7, 9,
and 10, Com-
panies "To the
Right Face,
Right Counter-
march, Quick
March.
Halt Front
Dress."

Nos. 5 and 7
Companies,
"Right About
Face."
Nos. 1, 3, 6,
and 8, Com-
panies "Stand
Fast."
Nos. 2, 4, 5,
and 7, close to
six paces on
the *Standing*
Companies,
"Quick March,
Halt, Dress."
Nos. 2, 4, 6,
and 8, "Right
Face, Right
Countermarch,
Halt Front
Dress."

For a battalion of ten companies.

Fig. 1.




Fig. 2.





Fig. 3.



For a battalion of eight companies.

Fig. 4.




Fig. 5.





Fig. 6.



No. 4 Company, "*Right About Face.*"
Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 6 Companies, "*Stand Fast.*"
Nos. 3 and 4 Companies close to six paces on the *Standing Companies*, "*Quick March, Halt, Dress.*"
Nos. 3, 5, and 6 Companies, "*To the Right Face, Right Counter-march, Quick March, Halt, Front, Dress.*"

For a battalion of six companies.

Fig. 7.




Fig. 8.




Fig. 9.



"*Off Packs.*"
"*Pile Arms, Front.*"

The remainder of the Drill is the same in all battalions, whether of *six, eight, or ten companies.*

The left files take off the packs of the right files first, the rear rank's packs being placed to the rear.

"*Out Front Rank Pole-men.*"
(Vide Fig. 10.)

At this Word of Command, the front rank pole-men will step out of the ranks and fall in five paces from the reverse flanks of their respective companies, fronting in the same direction, and dressing with their front ranks.

Nº. Cº.—Pole-men at Eight Paces Distance from the Right (or Left) "*Extend.*"

A non-commissioned officer from each company will then extend his pole-men at eight paces distance from the pole-men nearest the column—viz., from the front rank pole-man of the left section of the companies that have

"Eyes Front."

not countermarched, and from the front rank pole-men of the right section of the companies that *have* countermarched, placing himself opposite the third file from the reverse flank of his company, in order to dress his pole-men as they extend.

N^o C^o.— Pole-men, *"Right About Face."*

When dressed, the pole-men of the companies that have countermarched will be faced to the right about, and all the pole-men will be covered correctly from the head of the column by a Field Officer and the Adjutant.

In covering, the pole-men should be careful not to lose their dressing with their respective companies.

"Steady Pole-men."

At this Word of Command from the Field Officer, the pole-men of the countermarched companies will come to their front.

"Out Rear Rank Pole-men."

At this Word of Command, the rear rank pole-men will step out of the ranks and place themselves opposite their respective front rank men, at two paces distance, fronting towards them; and three non-commissioned officers from each company will also move out and take charge of the three tents farthest from the flanks of their companies, the non-commissioned officer already with the pole-men, taking charge of the tent next the companies.

*Out Packers
'Tents.'*

At this Word of Command, the unpackers of tents will step out, and place themselves rank entire, in rear of the front rank pole-men of their own sections.

Out Pegman."

At this Word of Command, the peg-men will step out of the ranks and place themselves rank entire, in rear of the rear rank pole-men of their respective sections, the rear rank men of the unpackers of tents and peg-men will be on the left of their respective front rank men. All the above instruction relates to Fig. 10.

Non-commissioned Officers.
Reg-men.
Rear Rank Pole-men.
Front Rank Pole-men.
Packers.

.....	9	9	9	9	9	9
.....	9	9	9	9	9	9
.....	4	3	2	4 3 2 1	9	9
.....	6	6	6	6 6 6 6	6	6

Ditto

No. 6 Company Countermarched.

Non-commissioned Officers.
Reg-men.
Rear Rank Pole-men.
Front Rank Pole-men.
Packers.

.....	9	9	9	9	9	9
.....	9	9	9	9	9	9
.....	4	3	2	4 3 2 1	9	9
.....	6	6	6	6 6 6 6	6	6

Ditto

No. 5 Company Countermarched.


Non-commissioned Officers.
Reg-men.
Rear Rank Polemen.
Front Rank Pole-men.
Packers.

.....	9	9	9	9	9	9
.....	9	9	9	9	9	9
.....	1	2	3	4	9	9
.....	6	6	6	6	6	6

paces 9


No. 4 Company

Fig. 11.



- 1 Front Rank Pole Men.
- 2 Rear Rank Pole Men.
- 2* Rear Rank Pole Men stepped back to show where door of Tent should be.
- 3 Unpackers of Tents.
- 3* Do. having stepped in a diagonal direction.
- 4 Peg Men.
- 4* Do. having stepped in a diagonal direction.

Fig. 12.



"Raise Tents."

At this Word of Command, the unpackers of tents and peg-men will take two paces outwards in a diagonal direction, to show the space their tents would occupy, and the rear rank men will take two paces to his rear to show where the door of the tent would be. (Fig. 11.)

"Prepare to Strike Tents."

The men being already in the position required for striking tents, no further movement is required.

"Strike Tents."

At this Word of Command, the front rank pole-men will step forward to their rear rank men, the unpackers of tents will step up to the peg-men, the whole of the pole-men, unpackers of tents and peg-men will then join their respective companies. (Fig. 12.)

Drill in Quick Time.

When the drill is understood in slow time, it should be practised in quick time to the following Words of Command :

*" Out Front
Rank Pole-
men and Un-
packers of
Tents."*

The Front Rank Pole-men and Unpackers of Tents come out and act the same as in slow time, the latter immediately getting the tents ready.

*" Steady Pole-
men."*

At this Word of Command, the rear rank pole-men and the peg-men will all step out at once, and place themselves at their respective posts.

" Pitch Tents."

The same as in slow time.

" Strike Tents."

The same as in slow time.

When the battalion is perfect in the preceding drills, it will be practised in the actual pitching of the tents.

The tents will be placed on the reverse flanks of the column.

*" Out Rear
Rank Pole-
men and Un-
packers of
Tents."*

The same as in the drill at slow and quick time.

*" Steady Pole-
men."*

At this Word of Command, the rear rank pole-men will get the poles, unfasten them, fasten the two pieces together, and place the ends of them between the feet of their front rank men, at the same time placing the other ends of them in the top of the tent. "The unpackers of tents *having unpacked their tents,*" "carry them to the pole-men of their own sections, and place them on the poles, with their doors fronting in the same direction as their respective companies." The peg-men unpack their mallets and pegs; they place one mallet in rear of the unpackers of tents; dis-

tribute the pegs round the tent, and take their posts in rear of the rear rank pole-men, as in the foregoing drill, the rear rank man having the mallet.

"Raise Tents."

At this Word of Command, the pole-men will raise the pole, the unpackers of tents will pass the backs of the tents over the front rank pole-men's heads, and take two paces outwards in a diagonal direction, as directed in the drill, and secure two ropes in rear of the tent, the rear rank pole-men as soon as they are perpendicular, will leave the poles and hold the *doors of the tents together*, while the peg-men secure two ropes in front of each tent, the four ropes of each tent thus secured, should be at equal distances round the tent, in order that it may be pitched in good shape. This done, the rear rank pole-men will secure the door ropes, and the unpackers of tents and the peg-men will secure the remainder of the ropes, passing the mallet to the right, and complete the pitching of the tents.

The non-commissioned officer in charge of each tent, will superintend its erection, but not work himself.

After the tents are completed, the men's knapsacks should be arranged round the pole in each tent.

"Prepare to Strike Tents."

At this Word, the front rank pole-men place themselves at the pole, the rear rank pole-men at the doors of the

tents, and the unpackers of tents and peg-men opposite the ropes they first secured.

"Strike Tents."

Roll of Drum.

At the roll of the drum, each man will pull up the pegs nearest him, the front rank pole-men will let the tops of their tents fall backwards, and step out of the doors, "*drawing their poles out with them.*" The unpackers of tents will draw the bottom of the rear of the tents forwards, so as to bring them "*under the doors.*" They will then wind up each rope on the wooden block belonging to it, and pack the tents carefully, assisted by the rear rank pole-men, will strap up the pole, and the peg-men will collect and pack the pegs up with the mallets.

All hands place the tents on the mules.

The pole-men, unpackers of tents, peg-men, and non-commissioned officers will then fall in with their respective companies.

4
Corporal Peg-men.
in
charge.

1
Rear Rk. Pole-
man.

1
Front Rk. Pole-
man.

2
Unpackers of
Tents.

Fig. 13.



RAISING THE TENT.

- 1 The Pole-man under the canvass raising the Pole and fixing it straight in the ground.
- 2 Unpackers holding the lower edge and rear of the Tent clear of the Pole-men's heads.
- 3 The Peg-men in front of the Tent holding the ends ready to secure them.
- 4 Non-commissioned Officer in rear of Peg-men, ready to hold the opening of door together.



Fig. 14.

TENT RAISED.

Tent raised. Unpackers and Pegmen in the act of driving the pegs. Non-commissioned Officer (No. 1) holds together the edges of the opening of the door-way.

³
Peg-men. ²
Rear Rank
Pole-man.

²
Front Rank
Pole-man.

³
Unpackers
of Tents.

Fig. 15.



STRIKING THE TENT.

- 1 Front Rank Pole-man walking out of door of tent with the Pole.
- 2 Rear Rank Pole-man assisting ditto and proceeding to separate the Pole.
- 3 Unpackers and Peg-men ready to pack Tent, collect Mallets and Pegs, and the whole then ready to place the Tent, &c., on the Mule.

Not more than fifteen men should be told off to a tent; every company should, therefore, be divided into more or less sections, according to its strength, each section not exceeding fifteen men, including non-commissioned officers, band, and drums.



While the men's tents are being pitched, the Quarter-Master of the regiment will mark the lines for the officer's tents, horses, kitchens, &c., and afterwards superintend the erection of the tents. Each officer's servant will be responsible that his master's tent is properly pitched.

The arrangement of the encampment, and the distances between the lines of tents are shown in the following sketch, Fig. 16.

Fig. 16.

Proportions of ENCAMPMENT for a Regiment of INFANTRY consisting of 10 Companies, at 3 Serjeants, 3 Drummers, and 75 Privates per Company, in round Tents containing 15 men each.

Front 160 yards divided as follows:



Depth—290.

DEPTH 290 yards, divided as follows :

From Parade of Quarter Guard to Centre of Men's	
Tents of ditto	6
Thence to Front of Officers' Tents of ditto	4
To the first Line of Parade of the Regiment	50
To the Line of the Colours.....	30
To the Centre of Serjeants' Tents	7
To the Centre of Rear Row of Private Men's Tents	36
To the Front of Subalterns'	18
To the Front of Captains'	20
To the Front of Field Officers'	18
To the Front of Colonels'	4
To the Front of Staff Officers'	15
To the Centre of Bat-Men's	10
To the Pickets of Bat-Horses	6
To the Rear of Dung	8
To the Centre of Grand Sutler	15
To the Centre of Kitchens	15
To the Front of petit Sutlers	10
To the Centre of Regimental Guard....	13
To the Parade of Regimental Guard	5
	<hr/>
	290
	<hr/>

The Quarter Guard Tents are placed fronting each other in a Line with the right of Grenadier company. The Officers' Tent facing the front.

The Parade should be formed by a Trench of two inches being made along the Line.

The Colours and Drums are placed in the Centre of the Grand Street.

Captains and Subalterns pitch in the rear of their respective Companies fronting other.

The two Field Officers' Tents front the Street on the right and left of the Battalion.

The Colonel's (or Commanding Officer's) fronts the Colours.

The Staff Officers' Tents front the Street on the right and left of the Grand Street.

The Bat-men's Tents front towards their Horses, and are pitched in rear of the Field Officers'.


The Grand Sutler (or Mess House) is placed in rear of the Colonel's Tent.

The front poles of the petit Sutlers' Tents and Women's Huts are in a Line fronting the Kitchens.


The Regimental Guard Tent looks to rear.

When circumstances will permit, the necessaries should be one hundred yards beyond the Rear Guard.

A Trench should be dug round each Tent to carry off the water in rainy weather.



Sketch of part of the Country
between the
COA AND AQUEDA.



APPENDIX.

Journal of General Craufurd's Out-post Operations between the Coa and Agueda in 1810, to which is prefixed a Letter on the same subject, to Lord F. Fitzclarence, by Major-General Shaw Kennedy, C.B.

Kirkmichael House, Maybole, Ayrshire,
23rd October, 1850.

My dear Lord,

1 As I understand your letter to me of the 2nd instant, it is your lordship's wish that I should give you any information which I may possess respecting General Craufurd's operations as Out-post Duties between the Coa and Agueda in 1810; and also that I should answer some questions respecting Out-post Duties contained in your letter.

2 As this letter must necessarily be a very long one, I shall adopt the unusual mode of writing a letter, that of doing so in a small memorandum book, as it can be as easily written in that way, and it will keep it better together. I shall number the paragraphs for facility of reference.

3 I shall first reply to that part of your letter which refers to General Craufurd's operations between the Coa

and Agueda. Upon receiving your letter I looked over my old papers, and found a journal which I had kept from the 12th March, 1810, 'till the 24th July, 1810; that is, from the day on which Craufurd commenced his operations between the Coa and Agueda, until the day they were terminated by the battle of Almeida. This journal is in itself a very poor production, being merely some notes written each day after our fatigues; but I send you, accompanying this, a literal copy of that journal, because it shows for almost each day what the principal movements both of the Division and of the Enemy were, and it shows what our information was of the Enemy.

4 I think it best to send you the copy of the journal literally word for word as it was written, with all its imperfections on its head, because I think that in this way it is more authentic. I even adhere to the form in which it was written, although that was imperfect. You will see that it was chiefly written in double columns on the same page; and my idea in doing so had evidently been to keep on the right hand side the every day occurrences, and to put the general information on the left column. The left column, however, must be considered as the information which we got under the same date as is given in the right column*.

5 By comparing the information given in my journal with the more authentic information obtained since

* In the Journal, as it is printed in the following pages, the right hand column of the original manuscript occupies the upper portion of each page, while the left column forms a *running foot note*.

of the enemy's force, it may perhaps appear erroneous; but if a study is to be made of Craufurd's operations, these operations must be judged by the information which he possessed at the time; and as the information of the enemy's force and movements in my Journal are the same as Craufurd acted upon, the operations should be judged from the information as shown in the Journal, although that may have been less correct than what has since been obtained; and this view of the matter is the chief reason why I send you the whole Journal, which I do the more readily, as, so far as I can judge, there is not one offensive expression towards any one in the whole of it; had there been such, I should have been sorry to give the whole, even in a private communication such as this is. The only omissions in the Journal are the names of three officers who were put under arrest, and a very few expressions that seemed erroneous or liable to misconstruction.

6 Accompanying this letter, I send the copy of a plan of the country between the Coa and the Agueda, as it is upon a larger scale, and contains the names of more places than the published maps: it is upon a larger scale than that one of part of Portugal, published by Sir George Murray with the other maps and plans illustrative of the Peninsula Campaigns.

7 Accompanying this letter also is the copy of a short journal I had kept previous to the operations between the Coa and the Agueda; I give it only for a few days, because I think it contains some introductory information in reference to the operations between the Coa and Agueda.

8 The objects to be gained by the Light Division's

holding as long as possible the whole of the country on the left bank of the Agueda up to the bridges and fords over that river, were, to encourage the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo to make a stout defence, to keep open the communication with Almeida as long as possible, and to command the resources of the country. These were objects of great importance, as delay in taking those towns was a formidable obstruction to the French Army, from its obliging them to undertake the operation against Portugal at a late season of the year; and was of immense value to Lord Wellington, in allowing time for bringing to greater maturity his defensive preparations. The object was great; but the operation of holding a country so extensive as that between the Coa and the Agueda by a single small Infantry Division of about 2500 strong, with one Cavalry Regiment 400 strong, (the 1st German Hussars) and six light guns, the original force with which it was undertaken, was unusually bold and hazardous; being done in the face of Ney's corps, supported by a powerful Cavalry. As the operation progressed, Craufurd's force was augmented to 3500 Infantry, with occasional assistance of some squadrons of the 16th Light Dragoons, and on the very last days of the operation by the whole of the 14th and 16th Light Dragoons; and he was supported on his right by Carrera, with 3000 Spaniards. But although Craufurd's force was thus somewhat increased, his operation became greatly more hazardous and difficult as it progressed; for in the more advanced part of it, he was opposed to two entire corps of the French army under Massena, and, say, 6000 Cavalry.

9 This formidable task, however, General Craufurd undertook when at such a distance from the rest of the army as to be totally unsupported by any portion of it beyond the Coa.

10 This operation by General Craufurd was completely successful as an advanced post and out-post operation. He held his ground firmly to the last without any loss; and remained in sight of Ciudad Rodrigo till the place was reduced to the last extremity, after a noble and protracted defence, considering the defective nature of its works; and he kept Almeida open, and free from all molestation, up to the day of its being invested by the whole of Ney's corps, supported by four or five thousand cavalry.

11 As the operation of an advanced Corps, therefore, nothing could have been more successful. The whole of General Craufurd's force he brought back in perfect safety under the guns of Almeida, and had nothing further to do but to cross the Coa at his leisure, and place his Out-posts on the left bank.

12 In any work, however, upon Out-posts, were this extraordinary and successful instance of an out-post operation stated without explanation of the particular causes of success, such might lead to error of principle: for example, were it abstractedly stated that such an extent of open country could be held by such a force as Craufurd had, in the face of such a force as Massena had, were the Out-post Duties conducted on the same rules as Craufurd conducted them, this, I conceive, might lead to fatal error.

13 It is necessary, therefore, that I explain to your lordship some of the reasons which, I consider, made

this case rather a special one, and which account for its having been successful.

14 I place first amongst these the personal qualifications of General Craufurd. This extraordinary undertaking was in a great measure one of his own bringing about. He almost led the Commander-in-Chief into it by the enthusiastic zeal with which he entered upon it, and the activity and ability with which he carried it through; he by these means may be said at least to have caused the Commander-in-Chief to endure it; for no prudent Commander-in-Chief would have done so unless he had great confidence in the person conducting the operation. Another peculiarity of this case was the great knowledge of Out-post Duties possessed by the 1st Hussars of the German Legion. General Craufurd in fact worked out the most difficult part of the Out-post Duty with them. He had the great advantage of speaking German fluently, and he arranged for the Out-post Duties of the different parts of the long line he had to guard, by his personal communications with the Captains chiefly of that admirable corps, men who were all masters themselves of the subject. They knew his plan for each space that they covered, but not his general plan, and each worked out his part most admirably. The General communicated with them *direct*. He had the advantage of possessing, with great abilities, and activity, and energy, uncommon bodily strength, so that he could be on horseback almost any length of time. Still you may argue that all that I have yet named are not specialties, that such men may again be found. But there were also actual specialties. The people of the country were enthusi-

astically in our favour: the French could rely on nothing that they told them, and could only look upon them as most determined enemies. This prevented all enterprize on the part of the French. They kept in masses, and acted with the greatest caution. A party of Guerrillas, that under Don Julian Sanchez, acted through the cantonments of the French army, and obtained information of their movements, as well as giving them annoyance.

15 If we consider General Craufurd's operations between the Coa and the Agueda as a field of Out-post Duties on an extensive scale, and as a study for instruction on those duties, the following observations seem to be necessary. When the operation was first undertaken, the *front* to be observed and occupied was the line of the Agueda on its left bank, extending about forty miles, and the depth from Rodrigo to Almeida about twenty miles. The surface of country in which the operation actually did take place, or was possible to take place, was that irregular figure formed by the river line of the Agueda from the bridge of Villar, a line running from the bridge of Villar by Forcales, Aldea Ponte, Aldea Rebeira, and Villa Mayer, to the bridge of Sequiro; then the river line of the Coa to the bridge of Almeida, and then a line running from the bridge of Almeida through Malpartida, and Barba del Puerco, to the bridge of San Felices. That country, although very irregular in its surface, is quite open and unenclosed, and is almost everywhere fit for the action of cavalry, infantry, and artillery. But after General Carrera co-operated with the Light Division, General Craufurd's right only extended to Espeja.

16 When General Craufurd took up the line of the Agueda with the first German Hussars, he kept his infantry back entirely, with the exception of the infantry post of four Companies of the Rifles at Barba del Puerco, upon the *calculation* of the time that would be required to retire the infantry to the Coa, after he received information from the Cavalry posts of the enemy's advance. By this means, he gained the great advantage of watching the enemy's movements, preserving the country from their foraging parties, and encouraging the defence of Rodrigo. If we are properly to understand the operation of General Craufurd, the *calculation*, as above stated, must never be lost sight of, for it was upon that *calculation*, that he acted all along. The cause of hazarding the four companies at Barba del Puerco, forms a separate consideration. It was formed upon the belief that the pass there was so difficult that four companies could defend it against any numbers, and that if turned higher up the river, the hussars would give Colonel Beckwith warning in ample time to enable him to make a safe retreat. But it will be asked if this *calculation* was attended to, when, after both Ney and Junot's corps had come up, supported by 5000 or 6000 cavalry, infantry picquets were placed by Craufurd so far in advance as Marialva? *Calculation* here, it must be admitted, had, in some degree, given place to confidence; confidence arising from the enemy's cautious and systematic proceedings, and to the admirable conduct of the 1st Hussars; for we began to think that nothing could go wrong when they were in front. The operation in *general*, however, was entirely founded upon a *calcula-*

tion of time and distance, that is, that the cavalry out-posts, were so arranged, that the information given by them should give time for withdrawing the infantry to the Coa before it could be overtaken, and obliged to come to action with a superior force of infantry.

17 I now come to a part of the subject in which you may be disappointed with the scantiness of the information, and may differ from me in opinion. I dont suppose that there exists the means of giving an exact plan of how each cavalry or infantry picquet was placed, and placed its Sentries: nor do I consider this necessary.

18 My Journal shows how far the hussar picquets (in fact the whole of the 1st Hussars may be said to have been on picquet for weeks together) were in front of the infantry; and it will be observed that this varied from, say, a mile, to, say, five or six miles. It seems quite impossible to fix how far a picquet should be in advance of the corps which it is covering; so much depends upon the enemy's position, the ground, and many other considerations.

19 Lallemand supposes the usual distance to be three-quarters of a league; if he means the *lieue terrestre* of 4870 yards, this would be two English miles, and 132½ yards. Arentschildt says, that the general rule is to advance the picquet at least two or three miles in front of the main body: but very properly qualifies this by saying that it is impossible to lay down any fixed principles on this subject. Arentschildt lays down the noble and just rule, upon which much depends: "The Commander of a Picquet who retires with his men at full speed, and the enemy at his heels, deserves the severest punishment, he must retire as slow as

“possible, and constantly skirmish.” Your lordship will see by the Journal a beautiful instance of this rule being put nobly into effect by our friend, poor Krauchenberg, who I see by your letter you afterwards knew very well. His charge at the bridge in front of Alameda was admirable, and on the most just principle of the duty of a covering force when retiring. As you knew Krauchenberg, and got his information on the details of Out-posts, you were at the very source of good information, for he and the other Officers of the 1st Hussars were our regular masters and teachers on the subject. I cannot say that Colonel Arentschildt, or the Captains of the hussars, were much consulted as to the general plan of the picquets; but for the details and execution of those duties, they were admirable. You will see from Colonel Arentschildt’s work, prepared so early as 1809, how carefully the regiment had been instructed in all the details of the Out-post duty, and that work now stands an authentic record of what the detail duties of the picquets were during Craufurd’s operations between the Coa and the Agueda.

20 I dont suppose that there exist any plans of how the picquets were placed, and how those picquets placed their Sentries, while we were between the Coa and the Agueda. Such a plan to be understood, would require to show every feature and detail of the ground with great clearness, and I think, that the circumstances cause such an endless variety in placing picquets and sentries, that a general principle is much more to be trusted to as a guide than particular instances. What then is the general rule to be followed for the distance *which an outlying picquet should be in advance of the*

corps which it is to cover? I derive the rule on this subject from the rule which regulates the advanced guard of any body of troops on their march, which is, that the advance guard should be at such a distance in advance of the column, that the column may have time, upon receiving information of the enemy's approach, either to form upon the head of the column in order of battle before the enemy can arrive; or, if it is the intention to retire, to do so unmolested: so in regard to a picquet, it must be so far in advance of the corps which it covers, as to enable that corps to get into order of battle before the enemy can arrive; or, if the intention is that of retreating on the advance of the enemy, to do so unmolested. But to state how far in advance, either an advance guard or picquet should be, seems impossible, for by the nature of the ground, the main body may be more safe, and more protected by the picquet being half a mile in advance, than if it were three or four miles in advance; how then is this to be decided? Certainly not as I conceive, by any positive rule. The circumstances which regulate it, are infinitely variable, and don't admit of a precise rule. When the outlying picquets are, from the position of the enemy or the nature of the ground, necessarily very near to the body which they cover, this should be compensated for as far as possible by works to obstruct the the enemy's advance. The picquets of an army are often only a few hundred yards in advance; I assisted in placing the picquets of a Division on the night of the 17th June, 1815, and I don't think that they were 300 yards in front of the line. On the night of the 16th, they were 500 or 600 yards in advance of the

Division. Speaking from memory, Barba del Puerco was one mile from the bridge of San Felices. The four companies of the Rifles had their picquet half way to the bridge, a double sentry at the bridge, and an intermediate small post. The double sentry has never since been heard of, I believe, and the enemy gained Barba del Puerco as soon as the picquet, and nothing saved the post but the surpassing gallantry of Beckwith and his Officers and men. The whole distance from the bridge to Barba del Puerco was a very steep defile through immense masses of rocks. The only security for picquets similarly placed, seems to be the erection of such works as will protect your sentries, and also to prevent a sudden rush being made upon the picquet itself by the enemy.

21 The same rule as stated in the last paragraph as applicable to a corps of troops in march and its advanced guard, applies to the advanced guards and picquets themselves; that is, the advanced guard of the former, and sentries of the latter, must be so regulated or placed, that the advanced guard itself, or the picquet, have notice soon enough of the enemy's approach so as to form and defend themselves, or to retreat upon the enemy's reaching them: although the distances of vedettes and sentries from their picquets cannot be defined, the rule of course applies in all cases, that no vedette or sentry should be beyond the reach of being heard when he fires.

22 The advanced posts should know how long is required for the corps which it covers to assemble, and to be prepared to receive the enemy's attack, or to *retreat*. You will see by Napier's History, that for the

Light Division, "seven minutes sufficed for the Division to get under arms in the middle of the night ; and a quarter of an hour, night or day, to bring it in order of battle to the alarm-posts, with the baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient distance in the rear. And this not upon a concerted signal, or as a trial, but at all times and certain." The rule which those who were mounted, and had to be with the Out-posts fell into, was that of not sleeping in our clothes, which was found unrefreshing, but to be able to dress and have a small bed packed up and placed upon the mule in the time that another man was *bridling merely* the riding horse.

23 The articles, "Advanced Guard," and "Picquets and their Sentries," in our *Field Exercise Book*, are well written ; and I see that your lordship notices the latter as being very good. It is to be remarked, however, that the writers in the article, "Advanced Guard," never once state the main principle by which the distance of an advanced guard in front of a column should be regulated. It tells you that one of the objects of an advanced guard is, to guard against surprise and unexpected collision, but it does not state the all-important principle that the advanced guard should be strong in proportion to the strength of the column which it covers, and should be at a greater distance in advance of the column, in proportion to the strength of the column, so as to give it time to form in order of battle on its front before it can be attacked.

24 It will be seen that it did not escape observation by Lord Wellington, that the Division was placed in rather a critical position in the end of June : that this

was his lordship's opinion there is proof in his letter to General Craufurd, dated 26th June, 1810, (see *Despatches*, vol. iv., page 139, edition 1844, in 8 volumes.) In that letter his lordship alludes to the main point of the question, the difficulty and danger of withdrawing any small corps of infantry, however well disciplined, over a country six or eight miles in extent before reaching the Coa, the greater part of which exposed the Division to the action of cavalry, when the enemy could have employed 5000 cavalry in the operation, 24,000 infantry, and a numerous artillery.

25 The boldest perhaps of all Craufurd's dispositions of the troops in his operation between the Coa and Agueda, was that of keeping not only the body of his Infantry in and about Gallegos, Espeja, &c., after the two bridges over the Agueda were completed by the French, but also his placing a company of infantry and 24 Rifles in Marialva. You will see by my Journal, (page 197,) that there was a picquet of infantry in Marialva, on the 9th of June, and continued there on the 12th, when the entrances to the village were ordered to be built up. The enemy's bridge at Carboneras had been completed on the 7th, and his bridge at Caridad had been completed earlier.

26 I conclude with the following few matters of detail, what I have to say of Craufurd's operations between the Coa and the Agueda. Special reports were made of the state of the fords of the Agueda every morning, and the rapidity of the rises were particularly marked. An Officer was appointed to examine all the deserters from the enemy, and to bring their informa-

tion together, so as to show collectively all the information they gave.

Beacons were prepared in some instances on conspicuous points, so as to communicate information of the enemy's offensive movements. To ensure against mistakes in the night, the system was adopted of having pointers at the stations of communication directed to those beacons, so that fires might not be mistaken for them in the night-time. These pointers (as I call them) are described both by Colonel Leach and Lieut. Sinnott, (see the latter's work, page 91.) Reports in general terms as to the enemy's movements were *objected* to by General Craufurd; when reports were made of the enemy's being in motion, his supposed force in *actual numbers* was desired to be stated, and of what arm or arms that force was composed. Reports in general terms of the enemy being in motion caused unnecessary alarm when the numbers were small.

27 I now come to that part of your lordship's letter in which you desire answers to the following questions: "The way you used to commence ordering out your "picquets from the time you came to your bivouac? "Who ordered them out? The numbers, Officers, and "men? Who actually placed them, or showed them "the ground they were to occupy? Who visited them "when posted? Who approved or disapproved of the "position of the picquets? Who altered such errors? "Who had the right to do so? Did your picquets take "their rations cooked or uncooked? If uncooked, "did you use the large 6 mess tins or the small tins?" In answer to the first question,—I suppose the advance

guard to be according to the principle already stated, so far in advance as to secure the main body from surprise; this position it maintains until the outlying Picquets march to their ground. When near the enemy, one company per battalion usually formed the outlying picquets for the Light Division.

That duty was of course taken by roster, and the Field Officers of the day for the outlying picquets commanded those picquets and marched them to their ground. Extraordinary precautions were taken in the Light Division to prevent surprise upon the Division's arrival at its bivouac.

All the Division Staff Officers, and all the Field and Staff Officers of regiments, remained mounted until the arrangements both for the outlying and inlying picquets were completed.

There was a Field Officer of the day for outlying and another of the inlying picquets; the former attending to the external security against anything from the enemy; the other was responsible that the internal regulations of the bivouac were carried into effect agreeably to the orders of the Division.

The Field Officers of the day for the outlying and inlying picquets, reported themselves to the Officer present in the immediate command of the Division as soon as the troops had formed on arrival at their bivouac, which gave the General, or other Officer in immediate command, an opportunity of giving them his orders. The Field Officer of the inlying picquet made himself acquainted with the situations of all the outlying picquets of the Division and of the adjoining

outlying picquets; and the Captain next for outlying picquet, with the position of the picquet he might have to relieve.

28 In answer to the questions:—"Who actually placed them and showed them the ground they were to occupy?" This was fixed upon and ordered by Craufurd himself; but in the absence of the General Officer he leaves instructions, or should do, with the Assistant Quarter-Master General, or Officer of the Quarter-Master General's department with the Division, whatever be his rank, to point out to the next Officer in command the ground that the picquets are to occupy, and how they are to occupy it. It then remains with the Field Officer of the day to command the picquets, and to manage them according to the rules of the service, the particular orders he may have received, and to the best of his ability and knowledge of out-post duty.

29 In answer to the questions:—"Who visited them when posted? Who approved or disapproved of the position of the picquets? Who altered such errors? Who had a right to do so?" After the ground was pointed out to the Field Officer of the day by the General himself, or by the Officer of the Quarter-Master General's Department, nothing but an express order from the General Officer himself, or of a Staff Officer authorized by him, or some urgency caused by the enemy (which had instantly to be reported), could authorize any change in the ground occupied by the picquets.

If it was left with the Field Officer of the day to

place his posts and sentries by day and by night, those could only be altered or corrected by the General himself, or by the Officer of the Quarter-Master General's Department, who was authorized by the General to place the picquets, or by some other Staff Officer sent expressly for the purpose by the General. The Picquets when posted were visited by the Field Officer of the day, the General Officer, or by some Staff Officer expressly authorized by the General to do so.

30 In answer to the question as to the number of Officers and men who were on picquet, and the questions: — "Did your picquets take their rations cooked or uncooked? If uncooked, did you use the large 6 mess tins or the men's small tins?" The Outlying picquets consisted of one company per battalion, unless a larger or smaller number was specially ordered; and the inlying picquets by night of two companies per battalion, and by day, when required, of one-fourth of the non-commissioned officers and men of each company under the command of two Captains and four Subalterns per battalion, who were ordered to be constantly present with the battalion.

The company on outlying picquet left off duty a sufficient number of men to draw the company's provisions and cook; this did away, you will observe, at once, with all difficulty as to the provisions and cooking of the Company on outlying picquet; and in Craufurd's time, the large camp kettles were those used in cooking. From a fear that this might too much reduce the number of men on outlying picquet, the Adjutant-General of the Division notified in orders,

from time to time, what was to be the strength of the company on outlying picquet; so that if the particular company going on that duty should be too weak, it might be made up to a certain strength from the rest of the battalion; and this extra picquet duty from other Companies formed a particular roster for the Adjutant.

31 It will be observed, that what has been said of outlying picquets rather refers to the Picquet Duties of the Light Division when it was not actually in line of battle with other Divisions; for, in the latter case, the Head Quarter, Staff, or General Officer of the day, might give instructions.

32 By Craufurd's orders, all Officers commanding guards or picquets, wrote down the verbal orders which they received, and gave them in writing to the Relieving Officer. It was ordered that each man should, during the continuance of a guard or picquet, have the same post as sentry that he was first placed in; also that the most intelligent men should have their posts as sentries at the most important stations.

33 Your lordship mentions having been with the French army three years ago, and having found their instruction very perfect in all that regards Out-post Duty. I suppose that at the time you allude to (three years ago) they were regulated in this respect by what is ordered in the paragraphs from 81 to 97 inclusive of the *Ordonnance of 1832*—" *Sur le Service des Armées en Campagne*," issued by Marshal Soult; which regulation seems to be very good, and yet not to contain even all that was adopted by General Craufurd in the Light Division, and not much that was not adopted by

him. It will be observed, that by the French *Ordonnance of 1832*, the French Out-posts have four reliefs, while our regulation (*Field Exercise Book*, page 300,) orders three reliefs. It appears to me that in any system of instruction on Out-post Duties, published for the information of our army, that it would be of much use to give the sections also of the French *Ordonnance of 1832*, that I have referred to above, not only because they are good in themselves, but that our Officers might have a knowledge of how they manage their Out-post Duty ; of course, if the *Ordonnance of 1832* is superseded by a more recent instruction, such should be substituted.

34 I have examined the plan marked No. 1, which your lordship sent to me, being that of the disposition of a battalion of ten companies, five of those forming five outlying picquets, the other five in reserve to them ; the whole covering the cantonments of a Division placed in and about the town marked B. (*Vide Pl. 2*).

35 The picquet, consisting of the Grenadier Company, is 3300 yards from the nearest end to it of the town H ; No. 1 company 2200 yards ; the other three companies each 2750 yards ; so that the average distance of the outlying picquets from the Division they cover is one mile and 990 yards, that is, rather more than a mile and a half. This distance does not violate the general rule already noticed. The supports are, say, a thousand yards from the picquets ; with the exception of the Light Company, which is two thousand from its support. There are four detached posts furnished from the picquets, and each of them is rather

upwards of one thousand yards from the picquet furnishing it. The line of patrols, parallel to the line of sentries, appears to be about 600 yards in front of the most advanced night sentries. All these arrangements are, I conceive, on quite right principles and judiciously made.

36 The posts of the day sentries are unquestionably good, for they see all the ground in front, and are near to their picquets; whether the most advanced night sentries would be safe might depend on the nearness of the enemy. Were the enemy very near, might it not be necessary to have a double sentry on each flank of each of the hills in place of one double sentry in front?

37 Even if the enemy is not very near, I think that a work should be made at each such post as those furnished at the bridge and ford by the left picquet; those works should be made with the double view of protecting sentries from being destroyed or overcome so suddenly, that they neither fire nor give any alarm, as was the case with the double sentry at the Bridge of San Felices; and the other object is that of delaying the enemy's advance; if not obstructed at the ford, there would be nothing between him and the town.

38 Whether the picquet on the right (that furnished by the Grenadiers) could be kept so far in advance, would depend, I should think, upon the nearness of the enemy. If the enemy was very near, it might, perhaps, be safer to have it a little nearer to the picquet, but still on the road; and that some obstruction was constructed so that the enemy could be delayed, either in front of or at the houses where the road passes them immediately behind the picquet.

. 39 I have read the Reports and examined the Sketches of the Officers sent out from Winchester to take up ground as Out-posts, and am quite convinced that such practice is the best means that there is in time of peace of instructing the army in Out-post Duties.

I beg to remain,

My dear Lord,

Very faithfully yours,

J. S. KENNEDY.

Major-General Lord F. Fitzclarence,

&c., &c., &c.

JOURNAL.

Pinhel, January 1810.

Tuesday 30th.

I LEFT Pinhel early this morning, and proceeded to reconnoitre the river Coa, from the Bridge of Pinhel down to where it joins the Douro. After passing through the villages of Bogalhale and Azeva, I arrived at Citadella, which is three leagues from Pinhel, and there passed the night.

Wednesday 31st.

I this morning passed the Coa, and visited the villages of Quintan and Val de Francina, on the right bank; after which I repassed the river, and crossing the Masueme, remained for the night at a village called Santa Comba, which is only one league from Citadella.

Thursday, 1st February.

After following the Coa, from where it is joined by the Masueme, I passed through the village of Manchagale, and made Villa Novo my quarters for the night. It is three leagues from Santa Comba.

Friday 2nd.

I this day crossed the Coa, and visited Castell-Melhor on its right bank; after which I passed the

Douro, and proceeded to Torre de Moncorvo, where I remained the night, and found Finlay, the Commissary there.

Saturday 3rd.

Yesterday, I crossed the Douro by the Barcade Almendra, and to-day re-crossed it by a boat half a league further down; after passing Villa Novo and Monohega, I again reached Santa Comba.

Sunday 4th.

Proceeded from Santa Comba by the villages of Bormura and Getierce, Azeva, and Bogalhah to Pinhel. The principal results of my reconnoissance of the Coa, were to discover that below the Bridge of Pinhel there are sixteen places at which it is possible to cross the river. From the bridge to where the Coa joins the Douro is between six and seven leagues. The banks of the river, from the bridge to Azeva are very rugged and difficult; from thence, to where it is joined by the Masueme, its banks are singularly high, rugged, rocky, and perpendicular; from that to the Douro they are high, but not so rocky. Upon the whole, that part of the river may be defended by a very few men. Villa Novo and Torre de Moncorvo are two very good towns; the former is close to where the Coa joins the Douro.

Monday 5th.

Was employed in making out the report of my reconnoissance.

Tuesday 6th, Wednesday 7th.

Went out with Loyd and Wells to Villa Torpine, and remained all night with Wells.

Thursday 8th.

Returned to Pinhel by the villages of Reygada and Cinqua Villa. This afternoon appeared the commencement of wet weather.

Friday 9th.

This day continues wet and cloudy. Received a letter from Duffy.

Saturday 10th.

Wrote a letter to my father, and sent a bill for prize-money.

Sunday 11th.

To-day positive information was received from several quarters that the enemy, after having collected his force in the neighbourhood of Salamanca, had moved towards Ciudad Rodrigo; he, yesterday, occupied Saint Martin del Rio and Tamames; his force not accurately known, but computed at 15,000 men. Captain Runian states in his reports, that the enemy had only 18,000 men, at most, in Castille. There are accounts of their also having troops in Leon, Benevente, &c., &c. To-day we received information that Soult had reached Xeres, and that some English regiments had sailed from Lisbon for its support, under General William Steuart, 95th. The garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo consists of 3000 or 4000 men, and the Duke de Parque has 13,000 fighting men. His head-quarters are at Saint Martin, in the Sierra de Gatta.

Monday and Tuesday, 12th and 13th.

A French corps, having only field artillery, scattered themselves round Ciudad Rodrigo, and kept up a fire upon the town, and summoned it to surrender; but receiving a determined answer of resistance from the

Governor, they left the place and marched to San Felices.

Saturday 16th.

The last of Ney's corps left San Felices this morning, directing their march towards Salamanca, Ledesma, and Zamora, &c., &c. A few of them had, on the 15th, crossed the Agueda, and entered Barba de Puerco. Yesterday, the General met General Cole at Castomheiro, to confer with him upon what was best to be done, and recommended that the Third Division should move up to the Coa, and that the Brigade from Trancosa should move to Pinhel. To this proposition General Cole dissented. I accompanied the General part of the way to Castomheiro, and then turned off to Almeida for information.

Saturday 17th.

Remained all day in the house.

Sunday 18th.

Visited the quarters of the 43rd, and returned by Lamegal, Manegotta, &c.

Monday 19th.

The Quarters of the Division were now as follow, viz, 43rd, Valverde, Azinbal, Peva, Chevethos, Treixe, Aldea Novo.

52nd, Pinhel.

95th, Villa Torpine, Reygada, Cinqua Villa.

45th, Louroperez, Varcaverde, Manegotta, Boqua, Lanieiris, and Barragao.

88th, Lanegal, Freixinho, Attalaya, Carvalhal, and Vendada. Troop of artillery, Pinhel. Troop of hussars, Aldeo Bispo.

Information was received now that the enemy were

very near to Badajos with a corps, and that a very considerable one was collected near to Placencia. The weather has been remarkably fine for some days, and seems set in for the fine season.

Tuesday 20th.

A spy, who had been sent by the Duke de Parque to see what men entered Spain from France, gave the following account :—On the 29th of January, he met on this side of Barjos 1400 conscripts ; on the 30th, at Mariando de Ebro, he met a corps of 8000 men ; and on the 1st and 2nd instant, he met Junot's corps, consisting of 24,000 men at Toloso. He remained from the 3rd to the 6th at Bayonne. On the 6th, 15,000 of the infantry guard had arrived, and Bonaparte was expected from Bordeaux that evening, and to set off for Spain next morning.

Wednesday 21st.

I went this morning by Villa Torpine to Castello Rodrigo, and returned by ———. Castello Rodrigo is situated on the Sierra de Marofa, and from it you have a very extensive view over a great plain towards Spain. I understood from the people here, and it was confirmed by other accounts, that the French were only three and a half leagues from San Felices, occupying Bitagudinia, Yecla, Bogaga, &c., with about 2000 men, and patrolled near to San Felices. There are the remains of a castle and wall at Castello Rodrigo ; both were destroyed by the Spaniards in 1762.

Thursday 22nd.

Information was received to-day, that the corps of the enemy at Talavera and that at Placencia had crossed the Tagus, and were proceeding towards Ba-

dajos. Also, that a part of the Andalusian Army had marched some time ago towards Badajos. King Joseph was in Seville with 4000 men.

Friday 23rd.

There was now a new distribution of the army, which was in order as follows. By private letters, it appeared, that the works which had been worked at for a month past, at Torres Vedras, &c., were now ordered to be razed, and new ones begun nearer to Lisbon, at Mafra, &c. It is also known that General Hill's Division had passed the Tagus, and marched towards Elvas, but for what purpose is not ascertained.

Distribution of the army.

Monday 26th.

The weather very fine for some time past; to-day, sultry and blowy.

Tuesday 27th.

The Officer of Hussars at Aldeo Bispo, and the Officer of the 95th, stationed at Barba de Puerco, reported that the enemy had returned to San Felices, about 3000 strong, and had pushed forward a party to Barba de Puerco. These reports were received between one and two o'clock this morning; and the Officer of the 95th added, that there was a considerable number of the enemy reported to be in the villages in the neighbourhood of San Felices. Received my father's letter of the 10th January, yesterday, and my aunt's from Liverpool.

Wednesday 28th.

Yesterday, a company of the 95th marched to Escarrigo, and 20 men went to the Bridge of San Felices, where they saw about 30 cavalry and 200

infantry pass. The 20 men retired to Escarrigo, and had a slight skirmish with the enemy, near to Barba de Puerco, which place the French took possession of. No despatch having been received to-day from Lieut.-Colonel Beckwith, I set off between three and four in the afternoon for Villa Torpine, and being informed that the enemy had retired from Barba de Puerco to San Felices, I returned to Pinhel at 7 o'clock.

Thursday, 1st March.

The General went to visit the Out-posts to-day, and was to sleep at Malpartido, where I went to meet him; from whence I went to Almeida, which is only half a league, and was informed by the Governor that the Duke de Parque had gone to Lisbon, and that his army was at Albuquerque for the protection of Badajos; also, that the French had suffered a repulse in their advance upon Cadiz.

Friday, 2nd March.

The General having remained at Villa de Ciervo all night, I came home early this morning. To-day, we got English letters and papers to the 13th ultimo, but no letters for me. I wrote to William Kennedy, by Tylden, to-day.

Saturday, 3rd March, Sunday, 4th March.

To-day, Captain Muller's troop of Hussars arrived, being on their way to join Captain Ally's troop at the Out-posts. It is now known, positively, that our troops under General Steuart had entered Cadiz, and were well received. It is reported that preparations are making at Salamanca for the arrival of Bonaparte there, and that he has ordered all arrears due to his army in Spain to be immediately paid to the soldiers.

This is a wet, blowy day, and appears the commencement of bad weather. The people still expect rain and unsettled weather at this season of the year. The following is reported to be the corps of Marshal Ney, viz., 6th and 25th Light Infantry; the 8th, 16th, 27th, 32nd, 69th, and 76th Regiments of the Line; the 15th and 25th Dragoons; the 15th and 25th Chasseurs; and the 3rd Hussars.

Monday, 5th March.

Rained nearly the whole day. I wrote to-day to my father. No news to-day of the enemy.

Tuesday 6th, Wednesday 7th.

Information was received to-day of about 200 of the enemy having marched into Barba de Puerco from San Felices. They only remained there two hours. The Field Officers, 52nd, all dined with the General.

Thursday 8th, Friday 9th.

To-day, the whole of the enemy's force at San Felices, about 1500 men passed the bridge, and advanced upon Barba de Puerco, Escarrigo, and Villa de Ciervo. After plundering these villages of all the provisions they could get, they returned to San Felices. Our Hussars were driven back from Villa de Ciervo to Val de Cuelha, and lost a man who was wounded, and fell from his horse. They had also a horse shot. As soon as the information of the enemy's advance was known here, I went out to the Hussars at Val de Cuelha, and remained there during the night. For these five days past we have had heavy rain, so that most of the rivers were not fordable, but they now fall rapidly.

Saturday 10th.

I started from Val de Cuelha about 8 o'clock this morning, and proceeded first to Aldeo Bispo, and from that to Barba de Puerco, where I met the General and Campbell. The enemy have a sentry on the bridge, and picquet on the hill. While we remained at Barba de Puerco, a Spanish detachment arrived there from Ciudad Rodrigo. I returned to Pinhel by the villages of Boisa, Escarrigo, Virmiosa, and Villa Torpine. From Escarrigo, I sent two companies of the 95th to occupy Barba de Puerco, by order of the General, and one company is to occupy Boisa to-morrow morning.

Journal from the time that Brigadier-General Craufurd left PINHEL, on the 18th of March, 1810.

12th March.

I left Pinhel before the General, and passing through Villa Torpine, got to the Convent of —— (which is within cannon-shot of Castello Rodrigo) about 5 p.m. The General, Campbell, and Bell, arrived about 7. Here we remained for the night.

13th March.

We left the Convent about 9 o'clock this morning, and passing through Almafallo to Escarrigo, we found Colonel Beckwith at the latter place. Captain Creagh's company of the 95th entered Almafallo as we passed through. While we remained at Escarrigo, the Governor of Almeida arrived there, and accompanied the General to Barba de Puerco. From this I went directly to Villa de Ciervo. The General and Campbell arrived soon after. We took up our quarters in the priest's house.

At the time that Marshal Ney advanced his corps to Ciudad Rodrigo, no distinct orders had been given to General Craufurd or to General Cole (the latter was at Guarda) in what manner they were to act. They met to consider of the best measures to be taken, and did not altogether agree in their opinions as to the distribution of the out-posts. General Craufurd, therefore, being anxious to have more explicit instructions, wrote to Lord Wellington upon the subject, and stated to his lordship the matter as it appeared to him; and particularly pointed out, that while our out-posts were on the Coa, and the enemy on the Agueda

14th March.

We set off after breakfast, and visited the Fords of Valdespino, Attalaya, and Cupero; from thence we went through Martillan and Sesmeiro to Gallegos, where we remained the night. The enemy patrolled this morning to the Ford of Valdespino.

15th March.

Campbell went off early this morning for Pinhel. The General visited the Fords of the Agueda, between Sesmeiro and Ciudad Rodrigo, while I went straight to Ciudad Rodrigo, and called upon the Governor with whom I dined. The General got to Ciudad Rodrigo about 4 o'clock, and returned to Gallegos to dinner.

with the support to the Right Brigade so far back as Guarda and Celerico, that it could not be in his lordship's option the defence of the Coa, as the enemy might pass before our force could be brought up. In answer to this Lord Wellington stated, that it had long been his intention to bring up the Divisions at Celerico and Guarda to the villages near to the Coa, as soon as the weather would admit of their being in such quarters; and stated that he was anxious to have the defence of the Coa in his power, as it would enable him to save Ciudad Rodrigo, if the enemy approached with a force that he could cope with. His lordship said that the out-posts must all be under the direction of one person, and that that person must be General Craufurd.

Accordingly next day a memorandum to Generals Picton, Cole, and Craufurd (from Lord Wellington) was received, by which the whole of the Out-posts were put under General Craufurd's directions, and the regiment of Hussars, first German Legion, was put under

16th March.

The General went to Villa de Ciervo this morning ; and I went to Ciudad Rodrigo to ascertain the truth of the report which had reached us that the enemy were approaching Ciudad Rodrigo with twenty-five thousand men. The Governor disbelieved it; but said they had collected 20,000 near to Salamanca. I returned to Gallegos in the evening, and the General remained at Villa de Ciervo. The day was very wet, accompanied by thunder. The 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th were very fine days, and hot.

his orders. Generals Picton and Cole also were directed to move up their Divisions for the defence of the Coa, upon General Craufurd's suggestion, and to afford him what assistance he at any time wanted of infantry. The General therefore moved the regiment of Hussars near to the Agueda, and occupied a line extending from Escalhon to Payo. The infantry were also brought across the Coa, and Barba de Puerco was occupied by the 95th; they had also some companies in Boisa, Escarrigo and Almofallo. The 52nd were in Villa Torpine, Cinqua Villas, Reygada, &c.; the 43rd, Malpartida, Val de Cuelha, and Val de Mula. The two Portuguese battalions were at Coimbra, on their way to join. The Light Brigade can bring about two thousand five hundred men into the field, and the Hussars four hundred. The four guns were moved across the Coa to Aldeo Bispo.

By the most authentic accounts it appears that the enemy had now a force collected in the vicinity of Salamanca of about 20,000 men under Marshal Ney. Besides this collected force, they had detachments in *Ledesma*, *Bitigudinia*, *San Felices*, and also in *Tamames*,

Saturday, 17th March, 1810.

I wrote last night to the General the substance of the information given by the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo. This day was very wet, and the General did not arrive at Gallegos as I expected. A little before two o'clock, therefore, I left Gallegos, and proceeded to Villa de Ciervo, which is two leagues from Gallegos. The road passes through Burlada, Villa de Puerco, and Barquilla. Burlada is a single house. Upon my arrival at Villa de Ciervo, I found that the General was out looking at the fords, and I went on towards Val de Cuelha, to see after my horses, which had not yet arrived, and met them a short way from it, and returned with Campbell. I sent my luggage to Pinhel, to proceed to Gallegos.

Sunday, 18th March.

This was likewise a very wet day. The General went towards the Coa to see the road by which he might retreat in case of necessity from the Agueda, and we met at Gallegos to dinner. Rowan remained at Villa de Ciervo. Captain Krauchenberg's squadron of Hussars arrived at Gallegos to-day, with a serjeant's party at Guinaldo.

and in the Sierra de Francia, to within three leagues of Ciudad Rodrigo. Constant garrisons are kept in Zamoro Toro, Valladolid, Leon, Benevente, and all the principal towns. Kellermann and Loison appear certainly to serve under Ney, in his corps collected at Salamanca; but the information is contradictory and uncertain respecting Junot. The Governor of Almeida has intelligence from Braganza, which he gives credit to, that Junot was before Astorga about the 10th instant, with

Monday 19th.

Campbell returned this morning to the quarters of the brigade to regulate the quarters and provisions. The General, Cornet Cordimann, and I left Gallegos about one o'clock for Guinaldo. The direct road is through Especa and Campilla; but we lost the road, and got to Carpeo, which is on the right bank of the Azeva. When you cross the river, there is a single house on the left bank. From this we proceeded to Especa, which, in a direct line, does not appear more than three-fourths of a league from Gallegos. Here we got a guide, and proceeded to near Campillo, which is on the right bank of the river. We did not cross to Campillo, but continued to proceed up the river to Ituera, where there is a bridge called Ponte de Ituera. From Ituera to Guinaldo is a short league. From Gallegos to Ituera, we found the country quite different from that which is between the Coa and the lower

5000 or 6000 men, and occupied the same points which Loison had done, (Loison appears to have made three attacks on Astorga about a month ago, and was repulsed by General Garxia, who is in the place with about 900 Spaniards and 20 pieces of artillery) and that 5000 more were expected to join him. A French corps of about 15,000 men occupy a position from the vicinity of Badajos to Merida. General Hill is between Portalegre and Elvas, with 10 British battalions of infantry, and some regiments of cavalry; he has with him two brigades of Portuguese infantry, and a regiment of cavalry under General Hamilton, with two brigades of British, and one brigade of Portuguese artillery. General the Marquis of Romana is in Badajos; and the army which *was under the Duke de Parque, is now under Romana,*

Agueda, being flat and much wooded. The country round Guinaldo is quite open and flat. The Azeva is the same river which you pass between Gallegos and Ciudad Rodrigo, and which runs near to Marialva. Carpeo is only half a mile above the bridge at Marialva. The villages on the Azeva, beginning with Marialva and going upwards, are Marialva, Carpeo, Campillo, Ituera and * * * * opposite side of the river, and to Carpeo, is a house called Aldeguala. From this country you see that very high conical hill of the Sierra de Xalama, called Pituel, and likewise the hill of the Sierra de Morofa, which are two of the most conspicuous objects of the whole country. Guinaldo is a large village, and the country about it very abundant. It is five leagues from the Sierra de Francia, which the enemy at present occupy. The people told me that there are 250 inhabited houses in Guinaldo.

(about 13,000 men) and near to Badajos. The Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo says, that General Blake has an army in Andalusia of 20,000 Spaniards, this is exclusive of the garrison of Cadiz, which is certainly upwards of 20,000 men. The garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo consists of 5000 men commanded by Don Andres de Herrasti. The wall of Ciudad Rodrigo is very old, high, nearly perpendicular, and almost circular in its form, with small square projections as flanks, upon each of which three guns are mounted. The work therefore is weak, inasmuch as it has been constructed, not according to the modern system, with proper flanks, &c. Its glacis is also very bad. There are no bomb proofs, and there is a hill higher than the works of the town, within 600 yards of the ramparts. It has, however,

Tuesday, 20th March.

We started from Guinaldo this morning, for the purpose of visiting the Bridge of Villar. Cornet Cordimann and three dragoons accompanied us. For half a league we passed through quite an open country, with the Agueda about half a league to our left; we then entered a wood, through which it is a league and a half more to the bridge. From the road, we saw upon our right, the village of Castillas dos Flores, and to our left, on the opposite bank of the Agueda, Penhoparde. We crossed the Bridge of Villar, and from

a double ditch. The division of the ditches is a considerable rampart, in which is the covert way, and which is well covered by the glacis. The garrison is also very large, in proportion to the periphery of the wall of the place, which is mathematically small from its circular form. The Governor is also Commander of the province of Castille. It appears by the account of a deserter from the enemy, that the corps of Ney consists of the following regiments, viz.—6, 25, 27, 39, 50, 59, 69, and 76th, with two regiments of dragoons, one of the chasseurs-à-cheval, and one of hussars. Each regiment of the line, consists of three battalions, and each battalion of 4 companies of the centre, 1 of grenadiers, and 1 of chasseurs. Each regiment has one colonel and three commandants of battalion; each company has 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 sub-lieutenant, 1 pay-serjeant, 4 serjeants, and 8 corporals; each battalion of about 500 at present, but when complete of 120 per company. The advance guard of the Spanish army is now at Coria, where it was forced to in consequence of the advance of the French into the Sierra de Francia. *It is under the command of General Carrera, and is*

thence proceeded to Payo, which is one league distant from the Bridge of Villar. Here the General took post-horses, and proceeded to Porto de Perales, which is one league from Payo. On his return, we immediately set off and returned to Guinaldo, where we found seventy Spanish dragoons. About 9 o'clock, p.m., the General received a letter from Campbell, informing him, that the enemy had, at 11 o'clock, p.m., attempted to pass at the Bridge of San Felices. They were opposed by the four companies of the 95th which were at Barba de Puerco, under Colonel Beckwith. The enemy were driven back with the loss of two Officers and fifteen men killed and made prisoners. The 95th lost Lieutenant Mercer, and two men killed, and seven or eight wounded. The enemy passed about 1,500 men, and had 1,000 more on the other side. This information caused the General to leave Guinaldo,

about 3000 strong. The Marquis of Romana's army consists of five divisions; the first is at Campo Major, under General Pol; the second at Uvas, under General O'Donald; the third is commanded by Ballesteros; the fourth is under Garxia, in Astorga and the Asturias; and the fifth is in Badajos, commanded by the Marquis de Controfuerte. It appears that the fourth division, under Garxia, has marched into the Asturias, leaving only a garrison in Astorga.

The River Agueda, and the Position of the Division at this time.

From where this river falls into the Douro, which it does about two leagues and a half North-East of Castello Rodrigo, to within half a league of Ciudad Rodrigo, its banks are very high, rugged, and

which he did at 10 o'clock, and arrived at Gallegos at 1 in the morning of the 21st, where we found Campbell. Rowan had not arrived.

Wednesday, 21st March.

The General and Campbell went this morning to Barba de Puerco, and I went to Almeida to speak to General Cox. I returned to Valde Mula, and slept in Dalzell's quarters.

Thursday, 22nd March.

Set off pretty early with Johnson this morning, and went to Malpartido, where I breakfasted with Colonel Gifford. Then proceeded through Val de Cuelha to Villa de Ciervo. Found the General and all out, but his luggage and servants here. Two companies of the 52nd were now at Barba de Puerco with the four of the 95th.

difficult to pass, with the exception of three or four of the fords. From Ciudad Rodrigo upwards, its banks do not form any serious obstacle, also for half a league below it, they are quite low and flat. After heavy rain, it is impossible to ford the river from the Bridge of Navas Frias (which is about two leagues South-East of Alfayates) to its mouth, and from thence to the Douro there are only three bridges, viz., that of Villar, which is about a league below Navas Frias, and that of Ciudad Rodrigo, which is under the guns of the place, and that of San Felices, which is so exceedingly difficult to pass, from the banks of the river being uncommonly high and inaccessible, so that a small number of men may defend it against a large force. Our position extends from Escalhon, which is near to the mouth of the river, to Gallegos, and from *that* by parties of hussars to the Bridge of Villar; and

Thursday, 22nd March.

For these two days there has been no rain. For a fortnight before, we have had rain every day. This has caused the rivers to swell so much, that the Agueda and Coa are quite impassable but by the bridges. They will both become fordable with four days' drought.

at Payo, a small party and an Officer is stationed to get information. While the river is not fordable, this position, although a very extended one, is pretty strong, and well calculated to give the army an opportunity of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo, in case of its being attacked; and this is positively Lord Wellington's intention, if the enemy appear before it with a force which he can cope with. When the river becomes fordable, we do not occupy Barba de Puerco with infantry, but only watch it with cavalry; and the infantry occupy Villa de Ciervo and back to Malpartida. Behind Barba de Puerco and Villa de Ciervo runs the Duas Casas River, the banks of which behind Barba de Puerco are very difficult, and would be a good position for defence. The hussars and horse artillery are in the villages between Villa de Ciervo and Gallegos when the river is fordable.

22nd. About 10 o'clock this night the companies of infantry were withdrawn from Barba de Puerco, and a troop of hussars sent there. The infantry were recalled from Barba de Puerco in consequence of information being received that 4000 or 5000 of the enemy were moved near to it, and that it was their intention to force the post, also because the river was falling rapidly, and it was supposed that the fords would be passable in the morning. About a league from Villa de Ciervo, there are three fords, called

Friday 23rd.

I went to Barba de Puerco early this morning, and found all quiet; the enemy's picquets as before. In the afternoon I rode into Almeida to speak to the Governor about intelligence of the enemy and the means of sending reports. Got wet in going in.

Valdespino, Attalaya, and Cupero; there were infantry picquets at these fords, which were recalled to night, and those fords were watched by the hussars. The enemy placed picquets opposite to these fords this evening and reconnoitred them about 4 o'clock in the afternoon with about 300 men.

23rd. It appears that the enemy retired from the Sierra de Francia, and marched towards Tamames, and the French have drawn in their troops from Aymonte.

Saturday 24th, Sunday 25th.

It appears that the enemy's force in Bitigudinia, Guadriamiro, Yecla, San Felices, Banobares, &c., amounts to about 6000 or 7000 men and 4 pieces of artillery. It is certain that a part of Ney's corps from Salamanca, has passed the Puente de Banos, and that thus reinforced, the enemy have approached Coria from Placencia, which has obliged Carrera, who was there with 3000 Spaniards, to fall back upon Celleras. Mortier's corps has been withdrawn from Zappa to Santa Ollalla, and the enemy's troops at Merida have gone towards Trujillo. Battering cannon have entered Spain from France, and are, they say, to be brought in advance of Burgos. This information is got by intercepted letters. Blake is said to have collected between 20,000 and 30,000 men in Murcia.

Since the affair of Barba de Puerco, (for which Lieut.-Colonel Beckwith and the companies there were hand-

Monday 26th.

To-day I went with the Spanish Captain of horse to the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo to get information, &c., and returned late to Gallegos, where the General, Campbell, and I passed the night.

Tuesday 27th.

To-day I went from Gallegos to Villa de Ciervo, and returned to Gallegos.

Wednesday 28th.

The whole of us returned to Villa de Ciervo. Yesterday the two battalions of Caçadores (Portuguese) which are attached to this Division—the first and second—arrived at Pinhel, and are to be brought up immediately to the frontier villages of Portugal. They are together about 800 or 900 rank and file.

We have had little or no rain for the last three days, and the Agueda is fordable to-day at Valdespino and Cupero.

somely thanked by Lord Wellington,) the Division has been distributed as follows, viz :—

43rd, Malpartido, Val de Mula and Val de Cuelha.

52nd, Castellejo, and Alameda.

95th, Villa de Ciervo.

The four guns are in Barquilla and a farm house (Burlada) between it and Villa de Ciervo. A serjeant and 8 hussars at Escalhon ; a troop at Barba de Puerco ; a squadron at Villa de Ciervo ; troop at Villa de Yequa ; a squadron at Barquillo ; a squadron at Serenilla, &c. ; and a squadron at Gallegos, one troop of which is in Ituera with parties at Guinaldo and Payo. There are beacons along the chain, which are to be lighted if the enemy should pass in any force. The 43rd are to be

Thursday 29th.

To-day and yesterday have been good, but the wind cold and northerly.

Friday 30th.

Went this morning to Almeida.

Saturday 31st.

The 52nd, who occupied Alameda, marched from it this morning, in consequence of a fever which was in the place. I went to Ciudad Rodrigo, and the General went to Valbom. We all slept at Alameda.

Sunday, 1st April.

The General went this morning to Castellejo, thinking it would be a good quarter for him, but found it would not do, and returned immediately.

brought more near to the Agueda; and the two Portuguese battalions to occupy the villages which the 43rd leave.

All the information now received of the enemy, showed that heavy artillery had arrived at Salamanca, viz., 5 mortars, 5 guns of 24 lbs., 8 of 18 lbs., and others of different calibre, amounting in all to 40 pieces, large and field.

It appears certain that Ney can collect a corps of 20,000, besides Junot's, which is 10,000 or 12,000; but the accounts differ as to Ney's being at Astorga or Valladolid. The French corps which was before Badajos retired some time ago to Caceres, and took up a position behind the Labor river. It marched from that position on the 31st ultimo, and took the direction of Merida. General Carrera has about 4000 Spaniards at Coria. General Blake has an army between Malaga and Ronda of 2000 men according to accounts. The French have taken possession of the Puerto de Banos with 3000 men

Monday 2nd, Tuesday 3rd, Wednesday 4th.

Remained at Villa de Ciervo.

Thursday 5th.

The General went to Villa Torpine, accompanied by Rowan and myself, to see the two Portuguese battalions of Caçadores attached to the Division. They had, altogether, about 700 men in the field.

Friday 6th.

About 10 o'clock this morning, Colonel Arentschildt came to report, that considerable bodies of the enemy's cavalry and infantry were on the river. The hussars and 95th were turned out, and the General and Staff went down to the river. We found parties of the enemy at each ford. They had in all, about 200 cavalry and 300 infantry. The infantry remained near the ford, while the cavalry went on to San

and 3 or 4 pieces of artillery ; Generals Ney and Mermet are in Salamanca, and Loison in Ledesma. Ney's own corps consists of two divisions, and of the regiments mentioned in page 8. The 6th Regiment has only one battalion at present. The Brigadiers who serve under him are Marchand, Maucun, and Mauconnia. Each brigade consists of two regiments ; and each division, of two brigades.

A division consists of 12 battalions, each battalion of 6 companies, each company of 120 men, consequently a division, if complete, would be 8640 men. To each Regiment is attached a four- or eight-pounder and a howitzer ; they have twelve-pounders in the park. At present their battalions do not average

Felices El Chico, and after taking some provisions, the whole retired to San Felices and Banobares. We followed them with about 110 hussars (by passing at the Ford of Cupero), as far as the small River Granao. To-day we had snow and rain.

Saturday 7th.

A very wet day, and we remained all day in the house.

Sunday 8th.

Continued wet.

Monday 9th.

I went this day to the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo. Cornet Cordimann of the hussars accompanied me from Gallegos. There were some showers in the forenoon, and very heavy rain in the evening.

above 500, and as the 6th have but one battalion, that would make Ney's own divisions about 11,000 men.

Loison's division occupies Ledesma, Bitigudinia, Tamames, Yecla, San Manos, Banobares, San Felices, &c., and is about 7000 strong. The other division is commanded by Kellermann, and is 5000, and is between Alba and Peneranda. By this it appears that Ney's corps is 23,000 men. Carrera continues at Coria; and defeated a party of the enemy on the 9th at Aldea Nuera, with, he says, 200 men. The Corps of the enemy which was near to Badajos, and which, as already stated, took up a position behind the Salor (which it quitted on the 31st, and marched towards the Guadiana,) is commanded by General Regnier, and has marched by Medellin, towards Cabazade Bues, and is supposed to be moving

Tuesday 10th.

Remained at home all day. A little rain, but trifling.

Wednesday 11th.

No rain. Remained at home.

Thursday 12th.

Fine day. We received this evening letters from England up to the 24th ultimo. I had one from my Father of the 16th March, by which I found all idea of getting Deshon's company to tally at an end. To-day, Captain Runian of the 97th called on the General; he is employed as a spy; and returned to the Sierra de Francia, after getting some money, for which he came.

Friday 13th.

A fine day. I wrote to my father, in answer to his of the 16th March. Only took an hour's ride with the greyhounds.

Saturday 14th.

Fine Day.

Sunday 15th.

A rainy day.

Monday 15th, Tuesday 17th, Wednesday 18th, Thursday 19th, Friday 20th, Saturday 21st, Sunday 22nd, Monday 23rd, Tuesday 24th.

These were all very fine days. We removed to Villa de Ciervo, and all quiet.

upon Cordova, which seems as if they intended to attack Blake, who is between Malaga and Ronda with 20,000 Spaniards.

Wednesday 25th.

To-day I went to Gallegos, and returned in the evening. Rainy.

Thursday 26th.

Went at 1 o'clock in the morning to Valde Mula with the despatch, returned at 4. Set off with the General at 10 a.m., and went to Gallegos. Campbell went on to Ciudad Rodrigo. We got back to dinner at Villa de Ciervo at 6 o'clock p.m.

Friday 27th.

The General went to-day to Gallegos, where he took up his quarters. Visited by Governor Cox.

Saturday 28th, Sunday 29th,

Were wet days, and nothing particular occurred. On both days we were turned out by patrols of the enemy crossing the river below Ciudad Rodrigo, but they immediately returned to the right bank.

25th. Very early this morning we had a report of the enemy's having advanced to Serradilla and Zamarra.

26th. By the officer sent to Ciudad Rodrigo, it was reported that the enemy appeared before the place last evening with 4000 men and six light guns. Campbell went there to-day, and the Governor said there were only 2000 men before the place.

27th. Upon Lord Wellington's receiving intelligence of the enemy's advance to Ciudad Rodrigo, he moved from Viseu, and arrived to-day at Celerico. The first division of the army also moved to Celerico and its neighbourhood, and the Portuguese troops and English cavalry were put in motion from Coimbra. The information of the enemy's force, &c., near to Ciudad Rodrigo is very uncertain. A great many cars were seen on the *Salamanca* road, but certainly no heavy artillery has

Monday 30th.

I went this morning to Almeida, and after returning from that, went to meet the Spanish General, Carrera, at Espeja, as he had promised to come to Gallegos from San Martin de Trebeja. He arrived at Gallegos in the evening, and remained till next morning.

Tuesday, 1st May.

Went to Espeja with General Carrera.

Wednesday 2nd.

Continued rainy, and the Agueda not to be forded.

Thursday 3rd.

The General went to-day to see the country near the Agueda on the left bank, higher up than Ciudad Rodrigo. I went to Villa de Ciervo. A fine day.

Friday 4th.

To-day we had some heavy showers. No movement of the enemy. The river not quite but nearly impassable. Rowan went into Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy remained as before.

even moved from Salamanca. The enemy occupies Zamorra. General Carrera moved to the Porte de Perrales as soon as he heard of the enemy's advance upon Ciudad Rodrigo. His head quarters were on the 29th at San Martin de Trebeja; his corps altogether is not more than 3000 effective men. The following is at present the distribution of the Light Division:—

Regiment of hussars extend along the Agueda from Barba de Puerco to Campillo.

First Caçadores and six companies of the 95th in Gallegos; Third Caçadores and two companies of the 95th in Espeja; second Caçadores in —————; seven companies of the 43rd in Alameda, and three in San Pedro.

4th. We now had intelligence that the enemy had

Saturday 5th.

Went this morning to Val de Mula, from whence the Priests of Toras were marched prisoners to Gallegos. A wet day.

Sunday 6th.

Wrote home to-day. The Agueda impassable this morning.

Monday 7th.

The regiments of this Division changed quarters this morning, and were assembled on the road between Alameda and Espeja.

Tuesday 8th.

The day of Alameda fair, which I went to see with Mr. Fraser. Fine day.

Wednesday 9th.

The 43rd marched this morning to Espeja, the 52nd to Villa Formosa, and the 95th and 3rd Caçadores to Fuentes de Onoro. I went into Ciudad Rodrigo.

taken Astorga on the 22nd ultimo, and that they had reinforced their corps in Estremadura. They still occupy Zamorra, and in Martiajo, they have 2500 men. To-day General Carrera moved his head quarters to Puebla de Azava, and he has two battalions of infantry in Guinaldo; he occupies Robledo, Campillo, Ituero, &c. with cavalry. His division could only be calculated upon at between 3000 and 4000 men in the field. It was now agreed upon between General Craufurd and General Carrera, that if the enemy attacks us, the Light Division should, in the first instance, assemble in the wood behind Espeja: and if the enemy's force was superior to that of the Light Division, that it was to fall back and join that of General Carrera at Nave de Aver, where the two divisions would wait the attack, if the enemy was not

Thursday 10th, Friday 11th.

Went into Ciudad Rodrigo.

Saturday 12th.

The weather very bad.

Sunday 13th, Monday 14th.

Continued bad wet weather. To-day the General and Campbell set off to visit the Upper Coa.

Tuesday 15th.

Wet day. Wrote to Campbell ——— to Captain Bouverie, to Captain Ellis.

very superior; in which latter case, the two divisions would retire to Villa Mayor. The following information was given by the Officer mentioned in the Journal of date Friday 18th instant. Marshal Massena, the Prince D'Essling, has been announced in the orders of the French army as Commander of what is called the Army of Portugal. This army consists of the second, sixth, and eighth corps of the army of Spain. Massena arrived at Salamanca on the 15th instant. The French army is divided into corps, the corps into divisions, and the division into brigades. The brigades consist of two regiments each; and the regiments, some of two, and some of three battalions. Each battalion has six companies, and he averages the battalions at between 500 and 600 men each. Of the second corps he knows nothing. The sixth is commanded by Marshal Ney, and the eighth by Junot. The sixth corps consists of three divisions, and the eighth of two. The following is the detail of the divisions, brigades, and regiments of the sixth, or Ney's corps.

First division, Commander, Marchand, and 6th and 69th regiments of foot. Brigadier-General, Mauchunle. 39th and 50th regiments of foot, Brigadier not known. Second division, Commander, Mermet, 25th and 27th

Friday 18th.

A French Officer, who deserted from the 6th regiment light infantry, was examined to-day. He gave himself up at Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday, and arrived here late last night. He had wounded his Captain in a duel, and was afraid of being shot for it. Went to Villa de Ciervo in the evening.

Saturday 19th.

The weather hitherto so very wet and unsettled, now become quite fine.

Sunday 20th.

Went this evening with Loyd to see the Ford of Molinos Flores. We saw there a French party of infantry, and spoke to the Officers across the water. Yesterday the French attempted to try if the ford was passable, but were prevented by our hussars. The General and Campbell returned this evening.

regiments of foot, Brigadier-General, Feré. 59th and 76th regiments of foot, Brigadier-General not known.

Third division, Commander, Loison, 66th and 82nd regiments of infantry, Brigadier not known; 32nd and another not known, nor the Brigadier, but supposed the 26th. There are before Ciudad Rodrigo three hut camps; and in each camp there is one brigade and one regiment of cavalry, amounting to about 3000 men in each, and making the whole encampment 9000 men. In the centre camp are two regiments of cavalry. The following is the detail he gives of the regiments in each camp: first, in their right camp, which is on the Val de Carros road, there are the 66th and 82nd regiments of foot, and 15th chasseurs-à-cheval; he thinks that the proper Commander of this brigade, is General Larcha, but that he is absent, and it is now commanded by

Monday 21st.

A very fine day. Went with Loyd to Cismeiro, Martillan, &c., and returned by the ford.

Tuesday 22nd.

Went to Villa de Ciervo, and saw the Priest of Garuy Ruy, the person in the habit of giving information. To-night we were turned out by a false alarm of the enemy having passed the river at Molinos Flores.

Wednesday 23rd.

This morning we got English papers to the 3rd instant. I received no letters. Some rain.

Colonel. Second, in their centre camp are, the 25th and 27th foot, the 10th and 25th chasseurs-à-cheval, and two four-pounders, commanded by Feré. Third, their left camp, which is at Pedro de Toro, consists of the 6th and 69th foot, and 3rd hussars, two four-pounders and a howitzer. He says that Mermet commands the camp. He is not certain of what artillery was in each camp, but believes there are three in each; in all nine. Junot's corps consist of only two divisions. The following is the establishment of a regiment of two battalions complete:

- 1 Colonel, Gros Major,
- 2 Chefs de Battalion,
- 2 Adjutant Majors,
- 36 Officers.

In each battalion there are six companies, and to each company, one serjeant-major, four serjeants, and eight corporals. The company is 120 rank and file when complete. Regiments of the ligne have four companies du centre, one du grandiers, and one du voltigeurs. The light infantry battalions have

- 4 companies du centre,
- 1 company du carbinier,
- 1 du voltigeur.

Thursday 24th.

To-day the General went to Puebla de Azava to see General Carrera. Fine day. Rode in the evening with Loyd to Palacios and towards the Ford of Pezerel to see the enemy's camp.

Friday 25th.

Rain.

Saturday 26th.

A very wet day. In the forenoon the servants of Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford arrived at Gallegos, and told us that the two Marshals would arrive in an hour, which they accordingly did. They had slept at Almeida last night, and came by Fort Conception, Villa de Ciervo, and Villa de Yequa. They were attended by General Cox, Governor of Almeida, a General of the Portuguese army, and Captain Bouverie, Aide-camp. After remaining at Gallegos about an hour, they went to the Bridge of Pontecilla, and returned to dine at Almeida. The General, Campbell, and I went as far as the Dos Casas with them. The Agueda was $7\frac{1}{2}$ feet high, owing to to-day's rain.

Besides the regiments mentioned above as forming Loison's division he has also the Légion du Midi, or first légère infantry, and the fifteenth légère infantry. By a deserter from the 3rd regiment of cavalry, it appears there is a foreign division commanded by Colonel Daniel, and composed of the following regiments, 3rd and Regiment of Baden (cavalry) and two regiments of infantry, the 3rd Dutch and Paluca regiments. By another deserter, it appears, that a portable bridge had arrived at St. Espirituo from Salamanca. Massena remained only

Sunday 27th.

Wrote No. 3. Went this evening with Loyd, and dined at Espeja with McKenzie. Wet day.

Monday 28th.

Wet day. Remained in the house.

Tuesday 29th.

The cast horses of the hussars were sold to-day, and we went to the sale at Alameda. This is a fine warm day.

Wednesday 30th.

This is Ferdinand the Seventh's birth-day. The General, Campbell, Rowan, Loyd, and myself went into Ciudad Rodrigo, and dined with the Governor. There were three rounds fired by all the guns of the place in honour of the birth-day. We went out after dinner with Don Julian and his Guerrillas, and passed along the French line of vedettes.

a very short time at Salamanca, and was understood to have returned to Valladolid, accompanied by Junot. Another corps of the Army of Spain, was also mentioned as forming part of the Army of Portugal, viz., the 4th.

26th. I was informed by the Adjutant-General of the Portuguese troops, that there are now between Celerico and Almeida, two Portuguese brigades, and immediately behind Celerico, three more; these five brigades, including Officers, and every thing, amount to 16,600, fit for duty, including four brigades of artillery. Marshal Beresford's head quarters are about two leagues from Celerico. The artillery is commanded by a Major Arentschildt. There are also two brigades of infantry, and two brigades of artillery with General Hill, commanded by General Hamilton. He says that the Portuguese regiments have each two battalions, and are con-

Thursday 31st.

The General went to-day to Alameda, and slept there.

Friday, 1st June.

This forenoon we rode to Gallegos, and after doing some business there, went on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo with Krauchenberg. We found that some of the enemy's parties had come down to the Ford of Carboneros, and were skirmishing with the Guerrillas. This induced the General to go on, and having got pretty near the place, we went into Ciudad Rodrigo, and dined with the Governor. After dinner, we went up to the belfry of the Cathedral to see the enemy's position. As there appeared something like a work being

siderably upwards of 1000 per regiment, upon an average.

30th. Positive intelligence was received this evening by the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, that the enemy's battering cannon left Salamanca on the 28th instant. Captain Ally, the officer of hussars at Martillan, reported that he saw a column of 3000 infantry, and 400 horse, pass through San Felices Chico this afternoon, and take the road towards Ciudad Rodrigo. Lights were seen this night on a hill, called Biban Rey, and the enemy established a camp there, which appeared to be a brigade of infantry, with cavalry and two field pieces. The enemy established himself also on the right of the town, by a camp, the left of which was at the Convent of La Caridad, and fronting the town. On the 1st of June, the enemy commenced to throw a bridge over the Agueda a little above La Caridad, and completed it on the following day. This bridge was made with 15 chevalets, and capable of bearing cannon. It was protected by the camp of infantry at La Caridad (which appeared a

in progress at the Convent of La Caridad, and as we saw a considerable body of men there, we proceeded with Don Julian and 20 or 30 Guerrillas to reconnoitre them, and found upon getting near to the convent, that the enemy had already commenced a bridge, and had a body of cavalry on the left bank of the river. General Carrera, whose parties watched this part of the river, had not reported either of these circumstances, nor did the people in Ciudad Rodrigo know anything of a bridge having been commenced. We returned to Alameda, which we reached about 12 o'clock at night.

Brigade), a considerable force of cavalry and some field pieces. A deserter informed us that the following six regiments of dragoons were encamped near the bridge, viz., 3rd, 6th, 10th, 11th, 15th, and 25th, making a force of 2500 or 3000 cavalry. The same deserter stated positively that Massena reviewed the troops in the camp on the 3rd June. On the morning of the 4th, the enemy encamped a body of cavalry between the Camp of Biban Rey, and the Ford of Carboneros. This morning the enemy commenced to bring to the Ford of Carboneros the materials for the construction of a bridge. The Agueda is here divided by a small island. On the 5th, they threw the bridge over one of the divisions of the river, and completed it on the 7th. From the Ford of Carboneros, the Agueda begins to make a bend towards Ciudad Rodrigo, so that the situation of the enemy's bridge is very favourable for taking in flank any enemy approaching the town. The bridge at Carboneros was similar in its construction to that at La Caridad. The enemy's cavalry have sometimes passed the bridge at La Caridad, but did not yet take up any position on the left bank of the Agueda. The weather

Saturday 2nd.

The General wished to see what progress the enemy had made with their bridge, and to see if they had taken up a position on this side of the Agueda ; for that purpose we went to Gallegos in the forenoon, and all the hussars in Gallegos and Espeja (amounting to 200) were ordered to march to Fonseca. An Officer was sent into Ciudad Rodrigo to beg that Don Julian would come out with his party. We proceeded across the country, and by keeping the hollows got pretty near to the hill on the left bank of the Agueda, opposite to La Caridad, without being perceived. Upon our arrival, we found that the enemy had all gone back to the right bank, and that their bridge was completed. Don Julian and all his party joined us, and we went with him into Ciudad Rodrigo and dined with the Governor. Returned to Gallegos at midnight. Had a fall from my horse in mounting! Since the 29th ultimo, which I mentioned as being a fine day, we have had quite settled weather, and very hot. We slept at Gallegos.

being so extremely wet, makes the roads so deep as to delay the march of the enemy's battering train, which was now said to be near San Muños. Besides the six dragoon regiments, mentioned above, the enemy are said to have in their camp, the 3rd hussars and 15th légère regiments of cavalry. The enemy now occupy all the villages near to the camp, and the villages on the right bank of the Agueda, from Ciudad Rodrigo to the Douro. The troops in the camp, and those in the neighbourhood, are certainly Ney's (or the 6th) corps of the Army of Spain. The whole of this corps is certainly before, and

Sunday 3rd.

Wet day, and nothing done.

Monday 4th.

I went this forenoon with the General to Carpeo, where he met General Carrera by appointment. After remaining a short time at Carpeo, we went upon the Ciudad Rodrigo road to near Conaje; about a mile and a half below which place, at the Ford of Carboneros, we found the enemy carrying materials to the water's edge for the construction of a bridge. General Carrera dined at Gallegos with the General, and went home in the evening.

in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, and it appears that Junot's (the 8th) corps of the Army of Spain, is on its march to Ciudad Rodrigo. About the 27th of May, Junot arrived at Salamanca, and 3500 of his infantry. It appears very certain, therefore, that the corps of Ney and Junot, under the command of Massena, are destined to undertake and cover the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Junot's corps will of course be diminished by the Garrisons which he must have left in Astorga, Valladolid, and that neighbourhood. Nothing whatever has been heard of the division of Martinier since the account given of it by Mr. Jackson, a person calling himself son to Commanding-General Jackson of our troops in Sicily. He was made prisoner in Germany, and made his escape by entering the Irish brigade. He states that in April, a division commanded by Martinier, and which belongs to the 2nd corps, was on its march between Vittoria and Valladolid, which place its advance entered on the 26th of April. This division consisted of the following regiments, and was said to be on its march to Ciudad Rodrigo, viz., 2nd and 17th light infantry, 8th, 45th, 46th, 54th, 64th, 103rd, 115th, 122nd, and 96th of the line, making in all 23 battalions. Also the 1st and 3rd

Tuesday 5th.

Some of the enemy's cavalry passed the Agueda this morning by the Bridge of La Caridad, and came to our posts at Marialva and Manzana, where they skirmished with our hussars. The General had ordered the hussars and two pieces of artillery to be at the hill above the enemy's new bridge at Carboneros before daylight this morning to interrupt them in its construction; but a very wet night prevented their marching, and in the morning, we found that the enemy had brought artillery for the protection of the bridge, and that the hill on which our guns must have been brought was within musket-shot. I went with the General by Mansanilla, &c., and returned by Carpeo.

Wednesday 6th.

Went to-day to Almeida, and returned by Val de Cuelha, Villa de Ciervo, Barquilla, &c. Don Julian dined at Gallegos to-day.

chasseurs-à-cheval, and 3rd dragoons. As this division did not approach Ciudad Rodrigo, and nothing since having been heard of it, Martinier must have either joined the 2nd corps on the Tagus, or marched into Arragon and Catalonia, if any such corps existed.

Sir Brent Spencer, who was appointed Second in Command of the troops, serving in Portugal, joined the army about this time, and took the command of the 1st division of the army. General Payne, our former Second in Command, went home on the plea of bad health.

General Hill continued on the South of the Tagus. The Spanish General, O'Donnel, who was stationed at Albuquerque, having been threatened with an attack by *Regnier*, General Hill advanced to his support, and the *enemy retired*. After this, the enemy threatened Badajos

Thursday 7th.

There was a false alarm this forenoon which caused our being turned out. I rode out in consequence with the General towards Mansanilla, and returned by Carpeo, &c. The enemy had completed their bridge at Carboneros this morning.

Friday 8th.

Were turned out this forenoon by a report of the enemy's having crossed the river. Went with the General to Mansanilla, looked at their bridge, and saw a column of infantry halted on the side of the river.

Saturday 9th.

Nothing particular occurred to-day. Rode in the afternoon with the General and Rowan to the river.

and General Hill moved towards Elvas. The Spanish General, Ballisteras, having advanced in the direction of Seville, was attacked by Marshal Mortier, Duke of Trivoso, and totally defeated. The following is a statement of Ney's corps, taken from accounts given by the deserters; and as there have been deserters from every infantry regiment, it may be considered as pretty correct as to the regiments composing the corps, and the number of battalions. The corps consists of three divisions.

1st Division (Marchand.)		
Brigadier.	Regiments.	Number of battalions.
Mauchunle	{ 6th légère	2
	{ 69th line	3
	{ 39th line	3
	{ 50th line	3
2nd Division (Mermet.)		
Basset	{ 25th légère	2
	{ 27th line	3

Sunday 10th.

The General employed to-day in regulating, with the Officers of hussars, the different picquets and stations of vedettes, their duties at the beacons, &c. Rode in the afternoon to the hill above Mansanilla, and saw the enemy busily employed in the construction of what appeared three distinct redoubts, which seemed to serve as a *tête-de-pont* to their bridge at Carboneros. Rodrigo was now completely invested, the French having placed picquets on all the roads, and occupied the heights of Maria Mayor and Pedrotelho. An attempt was made to send some ammunition into the town at night, but they could not get in.

Monday 11th.

Remained at home all day. Wrote No. 4. For the last four or five days the weather has been unsettled; but the rain not heavy. The Agueda, however, continues impassable at the usual fords.

Brigadier.	Regiment.	Battalions.
	{ 59th line	3
	{ 76th line	3
	3rd Division (Loison.)	
	{ 15th légère	1
Simon	{ 26th légère	3
	32nd légère	2
	Légion du Midi	1
	{ 66th line	3
Féré	{ 82nd line	4
	Hanoverian Legion	2

making in all 37 battalions of infantry; and calculating the battalions at 500 each, makes a force of 18,500 men.

The cavalry, with a corps, forms always a separate division of itself, and the following regiments are mentioned by the deserters as being with Ney's corps, and I sup-

Tuesday 12th.

I set off with the General early this morning, who went out with the intention of regulating the posts at Marialva, Carpeo, and Manzana. At Marialva there has been a picquet of one company of infantry since the 9th. Yesterday the picquet was augmented by twenty-four of the 95th, given from the company at Gallegos. The General made them build up the entrances from the front of both Marialva and Carpeo. While we remained at Carpeo a flag of truce arrived: it brought a letter for Lord Wellington from Ney. The person who brought it said he was Colonel of the 3rd Hussars. A company of infantry happened to be in Carpeo at the time the flag of truce came; they were drawn up so as to be seen at the entrances of the

pose form a division commanded by General Millet; Kellermann formerly commanded the cavalry of this corps, but has not been with it since the Battle of Alba. The regiments of cavalry and their strength is stated as follows by the deserters, viz.:

	3rd hussars	600
	15th dragoons	600
	25th dragoons	800
	10th and 15th chasseurs	600
General Millet	{ 3rd dragoons	800
	{ 6th dragoons	600
General Carrier	{ 10th dragoons	400
	{ 11th dragoons	500
		<hr/>
		Total 4900

By this calculation the cavalry and infantry of the corps amount to twenty-three thousand four hundred men. We have no account of the number of artillery

village, and the French party brought far enough to see them. From Carpeo we proceeded to Manzana, and found there a Spanish picquet, and near to it some of our vedettes, given from Captain Grubin's picquet at Aldea Nueva. Passing Manzana, we went to within half a league of Elbodon, and returned by Aldea Nueva and the Quinta of Aldequela. This afternoon the French took possession of Palacios and the height to its left, between the Fords of Capilla and Pezerel. The General ordered to-night that the 52nd

and engineers; but by a state of Victor's corps last year, it appears that, with his corps, they amounted to 2100, and supposing this corps to have the same establishment, it would make it upwards of twenty-five thousand men. Scarcely a day passed, without some skirmishes between the garrison and the besiegers. On the 6th, there was a very heavy cannonade during the greater part of the day, in consequence of the enemy's endeavouring to possess themselves of some mills near to the town; in which the Governor stated the enemy to have lost 200 men. As already stated, the enemy had, on the 7th, completed his bridge over the Agueda, at Carboneros; and as the operations of the siege became at this period more interesting, they are hereafter given in the form of a journal, commencing on the 8th.

8th. The enemy passed the Agueda to-day, by their bridge at Carboneros, with infantry and cavalry, and established themselves on the left bank of the river, near to the bridge. The Agueda has been for some days, and still continues to be, quite unfordable, and was so much swelled on the 7th, that the enemy was obliged to discontinue his work at the bridge, but which he had completed to-day.

9th. An infantry picquet consisting of one company was placed to day at Marialva.

should go to the hill in front of Gallegos at daylight to-morrow morning, and 43rd, 95th, and 1st Caçadores to be formed on the heights behind the village at five o'clock in the morning.

Wednesday 13th.

Remained in the house most of the forenoon. Rode with Colonel Elder to Marialva, and from the height above it saw the French very busily employed in the work near to their bridge at Carboneros.

10th. The enemy were observed to-day to be busily employed in the construction of their redoubts on the height in front of their bridge at Carboneros, to which they formed a *tête-de-pont*. An unsuccessful attempt was made to send in musket ammunition to Ciudad Rodrigo this evening.

11th. The enemy continued his works near Carboneros. The river not fordable.

12th. In the evening, the enemy took possession of Palacios, which he occupied with cavalry; and the hill between it and the river, with infantry.

13th. A heavy cannonade from the town this morning, but the cause of it not known. No information has been received of the arrival of the enemy's battering train. The fords of the Agueda were passable this morning with difficulty. The Guerrillas appear to have become active in Castille, since the French troops were withdrawn from it. The following account was received of Junot's corps, the only information we have of it:

Stations.	Salamanca	3000
	Toro	2000
	Zamoro	4000

He has left a garrison of about 1500 men in Astorga, and the remainder of the corps is in the neighbourhood of the above places. On this day, 28 pieces of the ene-

Thursday 14th.

Went this forenoon to Alameda, and from thence with Booth to Barquilla, to see Hamburg's horses, &c., and returned by Villa Puerco. The Field Officer of the 52nd, also Ross and Jinkenson, &c., dined with the General to-day. After dinner, there being some mistake about the instructions given to the sentry at the General's door, the Officer who was on guard was sent for by the General, and upon the General's asking him whether or not he had received any particular instructions from the Officer whom he relieved, as to the orders of the sentries, he replied that he had not, and that he had a general idea, but not a particular knowledge of the orders which the sentries had. The Officer who had been relieved this evening was next called for, and gave much a similar answer. Both were put under arrest, and the General declared

my's heavy artillery were said to be at San Manios, and 4 mortars, 1 large and 3 small; 11 howitzers and ammunition left San Manios on the 10th, and took the road towards Ciudad Rodrigo. This information and that respecting Junot's corps, rest on the authority of a spy, who was sent to Salamanca.

14th. The enemy did not continue to occupy Palacios, nor the hill between it and the river.

15th. By the information of deserters, the enemy appear to have begun their first parallel to-night, on the height of San Francisco.

16th. A very heavy fire from the town, which commenced last night, continued till after day-break this morning; a corroboration of the enemy's having opened *his trenches*.

he would bring them both to a court-martial. The Officer on guard was Lieutenant * * *, and the Officer whom he relieved was Lieutenant * * *. Lieutenant * * * stated that he had not visited his sentries since coming on guard, which was at sunset. It was about eight o'clock p.m. when the General spoke to Lieutenant * * *. The General's reason for putting these two Officers under arrest was, their not having received and not knowing the particular orders of the sentries of their guard. The weather is now uncommonly fine, and appears quite settled. The Agueda quite fordable. One of our hussars on vedette at Valdespino spoke yesterday to General Loison who was then reconnoitring. Two of our hussars deserted last night.

Received this morning a joint letter from Mary Kennedy and Helen. Also received No. 1 from Helen alone.

Friday 15th.

Remained in the house all day. The day rather cloudy, with some thunder and lightning, but very hot. This morning Lieutenants * * * and * * * were released. A great deal of firing during the night.

17th. The enemy's first parallel was to-day distinctly observed from the height above Marialva, it could not be seen yesterday owing to the haziness of the day. This parallel of the enemy ran along the crest of the height of San Francisco, and extended from thence to the river, on which its right rested. No other parallel was necessary, for, from this one, they were not more than 500

Saturday 16th.

Went this morning to the hill on the right of Marialva, and saw the enemy's parallel on the height of San Francisco. The morning was wet and hazy.

Sunday 17th.

Remained in the house all forenoon. Bought Ham-burgh's grey mare. Rode to Marialva in the afternoon. The Field Officer of the Portuguese battalions dined with the General. A battery, capable of holding about ten guns, was observed in front of the enemy's parallel to-day. They also had a work extending from the hill to the river.

yards from the wall of the town, and saw nearly to the bottom of it. The wall of the town is nearly circular, having no flanks, but three small projections, carrying 3 guns each; but it is secure against assault by the height of the wall, and by its having a double ditch. Upon its great wall were mounted 41 pieces of very good, heavy artillery, about 24 of which could bear on the height of San Francisco. The Governor, Don Andreas Harrasti, was a Brigadier-General in the regular army of Spain, previous to the present war. The garrison was sufficiently supplied with provisions and ammunition, and although there were not in the place bomb proofs sufficient to hold the powder, yet very considerable exertions had been made to put one of the churches into such a state, that it proved a secure magazine during the siege. The garrison of the place consisted of about 6000 armed people.

18th. Two columns of the enemy and about 8 field pieces and 80 waggons, were seen this morning from Molinos Flores. One of these columns, about 1000

Monday 18th.

Rode this afternoon to Molinos Flores, to inquire respecting the march of columns of the enemy and some guns which were seen in motion on the opposite side this morning. Was told by the Officer on picquet, Captain Crampton 95th, that about 1000 men and 80 waggons entered Felices Chico, and another column marched towards Castelligo. We supposed this to be the arrival of the advance of Junot's corps.

Tuesday 19th.

Went to Alameda early this morning, and got a bill from Fraser on Greenwood and Cox for fifty-five guineas, which I gave to Hamburgh for the grey mare. Felt unwell to-day, and upon speaking to Robb, he said I had some fever, and advised me some medicine.

strong, together with the guns and waggons, entered San Felices Chico by the road from Banovares; the other column, which appeared of about the same strength, marched towards Castellejo. This was the arrival of the first of Junot's corps, come to join Ney's, which two corps, under Massena, Prince of Essling, now formed the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. The Spanish General, Carrera, who, since the enemy came before Ciudad Rodrigo, has had his corps (which consists of the light troops of Romana's army, and consisting of between 2000 and 3000 men) between the Puerto de Perales and our Division was now at Almadilla. By General Craufurd's advice, he had come to Espeja.

19th and 20th. Nothing particular occurred.

21st. General Carrera, encamped his Division on the road from Gallegos to Fuentes de Onoro, and near to

Wednesday 20th.

Was worse to-day, and continued all day in bed. The day very hot. The enemy continue to work hard in the trenches, and fired some rounds of howitzers into the place to-day. Some of our Officers saw them take three guns into the trenches.

Thursday 21st.

Were alarmed this morning about 10 o'clock, and the infantry brigade and hussars formed behind the hill in front of Gallegos, on the Ciudad Rodrigo road. This proved only a foraging party, at which we fired seven rounds from one of the six-pounders. As if alarmed by this, about two hours after the enemy advanced upon Marialva and Carpeo with four regiments of cavalry and two regiments of infantry. Our picquets retired behind the Azava. The enemy retired again about 4 o'clock in the evening. This advance of the enemy caused the brigade's being again marched out in front of Gallegos. Captain Mellish and Mr. Fitzclarence came here last night; the Captain is to stay with the General for some time.

the great road leading from Aquilla to Alameda. This evening the enemy advanced with 4 regiments of cavalry, and two battalions of infantry upon Marialva and Carpeo. Our picquets retired behind the Azava. The enemy withdrew from Marialva and Carpeo in the evening.

22nd. Our picquets entered Carpeo and Marialva early this morning. The enemy was observed to be carrying his parallel more to his left towards the suburbs of the town, and to be constructing many batteries in front of his parallel.

Friday 22nd.

Our picquets occupied Carpeo and Marialva early this morning. All was quiet to-day, and I remained nearly all day in bed.

Saturday 23rd.

Nothing particular occurred to-day. Being better, I rode in the evening to General Carrera's camp, on the Fuentes road.

Sunday 24th.

On the morning of the 23rd, Don Julian Sanches, with about 190 men, sallied from Ciudad Rodrigo, and cut their way through the French picquets; he now joined Carrera. To-day, Carrera and his Staff dined with the General. Colonel D'Urban came to Gallegos to-night, and Captain * * *, Aid-de-Camp to General Beresford.

23rd. At one o'clock this morning the famous Chief of the Guerrillas, Don Julian Sanches, made his escape from Ciudad Rodrigo, with 190 of his men. He galloped through the enemy's line.

24th. During to-day nothing particular occurred, till soon after dark, when a heavy fire commenced from the place.

25th. The firing from the place continued all the morning, and at day-break the enemy opened his batteries against the town. The heavy firing from the place must, of course, have been in consequence of the enemy bringing his guns into the batteries. The fire from both sides continued to be extremely heavy from three o'clock in the morning until mid-day: during this time two explosions took place in the enemy's batteries, one of which was so great as to entirely destroy one of their principal batteries, and of course killed many people in it. The

Monday 25th.

A heavy fire was heard all this night from Ciudad Rodrigo, and at day-break the enemy opened their batteries against the place. The fire from the place during the night must of course have been in consequence of the enemy's bringing their battering guns into the trenches. The enemy's fire from the trenches was extremely heavy, but returned by the garrison with great spirit. During the middle of the day the firing was not brisk, but again became heavy in the evening. Being now nearly quite recovered from my slight feverish attack, I rode out with the General to see the place from the hill above Marialva, and to examine the enemy's batteries, &c. I soon returned, but while the General remained there (till about half-past 7 o'clock,) the enemy advanced with a considerable body of cavalry, and took possession of Marialva and Carpeo, from which places our picquets retired behind the Azava. We lost two horses and no men. During the forenoon there were three explosions of powder. The first of these was the most considerable, and happened when we had possession of the hill above Marialva,

firing ceased in a great measure during the heat of the day, and recommenced to be heavy in the evening, when it was kept up about five hours, making the whole continuance of heavy fire, during this day, about fourteen hours.

At 8 o'clock this morning, the enemy advanced upon Carpeo and Marialva, with strong bodies of cavalry, and threw some cannon shots into Marialva from a field-piece, which they brought to the hill on the right bank of the Agueda, above the Ford of Marialva. Our picquets retired

and the people there saw plainly that it was in the enemy's principal battery. Where the other two happened could not so distinctly be seen. The French showed no disposition to leave Carpeo and Marialva, and continued there with a very considerable force of cavalry. A considerable body of the enemy, supposed near to 3000 cavalry and infantry, were seen about 7 o'clock to-night, marching, as if coming from San Felices, and proceeded on towards Ciudad Rodrigo. This we supposed to be more of Junot's corps.

Tuesday 26th.

At day-light went out with the General to the Azava. Lord Wellington and Sir Brent Spencer came to Gallegos this forenoon, and rode to the picquet at Molinos dos Flores, from which they looked at Ciudad Rodrigo. After this, they returned to Gallegos, and after waiting here a few minutes proceeded to Almeida, which was now made the head-quarters of the army. General Beresford's head-quarters were now Trancosa; his Aide-de-Camp, Captain Suel, and his Quarter-Master General, Colonel D'Urban, have been here for several days. There was nothing particular occurred to-day.

Wednesday 27th.

A man arrived here this morning with a note from

immediately behind the Azava, and occupied the strong ground on its left bank. The enemy now occupied permanently the villages of Marialva and Carpeo, and, in fact, the right bank of the Azava.

26th. Don Julian Sanches surprised a strong party of the enemy's cavalry this morning, consisting of 4 officers and 80 men, all of whom were either killed or made prisoners.

the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, he came from the town last night. The following is the principal information brought by him,—“The wall of the town has “been knocked down about six feet, the breadth about “eight yards. In all, from 800 to 1000 killed and “wounded in the town. About three houses have been “burnt. One small explosion took place on the ram- “part and destroyed 14 people. One mortar and two “guns of the town can no longer fire. Says they have “still 28 pieces, which they can fire on the enemy’s “works. The people continue determined. The ex- “plosions which took place on the 25th, were all in the “enemy’s trenches, and the first of them entirely de-

27th. The fire from the town was kept up with great vigour during the whole day, as well as that from the cannon batteries which, by the bye, was not thought to be with such heavy metal, since the explosion of yesterday, and the wall of the town, (which we could see distinctly with glasses from Molinos dos Flores) had not been materially injured. The town was two or three times on fire during the day, but it did not seem to extend.

Information from Barba de Puerco, and from the enemy’s deserters, agreed in proving that the troops which were seen entering the enemy’s camp, as before mentioned, were of the corps of Junot, the 8th of the Army of Spain. It appears certain, indeed, that the march of the corps was so regulated that its advance should arrive at the camp before Ciudad Rodrigo, at the same time that the battering train did.

27th. The fire from the enemy’s batteries was considered heavier to-day than it had been the previous ones, but was returned from the place with the greatest spirit. The information given by the man sent by the Governor (for which see other side of this page) was

“stroyed (at least totally silenced) their chief battery. “They constructed a new one behind it. The enemy “have 11 guns and 5 mortars bearing on the town; “they have 5 batteries. They have also a great many “grenades and howitzers. Says the town is much “in want of provisions, and place their entire hope on “our relieving the town.” This man returned in the evening with a letter from Lord Wellington to the Governor. I was at Molinos dos Flores with the General, received Lord Wellington’s letter, and returned to Gallegos, and sent the man off.

pretty correct except in his statement of the loss sustained in the place, its want of provisions, and the injury done to the wall, all of which are much exaggerated, and supposed to be done with the view of inducing Lord Wellington to afford immediate relief to the besieged. Ever since the enemy placed themselves before Ciudad Rodrigo, they have kept possession of the Pass of Baños by a detachment of infantry and cavalry. They have not occupied Placencia, but have sometimes entered it; they, however, constantly occupy Almaraz and Arzobispo, and at the former place they have constructed a *tête-de-pont*. They generally have troops in Talavera. The occupation of Almaraz and Arzobispo is necessary to them for the communication of their corps on the North and South of the Tagus. The French General Regnier, whose corps (the 2nd of the Army of Spain) has still kept upon the Guadiana, and which has made a great variety of movements between Trujilla, &c., and Badajos (and which has been kept in check by General Hill and the Marquis de Romana) appeared now to be collecting nearer to the Tagus, and showed an intention of passing it. General Hill’s force consisted of the 2nd division of the British army, a division of Portuguese infantry under General Hamilton

Thursday 28th.

Some French papers having fallen into our hands, the General sent them by a flag of truce to Marialva this forenoon. The Serjeant who took it met Junot near the village; he conversed with him for some time, and sent his compliments to Lord Wellington and General Craufurd by him.

Friday 29th.

A General Officer (supposed to be Ney) reconnoitred the bridge at Marialva this morning: this caused a false alarm; and I rode out to the bridge with Colonel D'Urban, and from thence to Molinos dos Flores. In the evening, we again rode to Molinos dos Flores, from which we saw very plainly a breach in the wall of Rodrigo.

and the 13th British dragoons, and a brigade of Portuguese cavalry under Fane; the Marquis de Romana's force was estimated at 18,000 men, exclusive of garrisons. Regnier's corps was not computed at more than 16,000 or 17,000 men.

28th. General Junot was spoken to this forenoon in Marialva, by a serjeant of the 1st hussars, who took some French papers there which had fallen into our hands.

There was a total suspension of firing for about four hours to-day, and people were seen walking perfectly exposed upon both the walls of the town and the enemy's trenches. This induced a belief that the place had surrendered: but the firing commenced with great vigour on both sides about 6 o'clock p.m., and continued the whole night.

29th. A French General Officer, supposed to be Marshal Ney, reconnoitred the bridge of Marialva at noon. The following is the copy of a letter received

Saturday 30th.

Set off at four o'clock this morning, and rode as usual to the hill above Gallegos. Finding all quiet, we proceeded to Alameda, which the General made now the head-quarters of the Division. We passed the infantry which had marched in the night from Gallegos, and now remained in the wood, a little in front of Alameda, where the whole of the infantry of the Division halted. General Carrera's Division was now halted behind Alameda, on the right bank of the Dos Casas. Soon after our arrival at Alameda, an alarm took us back to Gallegos, where I remained till between four and five o'clock in the evening. The enemy now placed a regiment of infantry behind the Azava.

from Don Andres Harrasti, the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, addressed to General Carrera, and dated Ciudad Rodrigo, 28th June, 4 o'clock p.m,

“ La Brecha esta ya formada, y en desposition de asaltarse: El Puebla todo se halha en ruina, e en cendido pr. varios partes. La guarnicion no pueda ya con la fatiga y empieza a caer de animo a la visto del abandona en que se la dexa. En estas circunstancias, O venir, luego, luego, luego a secorrer esta plaza, O no contar con ella si asi no de executa, porque imposible no se devan pretender.”

The fire from the trenches continued during the whole of to-day.

30th. The whole infantry of the Division which had been collected for some days past, in and near to Gallegos, retired before day-break this morning to the wood immediately in front of Alameda, and hutted themselves there. The cavalry and a picquet of three companies and a half of infantry remained at Gallegos.

Sunday 1st July.

It was reported to the General early this m that our picquet at Molinos dos Flores had b taken, except the Serjeant and Officer. This, ho proved totally a mistake. The corporal who out with the relief stayed for an hour and quarter which the Officer, without farther enquiry, ga off and reported that his picquet was taken. was only one relief, his vedettes having been inc late last night; their situation also had been cha and he did not show the corporal where they so that the corporal lost his way, and this caus being so long out.

We dined at Gallegos to-day, and went to M dos Flores in the afternoon. Nothing particul curred to-day. The place continues to fire very but letters from the Governor prove that he mus surrender. We returned in the evening to Alan

The enemy placed picquets of infantry on the this evening.

1st. The following letter was received to-day the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, directed to G Carrera, and dated yesterday.

“Repito por ultimo vez, que luego, luego, “mañana mismo en el dia, ó no contar que puede “mus tiempo el enfermo, porque el mal ha t “un encremento que ya no Alcanzan los remedio “preciso contar lo que raiz.”

To-day, however, although the fire from the en batteries continued during the day, the number of was *inconsiderable*, and must have been occasioned

Monday 2nd.

Set off about four o'clock a.m., with the General for Gallegos. Just as we got to the beacon in front of Gallegos we saw a regiment of the enemy's cavalry march to, and form with their right upon Marialva. Six or eight pieces of cannon came near to Marialva, and halted behind the village. A chaise also entered the village. The regiment halted and remained permanently at Marialva; the guns were withdrawn. By a deserter we found this is the 1st dragoons, and belongs to the 8th corps. We went on to Molinos dos Flores, from which we returned to Gallegos, and the General wrote to Lord Wellington. Got to Alameda about ten p.m. The General went again to Molinos dos Flores in the evening and took Cotton with him, who joined us two or three days ago as Assistant Adjutant-General to the Division, in place of Graham, who is gone to ——— sick. I passed the evening with the 43rd, and saw Fergusson, who joined to-day from England. The weather continues very fine and not oppressively hot.

by want of ammunition, or some accident in their batteries.

2nd. The enemy's fire continued to be trifling during to-day.

(See other side of this, and the next page.)

For what occurred in the Division, and the operations of the Siege, see the Journal above this note as far as page 218, contains the principal information received respecting Junot's corps, and the strength of the 6th corps.

A Serjeant who deserted from the enemy's Irish brigade, gave the following account of Junot's corps,

Tuesday 3rd.

Went early this morning to Gallegos. Found the enemy exactly in the same position as yesterday, and the place continuing to fire. We returned to Alameda about 10 o'clock a.m., and again went to the out-piquets after dinner. On our way we met a hussar, who brought a report that the enemy were advancing. Upon getting to the Bridge of Marialva, we found that this report was occasioned by a small party of the enemy having carried off one of the cars which were laid across the bridge, so as to obstruct the passage. Returned to Alameda rather late.

(the 8th corps of the Army of Spain). The whole corps formed the siege of Astorga. It consists of three divisions. Did not know the Commanders of the 1st and 2nd, but the 3rd, in which is the Irish brigade, is commanded by General Sallinack. The Irish brigade is commanded by General Torny. The Irish brigade has two battalions, and about 350 men in each, and the 70th regiment was brigaded with it. The whole strength of the corps, at this time effective, he conceives to be 25,000 souls. The regiments of which he recollected the numbers were 15th, 41st, 70th, 92nd, and 95th. The corps is composed of native French, except a regiment of Prussians. States that there is a 9th corps of the Army of Spain, of which he saw two regiments at Valladolid which belong to it, viz., a Swiss regiment and the 65th of the line. Junot's head-quarters were at San Felices Chico on the 1st. Immediately after the fall of Astorga, the whole corps moved by Salamanca, &c., towards Ciudad Rodrigo, and that 4 regiments of Swiss belonging to the 9th corps, were put into Astorga as a garrison. The following and further particulars of the regiments composing the 8th corps, according to the account of deserters.

Wednesday 4th.

Immediately after day-light this morning, about 100 of the enemy's cavalry crossed the Azava immediately below the bridge, and proceeded in full speed to the top of the hill in front of Gallegos, to where our beacons stood, driving before them a small picquet of the 16th dragoons, commanded by Mr. Thomson. Here he halted and skirmished with them for a few minutes. Columns of the enemy's cavalry having now passed the Azava, they advanced in three bodies, and a line of skirmishers in their front. One of the enemy's columns entered Gallegos, while two others turned it upon either

22nd regiment, 4 battalions, 600 per battalion.

2nd, 7th, and 15th dragoons.

4th, and 10th hussars.

17th chasseurs.

The deserters generally state, that there are 8 regiments of cavalry with Junot's corps. The 22nd forms a brigade commanded by Godarvo. A regimental provisor and a regiment of the line, formed the other brigade, and these two brigades a division.

Another account of the 8th corps, was given as follows by a deserter, who appeared to be very intelligent.

1st Division.

36th regiment, one battalion, 600 strong

46th ditto, ditto, ditto.

50th ditto, ditto, ditto.

75th ditto, ditto, ditto.

This is the 2nd brigade, and is commanded by General Lopem.

19th regiment, one battalion, 600 strong

25th ditto, ditto, ditto.

38th ditto, ditto, ditto.

34th ditto, ditto, ditto.

flank. Our cavalry and guns withdrew gradually, and kept up a constant skirmish with the enemy. Behind Gallegos there is a small stream, with a stone bridge over it; the enclosures here obliged the enemy's centre column to pass by the bridge. Our skirmishers had got over, and Captain Krauchenberg, of the 1st hussars, had about half his troop formed behind the bridge. The enemy advanced rapidly over the bridge in considerable numbers. At the moment they were passing, Krauchenberg charged them, and drove them back

This is the 1st brigade, and is commanded by General * * *

2nd Division.

1st brigade, 22nd regiment, 4 battalions, 2000 strong.

2nd brigade, 65th ditto, 4 ditto, 2000 ditto.

3rd Division.

1st brigade, 70th regiment, 4 battalions, 2000 strong.

2nd brigade, { Irish brigade, 2 ditto, 700 ditto.
Polish brigade, 1 ditto, 500 ditto.
Bavarian regiment, 600 ditto.

3800

But it is evident that many regiments which belong to Junot's corps, are altogether omitted in the above statements of it. Three men of the 1st Prussian regiment stated that their regiment belongs to the 2nd division of the 8th corps, of which division they gave the following account.

	Strength.
1st Prussian regiment,	1300
Irish brigade,	600
52nd regiment of line,	1800
58th ditto ditto,	1800
	<hr/> 5500

with loss. The General was on a height immediately above the bridge, and from it he made the artillery give them two or three shots, admirably directed by MacDonald, but the enemy did not regard them, and advanced steadily to the bridge with his centre column, while his two other columns turned our flanks, and obliged us to withdraw. The enemy advanced rapidly, and we withdrew, giving them now and then a shot from the artillery and continuing the skirmish. Upon getting near the camp we were much disappointed to find that the infantry, in place of being formed, were advancing upon the road in columns; the 43rd and 52nd were halted, and the 95th formed in line in front and extended a little. The Caçadores were formed in line on the left of the 95th. Our squadrons of cavalry formed in line with the infantry, also two pieces of artillery. A squadron of the enemy came very close to our left, and received the fire of the 3rd Caçadores, upon which the squadron retired. We remained for some time in this situation, but the General having determined not to make a stand here, the 43rd and 52nd

and state that the division is commanded by General Sallina. By the accounts most to be depended upon, it appeared that the cavalry of their corps consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd regiments of Provisional, which amounted in all to about 5000 men.

Ney's corps. The sixth.

This corps is certainly underrated in page 195, by averaging the battalions (of which there are 37) at 500 per battalion, as the whole corps, when before Ciudad Rodrigo, did certainly not amount to less than 22,000 infantry. The following statement of the 6th corps

and Caçadores were ordered to march off and form near to the bridge, on the strong ground, on the left bank of the Dos Casas river. The enemy now began to turn our right, and the whole were withdrawn through Alameda. The enemy received some destructive shots from our artillery, both when we were in front of Alameda and when they were advancing into the village. After the whole Division had crossed the Dos Casas, the enemy's skirmishers came close to the river, and shortly after withdrew to Alameda. The enemy

does not differ very materially from that made in page 33 and 34, but it does somewhat as to the distribution.

1st Division, (Marchand.)

6th légère, 2 battalions.	}	Manenule.
69th line, 3 ditto.		
39th line, 3 ditto.	}	Marconnier.
76th line, 3 ditto.		

2nd Division, (Mermet.)

25th légère, 2 battalions.	}	La Passet.
27th line, 3 ditto.		
50th line, 3 ditto.	}	Bertè.
59th line, 3 ditto.		

3rd Division, (Loison.)

26th line, 3 battalions.	}	Simon.
82nd line, 4 ditto.		
Légion du Midi, 1 ditto.		
32nd line, 2 battalions	}	Ferre.
66th line, 3 ditto.		
Hanovarian légion, 2 ditto.		

Also the 15th légère, 1 battalion, is in one of General Loison's brigades. The statement of the cavalry attached to this corps, as stated in page 197, is confirmed by the accounts of deserters, and that it appears that Lancé commands one of the cavalry divisions.

soon after retired from Alameda and only left a picquet in Gallegos, with their vedettes towards Alameda. The infantry of our Division marched to Fort Conception, and the cavalry kept the line of the Dos Casas. The troops which were in Fort Conception (the 9th Portuguese regiment and 4 companies of the 45th) marched upon our arrival to their Division; also 18 guns which were in the fort went to Almeida. A picquet only occupies the fort, and there is an engineer in it ready to blow it up upon the advance of the enemy. Our left is in Val de Mula, and our right extends to the right of the village. Our right is prolonged by General Carrera's Division, who marched here with us from his camp on the Dos Casas. We saw Don Julian to-day; he withdrew his party from Martin Hernando upon the advance of the enemy, and is now in front of Fuentes. The General made Val de Mula his head-quarters. Colonel Pakenham, Colonel Hardinge, and Major Warr were with us all day. We had five men wounded. We made one prisoner, but it was impossible to ascertain the enemy's loss. Krauchenberg killed one officer and wounded two when he charged at the bridge. The fire from Ciudad Rodrigo continued to-day.

The two above stated corps (6th and 8th) together with the 2nd, which is commanded by Marshal Regnier, were avowedly those intended for the conquest of Portugal, and were called the Army of Portugal, of which Massena was Commander. Of this last (the 2nd corps) we had but little information, but it was supposed to consist of from 15,000 to 17,000 men in cavalry and infantry. This corps passed the Tagus by a bridge of boats, on or about the 13th, 14th, and 15th of July,

Thursday 5th.

Went with Colonel Packenham, Colonel Hardinge, and Major Warr to Barquilla this forenoon, and returned by Villa de Ciervo. The inhabitants had fled from all these villages. The enemy occupy Gallegos with a picquet only, but had entered it at noon-day with a considerable body, probably to forage. A small party of the enemy was in Villa de Yequa last night, also in Serranilla and Martillan, but they did not remain in these villages. The appearances were sufficiently melancholy during our ride to-day. We met the unfortunate inhabitants flying from their homes, and the whole of the people of some of the villages encamped in the fields, having with them all their property which they could carry off upon their cars. After dinner, I again rode to Barquilla, but heard nothing of the enemy.

between Almaraz and Alcantara. It marched immediately after crossing the river, upon Coria and Marolejo, and its advanced parties extended themselves as far as Azevo (which is close to the Puerto de Perales) on the eighteenth. At the same time that Regnier crossed the Tagus, General Hill made a corresponding movement, by crossing the Tagus at Villa Vilha, and marching to Castello Branco.

General Hill afterwards occupied the passes of the Sierra de Perdigao, which is a chain of mountains running from Villa Vilha on the Tagus, in a North-West direction, to the River Zezere. In this chain there are only two passes, that of Alvito, which is about two miles broad, and that of Perdigao, which is more narrow and *difficult*. From the above statements of the situation and numbers of the enemy's 2nd, 6th, and 8th corps, it

Friday 6th.

General A. Campbell called upon the General this forenoon, he was accompanied by Sir * * * *
 * * * *. General Campbell commands a Brigade, consisting of _____ which is now at Castomheira, and is at present the nearest part of the army to our Division. I rode with the General and Krauchenberg after dinner to Barquilla, and from thence to a hill, from which we could see Gallegos, at which place it appears by the account of the natives, that the enemy has only a picquet. A small party of the enemy's cavalry entered Villa de Puerco and Cis-meiro this morning, and plundered them; they had also completely destroyed and plundered everything in

appears that very soon after the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo they could collect (by two or three days' marches) on the frontiers of Portugal, an army of (supposing the 2nd corps, infantry 15,000, cavalry 2000; the 6th corps, infantry 22,000, cavalry 4500; the 8th corps, infantry 20,000, cavalry 5000), 57,000 infantry, and 11,500 cavalry: but it is to be considered, that out of this force Ciudad Rodrigo must be garrisoned, and also Alameda, if they succeed in reducing that fortress. The enemy's force did not at all diminish during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. The deserters agreed universally in stating, that detachments were joining the regiments continually; that these detachments were very considerable, and came from France. Besides these three corps, the enemy had some troops under Kellermann, in and about Leon, of which province and the Asturias, Kellermann appears to have the command; but it appears that his force had quite enough to do to keep the two provinces in subjection, without attempting any offensive operations either in Galicia or the North of Portugal. There was certain

Alameda, when they entered it on the 4th. Three squadrons of the 14th dragoons are now in Aldea de Bispo, with a picquet at Castellejo. The rest of our cavalry are in the wood to the right, and in front of the infantry camp with their picquets on the Dos Casas. Our patrols go into Villa de Puerco, and near to Gallegos. As our force of cavalry amounts to upwards of 800 men mounted, we are now in a state to take more liberties on the flat open country in our front. The weather continues hot and fine. To-day we had some thunder and lightening in the afternoon and a shower. Warr and Hardinge returned this evening. The fire continues at the place.

information of three battalions of the Imperial Guard having arrived at Burgos some time ago, but they never joined Massena. The enemy's 5th corps under Marshal Mortier continued in the Sierra Morena; and it appeared quite doubtful whether or not this corps would act in conjunction with Massena in his future operations against Portugal. Such was the disposition of the enemy's force on the frontiers of Portugal at the middle of July. For what passed relative to the Division during the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and principally also during the 5th and 6th, see other side.

5th. The firing at, and from the place, continued constant but inconsiderable, as before. It increased, during the night.

6th. The desertion from the enemy was now pretty considerable; there were 8 yesterday, and 12 to-day.

Nothing particular occurred on the 7th, 8th, or 9th, but on the morning of the 10th there was a most material change observed in the enemy's fire (which is more particularly described on the other side). This tremendous fire from

Saturday 7th.

Nothing particular occurred to-day. We rode to the front in the evening.

Sunday 8th.

I went about ten o'clock this morning to the cavalry camp, and arranged a march of the cavalry upon Villa de Puerco, to endeavour to cut off some of the enemy's parties which had plundered it this morning. We marched at one o'clock by Alameda, and through the wood upon Villa de Puerco, but the enemy had left it and Cismeiro. We found their vedettes between Gallegos and Alameda. I returned by Villa de Yequa and Villa de Ciervo, and turned in Gruben's squadron, which had gone to watch the fords there.

Monday 9th.

Sent No. 5 to H. Unwell during the forenoon and remained in my room. Colonel Talbot and Major Butler, 14th dragoons, dined with us to-day. Rode to the Spanish camp after dinner. The day oppressively hot.

the enemy's batteries continued till the evening, when at 5 o'clock the gallant Don Andres Harrasti was obliged to hoist the white flag, and surrender at discretion. An immense practicable breach was formed in both the outer and principal wall of the town; all the guns bearing on the enemy's batteries were dismounted; the town almost totally destroyed, and the enemy almost at the bottom by the glacis, and on the point of entering the breach by assault, when the gallant Governor delivered up his fortress. When the vast advantage is considered, which the enemy had in possessing the height of San Francisco (which commands the town, and from which nearly the bottom of the wall is seen, within 500 yards); the dis-

Tuesday 10th.

The firing has been so heavy from day-light this morning till between nine and ten o'clock a.m., that there must be some change in the enemy's batteries; they must either have got up ammunition, which they may have been scarce of, or got up more guns. Since the 1st instant until this morning the firing has been very slack on both sides. This morning the enemy entered and robbed the villages of Barquilla and Villa de Ciervo.

Wednesday 11th.

We started at twelve o'clock at night (of the 10th) to carry into effect the following scheme. The enemy have for two or three mornings past made a practice of coming into, and plundering the villages of Villa de Puerco and Barquilla. We wished to cut off these parties, and, for that purpose, six squadrons marched by Alameda, and were placed in the wood near to

advantages of the wall of the town in being very perpendicular, and scarcely having any flanks; that there was not a single bomb proof in the town, that there was a great deficiency of good artillery men; and above all, when the immense force is considered with which the enemy attacked the place, and that he was prepared with a great train of artillery, and every thing necessary for carrying on the siege with the utmost vigour; it must be allowed to Don Andres Harrasti and his garrison, the honour of having made a most noble and gallant defence. By those who examined the place previous to its investment, it was supposed scarcely possible that it could hold out for more than three or four days after the whole of the enemy's batteries should open upon it. Indeed this opinion was much more correct than is generally known.

Villa de Puerco. One squadron was concealed in the house between Villa de Puerco and Barquilla, and one squadron and a wing of the 95th regiment were placed behind the crosses near to Barquilla; also the 3rd battalion of Caçadores was placed behind the bridge of San Pedro and the ford of the Dos Cacas, below the bridge, on the road from Alameda to Fort de Conception. Having waited concealed in this situation till an hour after day-light, we observed parties of the enemy enter Villa de Puerco and Barquilla, according to our expectation. The cavalry then marched off from their right, and, proceeding on to the Villa de Puerco road, went on at a trot, but were detained considerably by a wall which we had to get over, in endeavouring to get in rear of the village. Having got the leading divisions over, we pushed on at a gallop, and now found that the enemy were not in the village; proceeding towards Cismeiro we saw upon the hill some of the enemy's cavalry; two or three hussars, and Campbell and myself galloped on. Upon my arrival nearly at the summit I came within about seventy yards of a body of infantry, which were

Whoever reads the above journal of the siege with attention, will not fail to observe an extraordinary and unaccounted for falling-off in the enemy's fire, from the 1st till the 9th, both days inclusive. On the 10th, at day-break, the enemy's fire was infinitely more furious than it was at any time from the 1st to the 9th, and even much more so than during the 25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th, for even on the 28th there was a considerable suspension of firing, and during the 29th and 30th it did not at all gain upon the fire from the town. If these

formed. Returning immediately to the head of the column, the two leading squadrons formed line and charged the infantry, who, by this time, were formed in square. This infantry of the enemy's, which consisted of only 200 men, remained unbroken, and got off without loss. Our loss was in all 32 killed and wounded, and 9 horses.

The French Officers informed us that Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered at five o'clock yesterday evening, and was entered by the French at six. We were pretty well convinced before that the place had surrendered, from our not hearing any firing; this had nearly induced the General to give up his project and to have returned from Alameda. After the affair at Villa de Puerco we withdrew the cavalry by Barquilla

things are taken into consideration, together with the explosions in the enemy's batteries, and the Governor's letters of the 29th and 30th June, they will be found very strong proofs that the Governor could not have held out for more than six or seven days, against such a fire as the enemy opened from his batteries, and kept up until the explosions in his batteries on the 25th.

The following is an abstract statement of the principal operations of the enemy against Ciudad Rodrigo :

Encamped before the place with between 3000 or 4000 men, which were soon reinforced by about 600 more.....	April 25th.
Massena arrived at Salamanca,.....	May 15th.
His bridge at La Carridad completed over the Agueda,	June 2nd.
Ditto at Carboneras,	„ 7th.
Place completely invested,	„ 10th.
First parallel commenced,	„ 15th.

and Castellejo. The conduct of the enemy's infantry, which we endeavoured to break, was cool and determined. General Carrera and his division left us to-day; his instructions from the Marquis de Romana were, to march to Alcantara upon the surrender of the place. I went out with * * * to Carrera's camp to see him before he went, after which we took a round towards Almeida. The enemy's attention being now of course entirely fixed upon the siege of Almeida, our utmost vigilance becomes extremely necessary, as we have no doubt of his soon forcing us over the Coa.

Thursday 12th.

Went to the cavalry camp at day-break in the morning, about eight o'clock a.m., received a report from the Spanish Colonel Mera, (who commanded Carrera's cavalry,) saying he had been attacked. The

Batteries opened against the place, ... June 25th.

And the place surrounded on the

evening of the 10th July, 1810,

The enemy were before it 77 days,

Completely invested it 30 days,

Trenches opened against it 25 days,

And battered it 16 days.

One circumstance of the siege of the place is omitted in the above account, viz., that of its having been summoned to surrender by the General of division, Mermet, on the 12th of May. The Governor, the garrison, and the inhabitants were offered the most advantageous terms; but they were rejected with disdain.

Ciudad Rodrigo was the last hope of the Spaniards in this part of the country. Their entreaties were most constant and sincere, that the English should relieve their city, and they could not conceive what took us there, if

General rode towards Fuentes, and found it was nothing. I went by Villa Formosa to Fuentes, and found Mera gone and all quiet. I dined with McLeod, and rode after dinner to Junca with Johnson. A letter from Lord Wellington to the General this morning expressed his lordship's wish that the infantry of the Division should be placed nearer to Almeida.

Friday 13th.

Nothing occurred worth noticing.

Saturday 14th, Sunday 15th.

Were turned out this morning, in consequence of about 7 squadrons of the enemy's cavalry having formed between Fuentes and Espeja, and having got near to Fuentes. Major Napier and Captain Cotton took a flag of truce into Gallegos this forenoon. Loison received them. He is quartered there, and they

we were to remain tame spectators of its fall. The Spaniards in and near to it, who thought that every thing depended on its fate, were much enraged at our remaining inactive, and although their hatred to the French was most rooted, yet they gave up all idea of resistance upon the fall of the place. The French of course took advantage of the ideas of the Spaniards about our not relieving the town, and pretended that Lord Wellington had given the Governor false assurance of his support. However people's opinions may differ respecting the policy of his lordship's having allowed the enemy to carry on their operations against Ciudad Rodrigo, without molestation, it is a positive falsehood, that any direct and unconditional promise was made to the Governor of his being relieved by the English army. Upon the approach of Ney's corps to Ciudad Rodrigo, Lord Wellington moved his head-quarters to Viseu: also the British and Portuguese divisions which were at

think about two regiments. There are some small camps in front of the village. Loison said that there was scarcely a house standing in Ciudad Rodrigo. He desired Cotton to tell Lord Wellington that he would bet his lordship 500 louis that he would not relieve Almeida, and that the Spaniards were very indignant with us for not relieving Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy's vedettes were only about a mile on this side Gallegos.

Monday 16th.

The infantry of the Division and guns moved to Junca this morning. The cavalry as before.

Tuesday 17th, Wednesday 18th.

Nothing particular. Rode into Almeida. Major Napier dined with Rowan and me.

Viseu, &c., were closed up upon Celerico, and the army was more concentrated than before. It is also certain, that the Quarter-Master General made arrangements at that time for the advance of the army upon Ciudad Rodrigo. But the supposition of the Commander-in-Chief having made a positive promise that he would relieve the place is quite absurd, as of course, however much he might be inclined to do so, his determination on the subject must have depended upon the force, &c. with which the enemy undertook the operation, and the disposition of the enemy's other corps. However, it is pretty clear, from the above statement, that his lordship would have advanced with the army to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, had he thought the enemy's force warranted his so doing.

The following is an abstract of a letter from Lord Wellington to General Craufurd, dated Almeida, 27th June, and in answer to a demand made by the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo (on the night of the 26th) of a cate-

Thursday 19th.

Received a report from the Officer on picquet at Fuentes, at 8 o'clock a.m., saying that columns of the enemy were advancing. The General went off immediately towards Fuentes, and I went and turned out the infantry at Junca. This, however, proved to be only a strong patrol of the enemy, which drove our picquet back from Fuentes, but were driven back in their turn, and we took a prisoner. The General now established the head-quarters of the division at San Pedro.

Friday 20th.

I went this morning to Aldeo Bispo to receive information from two spies whom I had sent on the 18th, the one to San Felices, and the other to Ciudad Rodrigo. By them it appears that the enemy have 4000 men in San Felices de Gallegos, and 3000 men in a camp about a league from it; in Castellejo and Silices Chico they have 1500 men; they also occupy Frexeneda; but the body of the enemy's army is encamped between Palacios, Carpeo, &c., and between that line and Gallegos. The loss in the town, including both garrison and inhabitants, during the siege, was 500 killed and wounded. The garrison (5300 men,) the Governor, and the Junta, were all marched off pri-

gorical answer from his lordship, of whether he intended to relieve the place or not.

After referring the Governor to his lordship's former letter, (which only promised relief if the circumstances should allow of it), he continues, "The Governor must be aware of the force which the enemy has collected for this enterprise; and how difficult it is for me to provide for his relief as long as the enemy will keep *that force collected.*"

soners to Salamanca. They made the members of the Junta walk; all priests and monks of the town are confined, also the writers of the *Diario*.

Saturday 21st.

About 5 o'clock this morning some firing was heard, and soon after a report was received by the General that the picquet at Castellejo was engaged with the enemy. Before we got on horseback we heard an explosion at the fort; the General rode off immediately to Valde Mula, and while going there the whole of the mines of the Fort Conception went off. I believe nine in all. These explosions appeared to be quite successful. On our arrival at Val de Mula we found the 14th formed behind the villages, and the enemy's skirmishers on the right and left of Fort Conception. On our left of the fort we saw about a regiment of the enemy's cavalry and a battalion of infantry. On our right of the fort the enemy advanced with two regiments of cavalry and two battalions of infantry. They turned our left, and advanced into Val de Mula at the same time. The 14th retired (skirmishing with the enemy) to the stream between Val de Mula and Alameda, and about a mile and half from the former place. The guns were brought up in rear of this stream, and the 14th (who were now reinforced by a squadron of the 16th and one of the hussars) formed in front of the guns. Our skirmishers maintained themselves a long time among some rocks in front of the stream till the enemy came on with infantry. The enemy did not pass the stream, and about 10 o'clock they retired to Val de Mula. Upon the first alarm, the infantry marched into their position close to Almeida. While the cavalry were skirmishing, the 95th

were ordered up, but they only got about half-way when the enemy retired, and were halted on the road, and hutted where they halted; the rest of the infantry hutted in the position, the left of which is within reach of the guns of the place, and the right in some enclosures. I went into Almeida to forward a letter to Lord Wellington, and wrote to Generals Picton and A. Campbell, to mention what had passed. The General went to Junca to dinner, and we returned in the evening, (after riding round the picquets from Nave de Aver to Malpartida,) and took a quarter in the suburbs of Almeida.

Sunday 22nd.

We went out at day-break to our most advanced picquets on the Val de Mula road, &c., and saw one or two of the enemy's vedettes, but everything quite quiet. We did not return till 8 o'clock. Our patrols, which went this forenoon to Val de Mula, found none of the enemy there, but saw infantry and cavalry picquets in front of the fort.

Monday 23rd.

Everything remained quiet at the out-posts this morning. I went to the camp in the evening, and saw Colonel Hull, Captain H * * *, and Oglander, who arrived with the regiment this morning.

Tuesday 24th.

[NOTE.—On this day, the battle of Almeida was fought. What appears in the Journal under this date, is omitted; because, as I was wounded in the action, it must partly have been stated on hearsay.]

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